| Forward Zone—2/2nd London Regiment. | |
| Main Keep Locality: | Headquarters and 1 company. |
| Jappy Locality: | 1 company with a standing patrol at Beautor. |
| Brickstack Locality: | 1 company. |
| Travécy Locality: | 1 company. |
| Battle Zone—2/4th London Regiment. | |
| Headquarters on the Crozat Canal, Fargniers. | |
| Fargniers South Locality: A Company (Lieut. H. J. M. Williams). | |
| Fargniers North Locality: B Company less 2 platoons (Capt. S. G. Askham). | |
| Farm Rouge Locality: | D Company (Capt. C. A. Clarke). |
| Triangle Locality: | C Company (Lieut. G. E. Lester). |
The two remaining platoons of B Company were detached as follows:
1 platoon (2/Lieut. D. F. Crawford) at the junction of the St Quentin and Crozat Canals.
1 platoon (Lieut. W. F. Brown) at Condren, where there was also a squadron of the Oxfordshire Hussars.
Quessy Locality: 1 company 1/4th Suffolks (Pioneers).
Brigade Headquarters were at Quessy Château near Crozat Canal, and the 3rd Londons were in Divisional reserve at Viry Noureuil.
It will be seen that the bulk of the defensive force was concentrated—if such a word may be applied to so attenuated a defence—on the right flank, where the line of the Oise marshes, by now practically no obstacle owing to the unusually dry spring, laid open the road to Chauny and Noyon. It was quite evident that should the Germans succeed in breaking through on the St Firmin-Vendeuil front they would almost certainly endeavour to expand the breach behind the British lines and make a south-westerly dash towards Noyon and Compiègne in order to complete the isolation of the British armies from the French. The Oise flank therefore was vitally important.
At 4.20 a.m. on the 21st March the enemy barrage opened with terrific intensity. The messages to man battle positions were already written in Brigade Headquarters, but delay was caused in conveying them to the various units concerned, for during the first few minutes of the bombardment Brigade Signal Headquarters were knocked out by a direct hit, so that this and subsequent messages had to be sent by runner. Lieut.-Col. Dann, in fact, did not receive any orders to move until long after he had, on his own initiative, despatched his companies to their posts.
It is rather difficult to understand why the companies were kept in billets such as cellars under the ruins of Fargniers and Quessy until the last moment, especially as warning of the attack had been received the previous afternoon. Most platoons had several hundred yards, and some as much as a mile and a half, to traverse to their trenches; and under the intense and accurate barrage many casualties were sustained during this forward move. By about 7.30 a.m., however, the companies were all reported in position.