It was confidently anticipated that the enemy would endeavour once more to break the Amiens defences in this area. The village of Villers-Bretonneux stands on a somewhat prominent hill seven miles east of Amiens, and its possession would have enabled the Germans to play havoc by their artillery with the city itself and our important road and railway communications which radiate from it. Its value to the Germans rendered it a matter of the highest importance to us to defend it stubbornly. In anticipation of an attack, therefore, the battle surplus was sent out of the trenches on the 10th and the work of strengthening the defences pressed on with vigour.
Further reinforcements were received from the Base, numbering in all 127 other ranks. These were mostly young lads under nineteen years of age whose despatch overseas had been rendered necessary by the impossibility of otherwise replacing the deficiencies in the ranks. They were all extremely keen and had received a good groundwork of training at home. But they reached the Battalion at a time when it had just been shaken by one battle and was about to become involved in another, and it can only be deplored that circumstances prevented any opportunity for assimilating them into the Battalion and for giving them some preliminary experience of warfare under quieter conditions. The whole Battalion was indeed rather conglomerate, for of a total of some 650 rifles about 450 were strange to the Battalion and called upon to go into action under a command unknown to them: this important point should be borne in mind in considering the battle which followed.
On the evening of the 18th April the 58th Division took over from the 5th Australian Brigade the front line east of Cachy, the 173rd Brigade occupying the whole sector. This sector extended from the immediate left of Hangard, through the Bois de Hangard to the Villers-Bretonneux-Demuin Road, the 3rd Londons on the right, the 2/2nd in the centre and the 2/4th on the left. The 2/4th Battalion's subsector, in which it relieved the 19th Australian Battalion, about 1500 yards frontage, was held with three companies (Nos. 1, 2 and 4) in the front line and one (No. 3) in support, Headquarters occupying a quarry east of Cachy. The 175th Brigade took over the Blue line while the 174th was in reserve in Cagny.
The Battalion was now straining every nerve to complete the defences. Much work was still to be done. The front line had originally existed as a line of isolated posts, and these were not yet completely connected up nor were they adequately wired. A great deal was to be done in providing efficient fire positions throughout the line in order that if lateral movement should become necessary the defence of the position might not be impaired.
Orders were received that the front line would be held till the last. The support company would be employed for counter-attack purposes in the event of the enemy gaining a footing in our positions; and the success of the defence would clearly depend on the rapidity and skill with which this local reserve was used. The right flank of the Brigade front was further strengthened by the 10th Londons, who were temporarily attached in Brigade reserve.
On the 21st the Battalion suffered a severe loss in the adjutant, Capt. F. W. Walker, D.S.O., who was wounded, his duties being taken by Lieut. S. A. Seys, the assistant adjutant. On the 23rd Capt. Hetley was attached to the 131st French Divisional Headquarters as liaison officer, and his company was handed over temporarily to Capt. W. C. Morton.
The same day information was obtained from Alsatian deserters that the enemy attack would take place at dawn the following morning.
We may restate the distribution of companies in the trenches as follows:
In Front— No. 2 (Askham) on the right. No. 1 (Morton) in the centre. No. 4 (Grimsdell) on the left. In Support—No. 3 (Hettler).
By an extraordinary chance the enemy was yet once more favoured by the weather, for, when his barrage dropped on our lines at 4 a.m. on the 24th April with bitter intensity and great accuracy, the day was dawning on a dense mist which impeded observation beyond a radius of about 50 yards. The bombardment was severe, and in the area of forward battery positions included gas shell.