The Calvinistic Doctrine of Predestination Examined and Refuted

by F. Hodgson

Let us take another view of this point. Let the advocates of this doctrine succeed in proving that man is a free agent, in the proper sense of the term, and capable of sinning, notwithstanding all his actions are decreed and brought to pass by God, and we have before us this remarkable result: Every individual of the human race, while in a state of probation, without a knowledge of God’s predetermination respecting him, and without any controlling influence brought to bear upon him, has, in every instance, willed and acted in accordance with the will of God. The result is universal voluntary holiness. Here, then, is a dilemma. Either there is no possibility of sin or of holiness, or, if there be a possibility of sin or of holiness, there is, in fact, no sin—there is, in fact, universal holiness.

4. If it be asserted that sin exists, notwithstanding this perfect coincidence between the will of God and the conduct of his creatures, it will follow, most conclusively, that God is the author of sin. He has decreed and brings to pass all the sensations, perceptions, emotions, inclinations, volitions, and overt actions, of the whole human race. Various attempts have been made to avoid this result, but they are all futile. The Confession of Faith says: “God, from all eternity, did, by the most wise and holy counsel of his own will, freely and unchangeably ordain whatsoever comes to pass; yet so as thereby neither is God the author of sin.” We pay all respect to this as a disclaimer. Our Presbyterian brethren do not intend to charge God with being the author of sin. But we are compelled to regard these propositions as directly contradictory to each other. Is not a being the author of that which he originally designs and decrees, and subsequently brings into existence? and is it not maintained that he decreed from all eternity, and brings to pass whatever occurs? Either sin has not come to pass, or God is the author of it. It is useless to say that God has brought to pass the act, but not the sinfulness. The sinfulness has come to pass. It is useless to say that sin is man’s, and not God’s act. Man does nothing but what God has decreed, and, in some infallible way leads him to do. “God’s power,” says Dr. Chalmers, “gives birth to every purpose; it gives impulse to every desire, gives shape and color to every conception.” Says Fisher, in his Catechism: “God not only efficaciously concurs in producing the action as to the matter of it, but likewise predetermines the creature to such or such an action, and not to another, shutting up all other ways of acting, and leaving only that open which he had determined to be done.” We might, with vastly more plausibility, deny that Paul was the author of his Epistles, because he employed an amanuensis, or, for the same reason, deny that Milton was the author of Paradise Lost. It is useless here to speculate upon the reasons which induced God to ordain and bring sin to pass. We are now concerned with the fact merely, and we hence conclude that he is the author of sin and the only being properly answerable for it.

5. If the advocates of this doctrine should still insist that it does not make God the author of sin; that man is a free agent, and properly responsible for his actions, notwithstanding they are foreordained; I press them with this plain consequence—God is, to say the least, a participant in the sinning. And he is not merely a coadjutor, but the principal—the principal in every instance of sinning. He originates the first conception of the sinning act. He forms the plan. He arranges all the circumstances. He, by his providence, applies the influence by which the result is effectuated. Here, then, is a dilemma from which there is no escape. Either God is, strictly and properly, the author of sin, or he is a participant therein, and not merely accessory, but the principal, the plotter, the prime mover, the ringleader thereof.

6. Another inevitable consequence of this doctrine is that, admitting the existence of sin, God prefers sin to holiness in every instance in which sin takes place. This consequence is too plain to require much illustration. If God freely ordained whatsoever comes to pass; if he was not under a fatal necessity of ordaining just as he did; if he had it in his power to ordain otherwise, he could have ordained holiness in the place of sin. The fact that he was free and unnecessitated in his decrees, and could ordain the one or the other, according to his good pleasure, is proof substantial that he prefers sin to holiness in every instance in which sin occurs. Had he preferred holiness, he could have decreed it, and it would have come to pass. This consequence has been admitted, and is, by many Calvinists at this day, maintained as a doctrine. In fact, it has been a matter of dispute amongst Calvinists—Dr. Taylor, of Connecticut, taking one side, and Dr. Tyler, of Connecticut, taking the other. But what a shocking conception! (See Christian Spectator, vol. iv. p. 465.)

7. Nor can we resist the further conclusion, from these premises, that sin is not a real evil, but, on the contrary, a good, and that in every instance in which it is preferred to holiness, it is worthy of such preference. This reasoning proceeds upon the assumption that God is a being of infinite goodness and wisdom, and, therefore, always prefers good to evil, being, of course, always able to distinguish the one from the other.

This inference also has been admitted by many of the advocates of Calvinistic predestination. They distinctly affirm that sin is the necessary means of the greatest good, and, as such, so far. as it exists, is preferable on the whole to holiness in its stead—that its existence is, on the whole, for the best. I give as authority for this affirmation, a publication of the Presbyterian Board, entitled Old and New Theology. On the first page we find this explicit statement: “It has been a common sentiment among New England divines, since the time of Edwards, that sin is the necessary means of the greatest good, and as such, so far as it exists, is preferable, on the whole, to holiness in its stead.”

I do not charge Dr. Musgrave with holding this inference as a doctrine, and yet it is very clearly asserted in an argument designed to prove the Calvinistic doctrine of foreordination. “There must,” says he, “have been a time when no creature existed, as God alone is from everlasting. Before creation, and from all eternity, all things that are possible, as well as all things that actually have or will come to pass in time, must have been perfectly known to God. He must, therefore, have known what beings and events would, on the whole, be most for his own glory, and the greatest good of the universe; and therefore, as an infinitely wise, benevolent, and Almighty Being, he could not but have chosen or determined, that such beings and events, and such only, should come to pass in time.” “The conclusion is, therefore, to our minds, irresistible, that if God be infinitely wise, benevolent, and powerful, and perfectly foreknew what beings and events would, on the whole, be best, he must have chosen and ordained that they should exist, or be permitted to occur; and that, consequently, everything that does actually come to pass in time, has been eternally and unchangeably foreordained.”

Here it is argued that God, as an infinitely wise, benevolent, and powerful being, must have known and preferred, and decreed, that just such beings should exist and events occur, as would, on the whole, be most for his own glory, and the greatest good of the universe, and such only; and that, consequently, he has eternally, and unchangeably foreordained everything that does actually come to pass in time. Now it is plain that all the events which have come to pass in time must answer this description—must be for the best, for his highest glory—or the argument falls to the ground.

The Rev. Jas. McChain, one of the editors of the Calvinistic Magazine, in a discourse published in that periodical, December, 1847, thus undertakes to prove that God “has foreordained whatsoever comes to pass:” “Jehovah is infinitely wise; does he not, therefore, know what it is best should take place? He is infinitely benevolent; will he not choose, then, that shall take place which he knows is for the best? He is infinitely powerful; can he not, therefore, cause to take place what he chooses shall take place? The Most High is infinitely wise, and knows what it is best should come to pass—benevolent, and chooses to bring to pass what is best —powerful, and does bring to pass what he chooses as best.” “Surely his infinite wisdom and goodness will choose and determine whatsoever it is best should take place, and his almighty power will perfectly carry out his plan.”

It is not my intention, at this time, to point out the fallacy of these arguments. I quote them to show that the consequence which I have deduced from the doctrine that God has decreed whatsoever comes to pass—that sin is not an evil, but a good, and worthy of being preferred to holiness in every instance in which it occurs—is actually recognized as a truth, and used as a premise in proof of the Calvinistic doctrine of the decrees.