28. It leads to rank infidelity. It is to my mind more reasonable to believe that God has made no written revelation of his will, than that he has revealed such a doctrine as this. Let the opinion become prevalent that it is a doctrine of the Bible, and, as the consequence, the Bible will be rejected by thousands, yea, hundreds of thousands. It is impossible for the ablest disputant to maintain a respectable argument against infidelity while standing upon this ground. He must assume the opposite ground, as the basis of his argument, or he will fail signally. The infidel objects to the Bible that it represents God as sanctioning crime, and making favorites of its perpetrators, and hence concludes that it cannot be true.
The usual reply is that, so far from having sanctioned vice and its perpetrators, he has solemnly prohibited it; that he holds the perpetrator guilty, condemns him to severe punishment, and will remit that punishment only in view of repentance, and reformation, and an atonement which fully vindicates the Divine government, and most impressively manifests its abhorrence of the course pursued by the transgressor. But what says this doctrine? That God has freely, and from all eternity willed, decreed, foreordained, whatsoever comes to pass. The infidel objects that the Bible contains contradictions, and hence cannot be the word of God. The usual answer admits that God cannot contradict himself, but denies that the Bible is chargeable with self-contradiction. Whereas, this doctrine declares that God has decreed and brought to pass all the contradictions that were ever uttered. Can it be that God is the author of a book which represents him as ordaining and bringing to pass all the acts of crime and folly that were ever committed, including all the lies that were ever uttered, as having two hostile wills in relation to the same event, as decreeing that his creatures should pursue a certain course, and yet commanding them to pursue a contrary course, and then, damning them, thousands upon thousands, for doing what he decreed they should do? It is impossible for the infidel to frame a stronger argument than this doctrine supplies him with.
I have shown, unanswerably, I think, that this doctrine leads, by obvious deduction, to the doctrine that God prefers sin to holiness in every instance in which sin takes place, and that sin is the necessary means of the greatest good. I will now quote an eminent Calvinistic minister upon the tendencies of this doctrine. He is commenting upon what he calls “the third solution” of the question, “For what reason has God permitted sin to enter the universe?” which he states to be that “God chose that sin should enter the universe as the necessary means of the greatest possible good. Wherever it exists, therefore, it is, in the whole, better than holiness would be in its place”—the very doctrine which we are told by high Calvinistic authority, has been a “common sentiment among New England divines since the days of Edwards.” He says:—
“The third solution has been extensively adopted by philosophers, especially on the continent of Europe; and its ultimate reaction on the public mind had no small share, we believe, in creating that universal skepticism which at last broke forth upon Europe, in all the horrors of the French Revolution. While the profoundest minds were speculating themselves into the belief that sin was the necessary means of the greatest good, better on the whole, in each instance, than holiness would have been in its place—common men were pressing the inquiry, ‘Why, then, ought it to be punished?’ Voltaire laid hold of this state of things, and assuming the principle in question to be true, carried round its application to the breast of millions. In his Candide, one of the most amusing tales that was ever written, he introduces a young man of strong passions and weak understanding, who had been taught this doctrine by a metaphysical tutor. They go out into the world, to ‘promote the greatest good’ by the indulgence of their passions; certain that, on the whole, each sin is better than holiness would have been in its place. But when Candide begins to suffer the natural consequences of his vices, he feels it to be but a poor consolation, that others are now reaping the benefit of his sin. Is it surprising that such a work induced thousands to disbelieve in the holy providence of God, and prepared multitudes to ‘do evil that good might come?’ ” (Christian Spectator, vol. i. pp. 378, 9.)
It would be easier, and more reasonable, to believe in a plurality of gods, than that one God should be capable of such conflicting counsels. And this would bring us to the verge of Atheism.
29. This doctrine covers with the wing of its sanction all the errors that were ever promulgated or conceived. I do not say that they all grow out of it, but that it justifies them. Why should I oppose Romanism, or Universalism, or Socinianism, or Puseyism, or Infidelity, when they are all decreed by Jehovah? Christendom presents the strange spectacle of men prying into systems, bringing to the light, condemning, and holding up to public odium their errors of theory and practice, and, yet, holding as a fundamental article of their own creed that God from all eternity freely decreed, whatsoever comes to pass. Let them first reject and refute the error which vindicates all errors. What right has a Calvinist to find fault with anything?
30. Again: It clearly follows, from this theory, that any attempt to prevent the commission of sin in our neighbors, is not only in opposition to the primary—the original will, the eternal purposes of God, but is also in opposition to the highest good of the universe; and that we should, as reasonable beings, rejoice in every instance of sin—of lying, robbery, uncleanness, and murder—as in every instance of holiness.
31. I do not identify this doctrine with pagan fatalism, but I hold that it is akin thereto, and that it tends to the same practical results. It is, in my opinion, worse than pagan fatalism. That doctrine represents all events and actions as strictly necessary, but it binds the gods as well as men. All bow to that mysterious power called fate. Thus it relieves the gods of all blame. But Calvinism asserts the freedom of Jehovah, and then imputes to him the foreordination of whatever occurs in the whole universe, and thus, by plain logical consequence, fastens upon him all the just blame of whatever is exceptionable. Calvinism is not pagan fatalism. It is Christian fatalism. It is fatalism baptized.