But, if the Calvinistic doctrine be that his decrees merely “extend to all events” (a very different thing from his decreeing all events), and that while he “decrees” and “effects” some he merely “permits” or “suffers” other events, what must we understand to be the Arminian doctrine, against which they are called to contend so earnestly? Are they prepared to acknowledge that they have abandoned Calvinism and run into Arminianism? Do they mean to say that there is no difference between these systems on the point in question? Not at all. How then do they preserve the antagonism of the two creeds? What is the Arminianism against which they are arrayed? Dr. Musgrave thus attempts the solution of this question.
“Now, I submit, whether the difficulty, thus confessedly pressing against both systems, is not capable on our principles, of a much more full and satisfactory conclusion. For we not only say, as Wesley does, that ‘God knew that it was best, on the whole, not to prevent the first sin of Adam,’ but we add, that, knowing this, he determined not only to permit that, but all the sins that he knew would follow from it, and to limit and overrule the whole for his most excellent glory.”
It seems, then, that the difference between Calvinism and Arminianism respecting the Divine decrees is that Calvinism affirms that God knew it was best, on the whole, not to prevent the sins which he has not prevented, but to permit, and limit and overrule them, while Arminianism affirms that God knew it would be best, on the whole, not to prevent the first sin, but determined to prevent all the sins that he foresaw would flow from it. What a strange statement! To what shifts are these men driven by their unfortunate creed! Where does Mr. Wesley, or any other Arminian writer, say this directly or indirectly? Our author very wisely declines any references at this point. Mr. Wesley does, indeed, deny that God permitted sin, even the “first sin of Adam,” in the sense of approving or tolerating it; but whoever denied that God permits, in the sense of suffering—not forcibly preventing, the sins which actually occur? He appropriates to himself, unfairly, Mr. Wesley’s doctrine, and then imputes to Mr. Wesley a tenet so perfectly foolish that it may be doubted whether any man ever advanced it, whether sane or insane, drunk or sober.
No! these are not the doctrines of Calvinism and Arminianism respectively. The reader will see the importance of the pains taken, in the first discourse, to identify Calvinism. I proved beyond dispute, that Calvinistic creeds, Catechisms, and other theological treatises, teach explicitly, that God has purposed, decreed, foreordained, whatsoever comes to pass; that in some way or other he brings to pass all events; that nothing will, or can, come to pass but what he has ordained; that none of his purposes can be defeated; that it cannot, with truth, be said of any event—it may or may not occur; and that all actual results, by whatever means obtained, are expressions of the design, or decree of God. Arminianism teaches on the contrary, that God has not ordained whatsoever comes to pass—that some things he has preordained; that other things he has not, but has, nevertheless, approved and commanded them, leaving it to the free agency of the creature to fulfil his requisitions; that other things, he not only has not foreordained, but, has condemned and prohibited them, and yet permits or suffers them to be, in preference to that violent interference with free agency which would be necessary to their forcible prevention.
Dr. Fairchild tells us that “this distinction between a decree to effect and a decree to permit has been adopted by Predestinarian divines in all ages.”
Yes, in all ages Predestinarian divines have been compelled to abandon and contradict their creed in the progress, and for the purpose, of its defence. But Calvin himself formally discards and protests against this distinction. He says respecting it: “A question of greater difficulty arises from other passages, where God is said to incline or draw according to his own pleasure, Satan himself and all the reprobate. For the carnal understanding scarcely comprehends how he, acting by their means, contracts no defilement from their criminality, and even in operations common to himself and them, is free from every fault, and yet righteously condemns those whose ministry he uses. Hence was invented the distinction between doing and permitting; because to many persons this has appeared an inexplicable difficulty, that Satan and all the impious are subject to the power and government of God, so that he directs their malice to whatever end he pleases, and uses their crimes for the execution of his judgments. The modesty of those who are alarmed at the appearance of absurdity, might perhaps be excusable, if they did not attempt to vindicate the Divine justice by a pretence utterly destitute of any foundation in truth. They consider it absurd that a man should be blinded by the will and command of God, and afterwards be punished for his blindness. They therefore evade the difficulty, by alleging that it happens only by the permission of God, and not by the will of God; but God himself, by the most unequivocal declarations, rejects this subterfuge.”
But Calvin protests in vain against resorting to this “evasion” and “subterfuge.” It is the only way in which the advocates of his doctrine can make a plausible show of argument when pressed with certain objections. Hence we find the Westminster divines employing it. They tell us in their Confession of Faith, that God was pleased, according to his wise and holy counsel, to permit the sin of our first parents. Lest, however, the faithful should fall into a serious mistake, another part assures them that the providence of God “extendeth itself to the first fall, and all other sins of angels and men, and that not by a bare permission, but such as hath joined with it a most wise and powerful bounding, and otherwise ordering and governing of them, &c.” The nature of that “ordering and governing” is explained in the declaration that “God from all eternity did by the most wise and holy counsel of his own will, freely and unchangeably ordain whatsoever comes to pass.” But how learned men can talk of God’s permitting what he has eternally and unchangeably ordained, is a mystery to some of the unlearned. Is it necessary to tell us, gravely, that God permits to come to pass that which from all eternity he freely ordained shall come to pass? He permits men and angels to do what he has predetermined they shall do, and what they cannot avoid doing! Wonderful!!
The apology for this gross misapplication of language, on the part of men whose learning is sometimes magnified almost into infallibility, is found in their distressing emergency. In no other way can they, with any plausibility, meet their opponents. The usefulness of this term “permit” is admirably indicated by the account which a Presbyterian colporteur gives of an interview with some who objected to the Calvinistic doctrine of decrees. He says:—
“I felt myself, however, sometimes compelled to combat with the opponents of our Calvinistic creed. On one occasion entering a house, the members of which all attended the Presbyterian Church, but were not members, I sold a Confession of Faith to the gentleman; his lady inquired what the name of the book was and on being told, after turning over its pages in a hasty manner, exclaimed: ‘I could never allow that book to be under my roof—it should not be read, and it never ought to have been printed.’
“What was I to do? The doctrine of our Church, so far as election is concerned, was attacked. After some little conversation on the subject, I found that she and her son charged our Confession with teaching that God passed a decree which put the fall of Adam beyond the possibility of escape.”