3. Whether sarvanâman in Sanskrit means “name for everything” (p. 430);
4. Whether Professor Whitney knew that the Phenician alphabet had by Rougé and others been traced back to an Egyptian source (pp. 430, 450, 468);
5. Whether Professor Whitney thought that the words light, alight, and delight could be traced to the same source (p. 467);
6. Whether in the passages pointed out on p. 434, Professor Whitney contradicts himself or not;
7. Whether he has been able to produce any passage from my writings to substantiate the charge that in my Lectures I was impelled by an overmastering fear lest man should lose his proud position in the creation (p. 435);
8. Whether there are verbatim coincidences between my Lectures and those of Professor Whitney (pp. 425, 470–474);
9. Whether I ever denied that language was made through the instrumentality of man (p. 470);
10. Whether I had or had not fully explained under what restrictions the Science of Language might be treated as one of the physical sciences, and whether Professor Whitney has added any new restrictions (pp. 422 seq., 475 seq.);
11. Whether Professor Whitney apprehended in what sense some of the greatest philosophers declared conceptual thought impossible without language (p. 484);
12. Whether the grammatical blunder, with regard to the Sanskrit pari tasthushas as a nominative plur., was mine or his (p. 490);