An air of depression hung over the whole place that it was almost impossible to dispel. As a Jock once put it, “To be in the Comical works made a body windy whether it was shellin’ or not.”
This was the eve of a great battle, so it may be well to describe the dispositions of the brigade in detail. Instructions had been issued that no further advance was contemplated during the coming tour of duty. The troops, therefore, went into the line with orders to make good what ground they could by patrolling, and to consolidate all gains.
The 5th Seaforth Highlanders took over the right sector and the 8th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders the left, the railway line being the northern boundary in the front line. As, however, the railway ran obliquely across the front, troops of the 8th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders in the rear lines were also in position north of it. The 6th Seaforth Highlanders were in support, occupying two lines of trenches from 300-600 yards east of the Scarpe. The 6th Gordon Highlanders were in reserve occupying old German trenches astride the Athies-Fampoux road just west of Fampoux. Brigade headquarters were in an old German 8-inch howitzer position in a sunken road immediately south of the railway at Fampoux.
Orders were given that on no account were troops to occupy the ruined buildings of the chemical works, as these were certain to draw heavy shell-fire.
During this period rumours were frequently circulated that the enemy was about to withdraw to the Queant-Drocourt line, a strong defensive system similar to the Hindenburg line some miles in rear of his existing positions. Orders were therefore issued for patrolling to be actively carried out, so that early information of any such withdrawal would be obtained, and further, that the ground which was made by patrols was to be consolidated.
The first twenty-four hours spent in the sector were sufficient to make it quite evident that the hostile artillery had not decreased since the Division had been relieved towards the end of April. The left battalion trench system, then Roeux village, then the area between battalion and brigade headquarters, and finally the reserve battalion, were all heavily bombarded on the 13th. Brigade head quarters, being in deep dug-outs, were well protected against bombardment. The battalion headquarters were, however, not so well situated. Those of the right and support battalions were in elephant shelters cut into a bank just east of the river Scarpe. As these shelters were in an area that drew a considerable amount of shell-fire, and as they were not even proof against a 4·2 howitzer, they were most unsatisfactory domiciles. The left battalion had its headquarters in an old German bomb store in a quarry north of the railway. This bomb store was reasonably shell-proof, but the quarry was a well-marked feature to which the German gunners paid continual attention.
During the day of the 13th the enemy shelled the eastern portion of Roeux; it was therefore assumed that he had evacuated it. Accordingly at 10 P.M. the whole line south of the railway was advanced to a road running due northwards from the eastern outskirts of Roeux. Positions were then taken up in shell-holes clear of this road. The whole of the village of Roeux also was occupied, six wounded prisoners being captured, one German being killed, and several wounded men of the 4th Division being brought in. As this considerable advance was made without any fighting, the day became known to the Jocks as “The Meatless Day.” Vickers guns were sent forward during the night to take up positions in the most forward line of posts or in advance of it. The results of this method of disposing the Vickers guns, as will be seen, proved far-reaching.
During this period the enemy was extremely active with low-flying aeroplanes over the forward area, and it was clear that he was making every effort to locate our defences. At 9.40 A.M. on the 14th there were nine such aeroplanes flying low over our trenches at the same moment. On occasions coloured lights were fired by them, a heavy shelling of the chemical works or some portion of the trench area ensuing. At other times his artillery was directed by observers who were seen to climb into “crows’ nests” in the trees of Hausa and Delbar Woods. Machine-guns and shrapnel were frequently employed to discourage this form of activity.
Throughout the 14th the enemy artillery remained active. The opinion had therefore generally been formed that, so far from it being his intention to withdraw, he was preparing for a deliberate attack on our positions. There were, however, still optimists who thought that his excessive shell-fire was accounted for by the fact that the German gunners were emptying their dumps prior to withdrawing. On the night of the 14-15th the sector was decidedly quieter than it had been for some days. The optimists put this down to the fact that the German artillery was busy withdrawing. However, this theory was rudely dispelled, for at dawn on 15th May the bombardment of the brigade area began again with tremendous vehemence, 8’s, 5·9’s, 4·2’s, and 77’s all being freely employed. Messages were received from all parts of the brigade front reporting heavy shelling. The 8th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders reported by runner that they were being violently bombarded with 5·9’s, and that all the telephone wires had been cut. The support battalion and the troops at Roeux similarly reported intense shelling. In fact, the only troops who were not involved in this bombardment were those which occupied the foremost line of shell-holes, to which they had advanced unopposed on the night of the 13th. They remained in their position quite secure without a round falling amongst them, and it was evident that they had not as yet been located in their new position.
Officers and men who were in the trench area during this bombardment all reported that the shells, from the sound of their flight through the air, appeared to be fired at the extreme range of the guns. This statement was confirmed by the fact that the corps heavy artillery, though they were continuously in action during the day attempting to counter the enemy’s batteries, could not diminish the volume of hostile fire.