A few days before going into the line on the last occasion, in conversation he expressed a definite opinion that he would be killed in the coming operations, as indeed he was.
Colonel Hyslop, who at the last moment assumed command of the 153rd Brigade, had been the first regimental officer to land in France with the Expeditionary Force, and had the unique record of having served with a battalion continuously from the date of landing.
Opposed to the Highland Division, and holding a slightly more extended front, was the 23rd (Reserve) Saxon Division, in process of being relieved by the 3rd Guards Division. The Guards had already taken over the rear lines up to the Black line, and were actually carrying out the relief of the front systems when the attack was launched. The enemy held the trenches with four battalions from the front line to the river Steenbeek inclusive, and with five battalions in reserve north of the Steenbeek.
For this attack the Divisional artillery was reinforced by the two brigades of the 11th Divisional artillery and by two army brigades, the 77th and the 282nd. These six brigades were divided into two groups of three brigades each, one group under the command of Lieut.-Colonel L. M. Dyson, D.S.O., covering the 152nd Brigade; the other, under the command of Lieut.-Colonel M. M. Duncan, C.M.G., covering the 153rd. A brigade of artillery covered each of the four battalion frontages, while the remaining brigade in each group covered the whole brigade front. This plan gave one 18-pounder gun to every twelve and a half yards of the front.
One hundred and twelve machine-guns were available for this attack, as a fourth machine-gun company, the 232nd, had now joined the Division, and forty-eight guns from the 11th Division were also placed at the disposal of the 51st. Of these, sixty-four fired three successive barrages, covering the ground in front of the Blue, Black, and Green lines. Sixteen were placed under the orders of the Brigadiers for purposes of consolidation, and thirty-two were kept in reserve.
As the attack was launched 206 drums of burning oil were projected from mortars on the enemy’s support and reserve lines, while to discourage the enemy further 150 shells filled with thermite were thrown at Fort Caledonia in the German reserve line three minutes after zero. There seemed to be rather a mediæval touch about the employment of drums of burning oil; but according to the statements of prisoners who experienced it, it appeared to have been as effective as ever.
One squadron of the 1st King Edward’s Horse and eight fighting tanks, with one supply tank, were also placed at the disposal of the Divisional commander.
The artillery had begun the cutting of the enemy wire on the 16th July, and for a fortnight were firing with great intensity, their average daily expenditure being 3500 rounds by the 18-pounders, 1000 rounds by the 4·5 howitzers, and 400 rounds by the 2-inch trench-mortars.
Naturally this great activity on the part of the gunners drew considerable retaliation from the enemy; nevertheless, they carried out their task with a precision that was little short of amazing when the fact is taken into account that they had to work entirely by aerial observation.
The concentration of the troops in the assembly trenches was a matter which required elaborate arrangements. On the night of the 28-29th the two brigades took over their battle fronts each with four companies, the remainder of the troops moving up to the trenches on the night before the battle. “To ensure secrecy, it was impossible, owing to the enemy’s activity in the air, to move from the camps in which the brigades were assembled before 8.30 P.M. There was thus barely time for the attacking force to arrive in its position of deployment before zero hour. It was therefore necessary to eliminate by careful arrangement all likely causes of delay. To avoid loss of direction, overland routes to the entrances of the communication trenches were marked out by stakes and tapes. Men who had been made familiar with these routes were employed as guides. Police were also posted at all junctions of tracks and of trenches, to ensure that in the event of gas being encountered the men would adjust their respirators as quickly as possible and continue their march. The troops were also instructed that in no circumstances was the march to the position of deployment to be delayed by enemy action. Previous to the attack this march had been rehearsed in the dark by bodies of troops both with and without respirators, so that it could be ensured, in selecting the zero hour, sufficient time was allowed for the operation. A hot meal was issued at the place of assembly, and soup and tea were issued from hot-food containers at the positions of deployment.”[7]