The third feature of this period was great activity in aerial bombing, which the Germans suddenly developed, and which they maintained in an increasing degree to within a few weeks of the armistice. Both bombing and long-range guns, which the enemy freely used in this front, were difficult to deal with, as shelter for the men could not be provided by means of dug-outs in the clay soil of Flanders. In consequence, both men and horses suffered a number of casualties from bombing, particularly in the camps and rest billets behind the line. On one occasion alone three bombs dropped in Siege Camp caused thirty-two casualties.
On 6th September the 5th Seaforth Highlanders attempted a raid on the enemy’s posts in front of Pheasant Trench (see [Map VII.]), 3 officers and 100 other ranks being employed. The raiding party failed to reach the enemy’s lines owing to the intensity of his rifle and machine-gun fire; but they obtained some valuable information, and caused the enemy serious losses by the energetic use of their rifles. They observed that Pheasant Trench was protected by an uncut belt of wire about fifteen yards in depth. They also found that in some parts Pheasant Trench was manned by dummies, and in others by men holding it in two ranks, the front rank using their rifles while the rear rank threw bombs. They took advantage of this close grouping on the part of the enemy by shooting twelve of them. During the advance a party of about twenty of the enemy left two advanced saps and made for the rear, but only four of them reached cover. The raiders could not regain our lines during daylight, and remained in shell-holes until dusk, when they returned, having lost 1 officer and 19 men killed, 2 officers and 18 men wounded, and 9 men missing.
On 19th September the artillery and trench-mortars began a bombardment preparatory to the attack.
The object of the operations was to secure a satisfactory “jumping off” place for an attack against Poelcappelle, and to secure positions in the valley of the Steenbeek from which the artillery could cover this attack.
The area which the Highland Division was detailed to capture was some 1500 yards in depth, about 1500 yards in breadth in the first instance, but widening to some 1900 yards on the final objective. In this area the ground gradually rises from the river Steenbeek except in the centre, where a depression marks the course of the Lekkerboterbeek, a small stream running east and west about six feet broad, two feet deep, with banks five feet in height. On the left a slight ridge above Pheasant Farm forms the highest ground from which close observation of Poelcappelle is obtained, and which covers the Steenbeek Valley. On the right a depression is formed running north and south by the Stroombeek, a tiny stream beyond which lies a slight ridge about Quebec Farm. From here also observation of the surroundings of Poelcappelle is obtained. About the position of assembly the ground is broken by swamps and pools, but becomes drier and firmer as the higher ground is reached.
The 154th Infantry Brigade was allotted the task of carrying out the attack. In this stage of the war the detailing of troops for the attack required more than ever careful consideration. Dug-outs could not be constructed in Flanders; the Germans had therefore to rely for protection against shell-fire on concrete pill-boxes and shelters and reinforced farms. Any troops to whom this form of protection was not available would have little chance of surviving bombardments of the intensity which had by this time become the fashion. The German therefore tended to restrict the numbers of troops he employed on the stationary defence in accordance with the number of shelters available. It was therefore to be anticipated that the garrison would be a light one, but that it would in the main survive the artillery bombardment. It was thus evident that should large numbers of men be employed in the attack, if they were successful they could not hope for a big bag of killed and captured Germans, whereas if they failed heavy casualties would result in an endeavour to overcome comparatively few of the enemy.
In these circumstances the Divisional commander decided to employ only the 154th Brigade on the initial attack. Had the operation been a failure, critics would no doubt have said that the attack had been too light. As it turned out, the troops detailed for the assault reached their final objective, overcame all resistance, and with the assistance of two battalions of the 152nd Brigade which were sent forward to support them, defeated six counter-attacks delivered by four different German Divisions. In killed and missing in this operation the Division only lost 17 officers and 184 other ranks.
The conditions under which the action was fought were in some respects new. There was a well-defined trench line, running right across the Divisional front about 150 yards from the British front line, known as Pheasant Trench and New Trench; and, again, some 1200 yards in rear, Kangaroo and Beer Trenches also traversed the Divisional front. The defence, however, primarily consisted of concrete pill-boxes and fortified farms distributed throughout the area to be attacked, supported by troops concealed in shell-holes.[8]
To meet these conditions every known “pill-box,” farm, or fortified post had a specific body of troops detailed for its capture. The sole business of these troops was to follow the barrage until they reached their own particular objective, to overcome the enemy in the objective as quickly as possible, and then take their appointed place in the scheme of consolidation.
In addition, the very fullest use was made of the enormous artillery and vast supply of ammunition at the disposal of the Divisional commander. The part played by the gunners in this attack was indeed considerable, the Divisional artillery, as usual, carrying out its allotted programme faultlessly.