The Division had not been long in rest in its new area before it transpired that it was again required to take part in active operations. The news that this was the case came rather as a shock, as the Division had already fought battles in the year 1917 on 9-12th April, 23-24th April, 16th May, 31st July-1st August, 20-23rd September, and had lost in casualties since 9th April 457 officers and 9966 other ranks—a total of 10,523.
Moreover, the forthcoming operations were to be of an experimental nature, since the plan of attack was to attempt to break through the Hindenburg Line by employing a large number of tanks in an offensive which was to be a complete surprise.
To quote Sir Douglas Haig’s despatch: “The object of these operations was to gain a local success at a point where the enemy did not expect it. Our repeated attacks in Flanders, and of our Allies elsewhere, had brought about large concentrations of the enemy’s forces on the threatened points, with a consequent reduction in the garrisons of certain other sectors of the line. Of these weakened sectors the Cambrai front had been selected as the most suitable for the surprise operations in contemplation.”
In order to maintain this element of surprise up to the last moment, various measures had to be taken. In the first place, the Division was left in its present quarters in the neighbourhood of Hermaville, so as not to draw the attention of the enemy to the area to be attacked. For the same reason the usual full-sized replica of the enemy’s trenches was taped out west of the town of Arras, and all training took place in that area.
Further, the Division was not allowed to take over the trenches from which it was to deliver the attack. It had therefore little opportunity for preliminary reconnaissances of the battle area, with the exception that parties of officers and N.C.O.’s daily visited the trenches to spy out the land. These parties were all clothed in trousers to prevent the enemy’s observers from suspecting the presence of the Highland Division in the neighbourhood of the position to be attacked.
The Division was given every opportunity of practising the attack with tanks, the platoons carrying out their training with the actual tanks and crews which were to accompany them in the operations. It will be seen that, as usual, liaison was synonymous with success, and that on the day of the attack the co-operation between the tanks and the infantry was admirable.
An additional difficulty lay in the fact that somehow or another the Division had to be concentrated in the battle area some thirty-six to forty-eight hours before the battle, so as to allow the troops adequate rest before proceeding to the assembly trenches.
On this account the C.R.E. and the three field companies, R.E., with the 8th Royal Scots, moved to the IVth Corps area early in November to prepare hidden shelters in which the troops might be accommodated during this period. The sappers and pioneers worked with such effect that between the 2nd and 19th November camouflaged accommodation had been provided for 5500 men in the ruined village of Metz and for 4000 men in Havrincourt Wood. The necessary dumps of material were also formed by the C.R.E., tracks for moving guns forward prepared, and, as cavalry were also detailed to take part in the operations, six water points with a capacity for watering 7000 horses per hour were constructed. Forward routes for infantry were also laid out and advanced dressing stations completed; no mean record for a little over a fortnight’s work.
All undertakings of this nature were made more difficult than usual by the fact that no increase in the normal amount of lorry traffic on the roads during the hours of daylight was allowed. Further, no new work was carried out in the forward area, in case it might be noticed by enemy airmen. As it turned out, the weather was fortunately cloudy and misty, so that observation from the air became practically impossible throughout the period of preparation.
The area through which the Division was destined to advance was traversed by three separate trench systems, each forming integral parts of the Hindenburg system. Of these, the first, known as the Hindenburg front system, was composed of a maze of wide, heavily-wired trenches, supplemented by numerous saps, the whole presenting such a tangle of excavations that it was impossible to foretell accurately where the principle points of resistance were most likely to be found.