During the night the enemy infantry remained inactive. Fontaine was found to be a large village little damaged by shell-fire, but as darkness had fallen shortly after its capture, it was impossible to make a systematic search of all the cellars and dug-outs contained in it, in which parties of Germans might be hiding.
But though the enemy remained quiet, the position in Fontaine was a desperate one. The enemy still held Bourlon and La Folie Woods. The village was, in fact, like a nut gripped by the crackers.
At 6.30 P.M. steps were taken to ensure that the flanks of the defenders of Fontaine were securely connected with the neighbouring troops, the 9th Royal Scots, who had relieved the 4th Gordon Highlanders in Cantaing, being ordered to swing forward their left flank until they were definitely in touch with the right of the 4th Seaforth Highlanders. At the same time the 7th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders were instructed to make certain that no gap existed between the troops on the west side of Fontaine and the Cantaing Line. It was imperative that no such gaps should exist, as should the enemy succeed in penetrating between Fontaine and the Cantaing Line during the dark, there was every chance of the entire garrison of Fontaine being cut off.
At 8 P.M., as there was no activity on this part of the front, the brigadier ordered the 4th Seaforth Highlanders to take over the defences of Fontaine, thus relieving three companies of the 7th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, who were to be used in their turn to defend the flanks in rear of the village. The object of these orders was to place the defence of the village under a single command.
Fontaine Notre Dame was subsequently lost in a counter-attack. It has often been urged that this would not have been the case had a stronger garrison been detailed for its defence. This is not true. Fontaine could only have been secured by a successful attack on Bourlon Wood. Sufficient troops could have at any time been moved into Fontaine to give such an attack adequate support on its right flank. No number of troops could be expected successfully to hold Fontaine against counter-attack so long as the enemy held Bourlon Wood.
The village was indeed merely the point of junction of two defensive flanks. Only two policies appeared possible: either an attack must be delivered against Bourlon Wood by the Division on the left, or Fontaine must be evacuated. To put more men into the village would have been to expose more men to certain defeat in the event of counter-attack. It would have been the equivalent of putting a large nut within the grip of the crackers instead of a small one.
The perimeter of the village was some 3500 yards, the strength of the 4th Seaforth Highlanders roughly 400, or approximately one man to eight and three-quarter yards of front. In addition, six Vickers guns had also taken up defensive positions in the village.
Immediately after the completion of the relief by the 4th Seaforth Highlanders, it was reported that the enemy were massing for attack in Bourlon Wood, and shortly afterwards that they were dribbling forwards on to the Cambrai road, in just the same manner as they had done for the counter-attack near Poelcappelle on 20th September 1917.
At 5.30 A.M. on 23rd November, Lieut.-Colonel Unthank, D.S.O., commanding the 4th Seaforth Highlanders, who had established his headquarters in the centre of the village, sent an officer and the battalion scouts to establish four posts of observation on the Cambrai road north of the village. These were in position by 7 A.M.
As soon as dawn broke a fleet of twelve enemy aircraft circled over Fontaine at a low altitude. The battalion headquarters staff were lined up in the main street, and forced the planes to fly at a higher altitude by their rifle-fire. They, however, continued to observe and to engage our troops with machine-gun fire all morning.