Immediately before the hour fixed for the operation to begin, the enemy successfully counter-attacked the 40th Division in Bourlon Wood, and uncovered the left flank of the 6th Seaforth Highlanders. They had, in consequence, to fall back, with the result that the situation west of Fontaine became uncertain.
However, while this withdrawal was taking place, the tanks had begun their advance through a heavy artillery barrage, which accompanied the German counter-attack on Bourlon Wood. Several of them were put out of action by direct hits, in consequence of which some confusion and disorganisation arose, which resulted in none of the tanks entering the village on the front of the two companies of the 5th Seaforth Highlanders.
In view of the intensity of the machine-gun fire which was being poured out of Fontaine, it seemed clear that an attack unsupported by tanks had no possible chance of success. The enterprise was therefore abandoned, and the men withdrew and dug in so as to form a connecting link between the 6th Seaforth Highlanders and the troops south of the village.
This gallant attack on Fontaine illustrates the extreme difficulty of taking an undemolished village with or without tanks, if strongly held and organised for defence, unless there is sufficient time available to subject it to a severe and thorough bombardment.
No further changes in the situation occurred, except that after dusk the line was so adjusted as to be continuous from the left of the 6th Seaforth Highlanders in the south-east corner of Bourlon Wood to the right of the 9th Royal Scots south-east of Cantaing.
During the night of the 23-24th the Division was relieved by the Guards Division, and a continuous line was handed over five miles in advance of the trenches occupied by the Division at zero hour on the 20th.
The part played by the Highland Division in the battle of Cambrai was a great one. It had reached its final objective, though Fontaine was ultimately lost; it had captured 2609 unwounded prisoners, including 66 officers, with a loss of 27 officers and 312 men killed and missing, and of 41 officers and 1190 men wounded.
In the action the tanks certainly played a gallant and conspicuous part, and since they were alone responsible for crushing the wire throughout the varying phases of the attack, contributed largely to the success of the infantry. It must, however, be borne in mind that the tanks suffered serious losses. In “D” Battalion ten tanks were knocked out by direct hits, and in “E” eighteen. Many others, through mechanical trouble, were unable to reach their objective. Indeed, of the seventy that took part in the first day’s action, only twenty-six rallied at the conclusion.
It will thus be seen that in many cases the infantry gallantly continued their advance without the support of their tanks, so that the success was equally due to their splendid qualities, which enabled them to reach their objectives by substituting for the help they anticipated from the tanks their own initiative and resource. Those tanks that remained in action did magnificent work, as is testified by the following figures. In one day “Z” Battalion fired 2000 6-pounder shells, and 95,000 rounds of small-arms ammunition, excluding any rounds fired by the tanks that were knocked out. In many cases tanks not only fired every round of their own ammunition, but also all the ammunition that they were carrying for the infantry.
One has now reached a point at which one may pause and consider the last three attacks carried out by the Division. They were delivered at the height of the German’s defensive power; two of them against trench systems perfected by every modern artifice, deliberately constructed with ample leisure in which to complete them; one against the barrage-proof pill-box; all of them before the German had exhausted the flower of his army in his violent attacks of the first six months of 1918.