The night was quiet, the enemy no doubt being busy moving his guns and bringing up ammunition. His infantry, however, made many gallant attempts to cut the wire of the Beaumetz line by hand. At 6 A.M. a bombardment of our positions opened, which continued until 10 A.M., when his infantry launched a strong attack. This was particularly heavy about the Bapaume-Cambrai road and the Hermies Switch; the enemy, however, only succeeded in driving in our outposts, and the line held firm in spite of all his attempts.
The fighting continued throughout the morning and afternoon. Continuous attempts made by the enemy to dribble up were dealt with by machine-guns, rifles, and rifle grenades, while the artillery several times dispersed masses of Germans forming up for attack between Louverval and Doignies.
The Jocks were at the top of their form, were inflicting great losses on the enemy, and were complete masters of the situation. Only once did the Germans penetrate our lines, just south of the Cambrai road. They were immediately ejected by a bombing attack delivered by the 6th Seaforth Highlanders. All ranks had, in fact, the greatest confidence in their ability to defeat the enemy’s attempts so long as the line north and south of them held firm and secured their flanks.
Unfortunately this was not to be the case. On our left flank the enemy’s attack in the morning had been successful. The Corps line was broken 2000 yards north-west of Morchies, and the Divisional line began to be enfiladed by artillery fire from the north.
To prevent the enemy from exploiting this success and turning the left flank of the Division, two companies of the 3rd Worcesters were ordered to take up a position west of Morchies facing north, and at the same time the 19th Division ordered the 58th Brigade to dig-in on the spurs 1000 yards north of Beugny, also facing north.
During this day 256th Brigade, R.F.A., played a memorable part. During the morning its batteries brought effective observed fire to bear on the enemy east of the Beaumetz-Morchies line, doing considerable damage to his attacking troops. In the afternoon they ran their guns out of the pits, and engaged over open sights masses of the enemy on the left flank of the Division, particularly near Maricourt Wood, where several big concentrations were broken up. Later, when a counter-attack accompanied by tanks took place in this area, “B” 256 covered their advance with smoke, upon which large numbers of the enemy were thrown into confusion, and were subsequently heavily engaged by the concentrated fire of the whole artillery brigade. This battery, commanded by Major B. Will, about the same time completely neutralised an enemy battery that was endeavouring to come into action near Maricourt Wood. For four hours on the afternoon of the 22nd the 256th Brigade, R.F.A., fired continuously over open sights, the howitzers using instantaneous fuzes, and caused very considerable casualties to the enemy.
The amount of ammunition expended by this brigade on the first two days is of interest:—
| Battery. | No. of | No. of | Rounds | ||
| guns. | rounds. | per gun. | |||
| 21st March | { | A | 5 | 4800 | 960 |
| B | 4 | 3600 | 900 | ||
| C | 5 | 4000 | 800 | ||
| D | 4 | 3700 | 925 | ||
| 22nd March | { | A | 5 | 5100 | 1020 |
| B | 4 | 7000 | 1750 | ||
| C | 5 | 6000 | 1200 | ||
| D | 4 | 2500 | 625 |
—a total of 36,700 rounds fired by eighteen guns. Imagination can easily picture the efforts made by the drivers and horses of the ammunition waggons in bringing this amount of ammunition through the barraged roads to the guns.
About 7 P.M. 235th, 255th, 256th, and 234th Brigades, R.F.A., all withdrew to positions farther in rear, Colonel Dyson assuming command of all field artillery covering the Divisional front. This latter arrangement was necessary, as communication between artillery brigades and Divisional headquarters no longer existed.