“On behalf of the Canadian Divisions I thank you most sincerely for the splendid help and support you have given to the main advance south of the river. I wish you all the best of luck always, and have every confidence that the splendid reputation that the Division now enjoys will ever be maintained.”

Until 14th September, when the Division was relieved by the 49th Division, no events occurred which materially changed the tactical situation. The period was not, however, a quiet one. The enemy was at times extremely active with his guns, on occasions using quantities of mustard gas, the targets against which he chiefly vented his spleen being the railway cutting, Greenland Hill, and Fampoux.

Enemy aircraft were also unusually active in this area, particularly in bombing the troops in the line. On one occasion in particular, 4th September, aircraft were crossing over lines frequently throughout the night—singly, by twos, and in flights up to six in number—which heavily bombed the vicinity of Roeux, Fampoux, and the valley north of Fampoux.

Patrolling was maintained with the greatest energy, as it was anticipated that the success of the operations in the south in which Cambrai was becoming threatened might at any time lead the enemy to further withdrawals.

In consequence, encounters in No Man’s Land were of frequent occurrence, in which considerable damage was inflicted on the enemy—not, however, without losses also being sustained by the Jocks. On one occasion a daylight patrol of the 6th Seaforth Highlanders, consisting of one officer and two other ranks, had a lively fight with an enemy post 200 yards from Biache power station. They killed two of the enemy and wounded several others, and then returned to our lines, all three having first been wounded.

On relief on 14th September the Division remained at rest and training until 24th September, when it again returned to the same sector, and remained in the line until 4th October, when it was again relieved by the 44th Division. This relief was not, however, carried out with the object of allowing the Division a period of rest, but for the purpose of its being moved to another portion of the front to take part again in active operations.

Probably, in common with many other Divisions, the men of the 51st had come to consider that they were doing more than their fair share of battle fighting. They had, indeed, been engaged in nine major operations in the period of seventeen months from April 1917 to August 1918.

The men thus felt entitled to covet the long periods of rest such as fell to the lot of some of the more fortunate Corps and Divisions, which occasionally were given five or six weeks’ rest in which to regain their form after an operation.

They, however, comforted themselves by the thought that they were so continuously employed in the forefront of the battle because the Higher Command had learnt to rely on them to carry to a successful issue any task that was set them.