[64] Garnett’s Essays, p. 281-341.
[65] Quoted by Mr. Garnett, p. 283.
[66] Grimm, 29-31. Compare Heyse, System, s. 28. “Nur was gedacht ist, kann gesprochen werden; und das klar gedachte ist nothwendig auch ansprechbar.” What St. Paul saw in his rapture was only unutterable because it recalled no human analogon. (2 Cor. xii. 4.)
[67] Manudscha, Goth. Manniska, Germ. Mensch; from the root man, “to think.” Compare φράζειν, “to speak,” and φράζεσθαι, “to think.”—Heyse, s. 40. Turner ad Herod, ii. 7.
[68] “Speech,” says Humboldt, “is the necessary condition of the thought of the individual.” The statement should at least be qualified by the word “now.” For some allusions to this interesting discussion, see Archbishop Whately’s Logic, ch. ii. M. de Bonald assumed the reverse: “L’homme pense sa parole avant de parler sa pensée.” See, too, Mill’s Logic, ii. 201. Charma, p. 134. Of course the short-hand of human intelligence is too infinitely rapid and abbreviated for us to be always able to read it off with facility; or, as Mr. Tennyson expresses it,
“Thought leapt out to wed with thought,
Ere thought could wed itself to speech;”
but we are inclined to believe that without some signs (not necessarily words—see Charma, Essai sur le Langage, p. 50) thought could not exist. When we cannot express what we mean, the reason probably is that we have no clear meaning. “Die Sprache ist nichts anderes als der in die Erscheinung tretende Gedanke, und beide sind innerlich nur eins und das selbe.”—Becker, Organism. der Sprache, p. 2. “Sans signes nous ne penserions presque pas.”—Destutt de Tracy, Idéologie, pt. xvii. Plotinus distinctly asserts the contrary. Τὸ δὴ λογιζόμενον τῆς ψυχῆς οὐδένος πρὸς τὸ λογίζεσθαι δεόμενον σωματικοῦ ὀργάνου.—Ennead, v. 1, ch. 10.
[69] In Memoriam.
[70] See Harper, on the Force of the Greek Tenses.