[186] Horne Tooke, Part I. ch. ii.
[187] Dr. Whewell, Hist. of New Phil. in Eng. p. 72.
[188] We consider this on the whole a less objectionable term than “sensualist” or “sensuist;” the latter word is uncouth, and the former, from the things which it connotes, is hardly fair.
[189] See V. Cousin, Cours d’Histoire de la Phil. Morale.
[190] οὔτε τῆς ψυχῆς ἴδιον τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι οὔτε τοῦ σώματος.—Arist. de Somno, i. 5. “Sensation is not an affection of mind alone, nor of matter alone, but of an animated organism, i.e. of mind and matter united.”—Mansell’s Metaphysics, p. 92.
[191] “Il n’y a rien dans l’intelligence qui ait passé par les sens; rien, pas même l’idée des sens!”—Charma, Essai sur le Langage, p. 34. This is far truer than the assertion of D’Alembert, that “the object of Metaphysics is to examine the origin of ideas, and to prove that they all come from our sensations.”—Elém. de Philos. p. 143.
[192] Ἡ μνήμη ταῖς αἰσθήσεσι συμπίπτουσα εἰς ταὐτόν ... φαίνονταί μοι σχεδὸν οἷον γράφειν ἡμῶν ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς τότε λόγους.—Plat. Philebus, p. 192.
[193] Penser c’est sentir.
[194] πάντων μέτρον ἄνθρωπος.—Protagoras.
[195] We allude to his monstrous hyperbole “that it would be our duty to hate God if bidden to do so by Him,” which is merely equivalent to the sycophant’s excuse, πᾶν τὸ πραχθὲν ὑπὸ τοῦ κρατοῦντος δίκαιον.