The mosque receives a large interest for a comparatively trifling expenditure of capital; and has besides the reversion in the event of default of heirs. The tenant, though he has to pay a rent where formerly he paid none, is not burdened by this slight charge, and sets against it the immense privileges he has acquired; for, as a tenant on vakouf land—that is, holding direct of Allah—he pays no taxes; he is safe from confiscation by the Government, extortion from its officials, and persecution from private creditors. It is the most profitable and secure tenure to be met with in Turkey, and it is a matter of congratulation that the mosque authorities place so high a value upon money that they are willing to accept it even from dogs of Christians who wish to avail themselves of the protection afforded by vakouf leasehold.

No official report of the extent of the vakouf lands has, so far as I can learn, been published; but it is easy to understand that their extent and value must be very great. It is even estimated at two-thirds of the whole land of Turkey. It is therefore remarkable that the revenues derived from them do not nearly suffice for the purposes for which they were intended. The expense of maintaining the services of the mosques and of keeping up the extremely economical system of religious education would not seem to be excessive, though the charitable imarets would of course require considerable support. But these are not the real reasons why these rich revenues are not sufficient. One reason is, that they are expected to maintain a large class of Ulema, whose numbers are altogether disproportionate to the educational results they produce. The other and far more disastrous cause is that the revenues are corruptly administered.

At first the management of the funds lay in the hands of agents appointed by the pious founders. When an agent died, his successor was named by the Roumeli Kadisi (or Anadoli Kadisi if in Asiatic Turkey). The agents were under the supervision of inspectors, whose business it was to verify the mosque accounts. These inspectorships were generally given to high functionaries of the Porte, and so lucrative were they that they excited keen competition (in the Turkish sense), and eventually came to be regarded as the fixed appendages of certain offices. It may easily be imagined that between the agents and the inspectors there was not much of the vakouf revenues left for the right purposes. As a matter of fact, most of the money found its way into the pockets of the inspectors of the Sublime Porte.

Among the many schemes that engaged the attention of the Reformer-Sultan Mahmoud there was of course a place for vakouf reform. He wished to amalgamate the vakouf lands with the mirié or crown lands, but had not the boldness necessary to the carrying out of so revolutionary a measure. He contented himself with clearing away some of the more obvious abuses of the administration of vakoufs, and appointed a director, with the rank of Minister, to see to the proper management of the property. Still, however, the revenues did not prove sufficient. The annual budget of vakouf returns reached a total of 20,000,000 piastres; yet in 1863 it had to be supplemented by another 20,000,000 piastres from the Treasury, and is ever in need of similar assistance. The funds are still misapplied; and, as the result, the mosques and medressés have fallen more and more into ruin and decay; the imarets are become instruments of a merely nominal almsgiving; and every charitable or religious intention of the pious founders is daily trodden under foot.

Among the minor objects of vakouf endowments are the construction and maintenance in repair of aqueducts and road fountains. I have often witnessed with regret the manner in which the trust is abused by its holders. In most towns the principal water supply is endowed by vakoufs, the revenues of which were intended to defray all expenses connected with keeping the channels and fountains in repair. In three cases out of four these funds are misapplied. At Salonika, for instance, the water supply is richly endowed, and the town ought clearly to be well furnished with water. Instead of this, a great number of the fountains are dried up, and a serious waste of water is caused by the neglect of the water-pipes. It is painful to see the crowd of miserable Jewish children waiting for hours round the dribbling fountain under a burning summer sun, or pierced with the biting winter winds, till they get a chance of filling their pitchers—too often only to get them broken in the battle that immediately ensues. In summer, when the want of water is most severely felt, many people do not scruple to dig down to the water pipes in some deserted street, stop the current that leads to the fountain, and thus obtain the supply they need. In former times fountains were erected on all the main roads and in every town and village; but most of them are now dried up or fallen to ruin. Some of those that remain are of solid marble, with a carved frontage inscribed with the name of the donor, the date of erection, and some verses from the Koran. Some are in the form of basins, with jets playing in them, sheltered sometimes by little kiosks, and always shaded by fine old trees. The thirsty traveller and his beast are all the more grateful when they do find a fountain with water running, because the chances are so overwhelmingly against such good luck—thanks to the vakouf administrators, who from this point of view deserve credit for intensifying the virtue of gratitude.

2. The Mirié, or crown-lands, include the private demesnes of the Sultan and the royal family, the lands reserved for the partial support of the administration, the waste lands, together with an enormous extent of land originally granted on condition of military service to the most zealous supporters of the Sultan, with a view to retaining their fidelity and assuring the supremacy of the Government over the native princes. The country was thus given over to the power and license of an army of occupation. It was divided into sandjaks governed by Pashas, Beys, and Beglerbeys. Those last-named were the administrators of the sandjaks. Their duty it was to collect the taxes and furnish the contingents of troops to the Imperial army. The favored officers of the Porte received immense grants of land in return for their zeal; they were exempt from taxation, and only required to find soldiers for the wars of the Porte. Excluding vakouf lands, the greater part of Turkey was thus placed on a sort of feudal tenure, the proprietor holding of the crown by military service. All the evil effects of the system soon developed themselves.

The lands of these military proprietors were of course chiefly tilled by the rayahs, who had formerly held them in freehold. Although these underholdings were supposed, like all mirié lands, to be registered, and thus to enjoy the advantage of a legally fixed rent, they were yet subject to the endless extortions invariably associated with the notion of Turkish officials. Especially heavily did this system press upon the Christian tenants of the military landowners. In principle the conduct of the Turks to their Christian subjects was not greatly blamable; it was in practice, as usual, that the grievances arose. The Christian communities were managed by their Kodja-Bashi, or headman, who had to collect the tribute, proportioning it to the means of each individual; and to gather the kharadj, or poll-tax, and other impositions. A community was allowed to compound for each or all its taxes by a fixed sum. Thus far all appears surprisingly satisfactory. But when the actual condition of the Christian tenants is looked into, a very different impression is produced. Their landlords were ever devising some new extortion; the taxes were levied with ruinous irregularity; fresh impositions were constantly being added; and, in fine, their state became so intolerable that large numbers of them deserted their faith (of which they are generally highly tenacious in spite of ignorance and persecution), and became Moslems, and were at once placed in possession of the privileges of the dominant race. A curious instance of this conversion by necessity was that of the Krichovalis, a lawless race of mountaineers about Vodena. About the beginning of this century they found themselves unable longer to endure the disabilities of their condition. They met in solemn assembly in their old church on a great feast-day, and swore the sacred oath upon the Bible that they became Mohammedans under protest, being compelled to abandon their faith in order to escape the intolerable trammels of their bondage. The Bible on which they swore, containing the signatures of the chief men, still exists, I am told, in the keeping of the Greek priest.

The evils of military tenure bore upon the Porte as well as upon the rayahs. The Sultans were not slow to note with alarm the growing power of the great feudatories. They endeavored to curtail their privileges and to strengthen the hands of the rayahs and attach this class to themselves. But for a long time the efforts of the central government were unavailing. The military landowners made common cause with the Beglerbeys, who had by degrees acquired the supreme control of their sandjaks; and these two united in defying the authority of the sovereign. A great landed aristocracy had grown up, like the baronage of England in Angevin times, and threatened the very extinction of the supremacy of the Porte over its subjects. A great blow must be struck at the country Beys; and Mahmoud II. resolved to strike. He was completely successful, and left to his successor Abdul-Medjid only the task of bringing some of the rebellious chieftains to punishment. Some were beheaded, other banished, and all had their property confiscated. Inoffensive tenants by military service received compensation; but the system was rooted out, and has now ceased to exist.

How the great feudal landowners were crushed will be understood from a few examples. A short time ago I made the acquaintance of one of the dervish sheikhs who followed Ali Pasha when he was dispatched by Abdul-Medjid to reduce the Bosnian rebels. I asked how the reduction was effected; and this was his account: Ali Pasha, with a small but well-organized army of Nizams, on approaching the country, asked permission of the Bosnians to cross into the Austrian territory. The Bosnians unsuspectingly granted leave, and we marched into the country and pitched our camp in its very heart. After a few days the Pasha produced the Iradé of the Sultan, containing a demand for 60,000 recruits from the Bosnians. They refused to furnish them, and began to assemble and arm. The Pasha did not insist upon the enforcement of the Imperial order, but opened negotiations. He was a wily man and knew his business. He managed with soft words and fair promises to entice all the Bosnian grandees into the camp, under the pretext of holding a general council. Having thus collected all the influential persons of the country, he put them under arrest and proceeded to try them. Some were beheaded, and Ali Pasha with his own hand struck down the leading chief. The rest after some further parley were brought to terms, and were then exiled and their goods confiscated. The 60,000 recruits were soon raised, and the general marched triumphantly back to Constantinople at their head.

The Albanian chieftains were dealt with in the same way: when forced failed, treachery prevailed. Their two leaders, Veli-bey and Arslan-bey, were enticed by a friendly invitation to Monastir, where they were received with every mark of consideration and kindness. A few days afterwards they and their friends were invited to a great feast by Reshid Mehemet Pasha. This was to take place in a kiosk outside the town near the head-quarters of the regular troops.