The Isthmus of Suez Question

by Ferdinand de Lesseps

The Mediterranean ports will profit, it is true, by the opening of the Isthmus of Suez, but England with the 5,000,000 tons employed in her commerce—a tonnage greater than that of all the navies of Europe, including France, united—cannot fail to profit in a much greater degree by the increase of relations which must necessarily result from the shortening of the distance between the points of traffic; to this opening moreover she will be indebted for the inestimable advantage of finding herself in closer connection with her colonies, than another nation whose competition might otherwise be really formidable in the eyes of the upholders of an exclusive system.

But on the contrary, England, adopting the policy of commercial freedom, has been seen to favour the attempts which have been made to cut through the American Isthmus, although, if successful, it would bring the United States nearer the British possessions in India and still nearer to Australia. She is not, however, ignorant of the fact that the maritime commerce of the United States, which twenty years ago employed only 1,000,000 tons, now, in 1854, requires no less than 5,400,000, and that this vast tonnage, already larger than her own, is constantly increasing. But England on her part does not remain at a stand-still, and she has done well in showing no fear of the contest. The law of progress has been justified by official statistical documents. The burthen of the English ships built in 1842 was 130,000 tons; in 1843, shipping to the amount of 203,000 tons was built. It is especially since the relations of the United States with the Indian Seas have been extended, that the commerce of Great Britain has in those very regions experienced a still farther developement. Thus, the imports from the Indian Peninsula, which in 1849 amounted to £9,238,000, had in 1853 increased to £13,610,000. Those from China, which in 1849 were £6,200,000, rose in 1853, to £8,300,000. Again, the tonnage employed in the trade between Great Britain and her Eastern possessions, including the other countries in the Indian Seas, to and fro, amounted in 1849 to 967,076, and in 1853 to 1,595,138 tons.

It may perhaps not be superfluous to reply to those persons who still believe in the supposed monopoly which they think it advisable for England to retain in her commerce with the East; we have just seen that there is in fact no such monopoly as far as the United States are concerned, and that England does not suffer from the want of it. It is the same with respect to Europe. This state of things has a tendency to increase every day, even with the existing means of communication by the Cape of Good Hope and the imperfect transit through Egypt. Marseilles, Bordeaux, Havre, Genoa, Trieste, Amsterdam, Rotterdam, and Hamburg, all despatch vessels direct to the Indies. Marseilles and Trieste now receive, viâ Egypt, cases of indigo from India and bales of silk goods from China. Powerful companies, in anticipation of peace, are at this moment engaged in building ships expressly for trading to the East, or else in devoting to that purpose the steamers and sailing vessels now used as transports in the Black Sea.

Other objections have been made, and as they have been seriously brought forward, I cannot allow them to pass without remark. Some very modest Englishmen have compared their country to Venice, and have contended, that if Venice lost her power by the discovery of the Cape of Good Hope, England would see hers decline by a return to the shortest route. In the first place, the shortest route is a geographical fact which no one can get rid of, and, from the moment that it is ascertained that no material obstacle prevents the opening of this direct line, it will not be for any Government, much less for the one which has inaugurated the era of commercial freedom, to oppose the realization of a work which will satisfy the interests of all. Then, Great Britain in the nineteenth century cannot be compared to Venice in the fifteenth: the latter, in consequence of her defeats in 1291 and 1298, had been obliged to cede the supremacy to Genoa, and, after having still shone in the first rank when she put herself at the head of the league against Charles VIII. (1495), finally lost her preponderance when the Portuguese destroyed her fleets in the Red Sea, and the Emperor, the Pope and the kings of France and Aragon formed the league of Cambray against her (1508). It would be useless to prove by historical evidence that the decline of the Queen of the Adriatic was due to other causes than the discovery of the Cape (1497), by which she might have profited as well as the Portuguese, if she had had the same elements of strength and vitality. Trieste, which has succeeded to her commercial prosperity, and even surpassed it, has had no need of the re-establishment of the ancient route to India. If Trieste participates largely, as is to be hoped, in the advantages of the Isthmus Company, if her neighbour of the Adriatic finds therein a new life, Great Britain will lose nothing thereby. Has it ever been seen that a capital city, brought into communication with a great market by a railroad, has had to regret the shortening of the distance and the amelioration of its own relations, because some secondary towns on the line were nearer to the market and participated in the common benefit?

Marseilles, Trieste, Greece, the ports of Italy, of Spain and of Turkey, are nearer to Egypt than London and Liverpool. Well; in the present state of the relations of Europe with Alexandria, England absorbs to herself alone half the value of the commerce between all other countries and Egypt, and her tonnage comprises two-thirds of the navigation to and fro under all flags.

I wrote the following from Cairo, December 3rd, 1854, to a friend of mine, a member of the British Parliament.

“Some persons assert that the Viceroy of Egypt’s project will meet with opposition in England. I cannot believe it: your statesmen are too enlightened for me to entertain such a supposition under present circumstances. What! England herself transacts more than half the general commerce with India and China; she has an immense empire in Asia; she may reduce by one-third the charges on her commerce, and bring that Eastern Empire nearer by one-half; and she would not allow it to be done. Wherefore? To prevent the Mediterranean nations from taking advantage of their situation to increase their commerce in the Eastern Seas,—she would deprive herself of the immense advantages which must accrue to her, in material respects, and in a political point of view, from this new communication, solely because others are more favourably situated than herself, as if geographical position was all-in-all, and as if, everything considered, England had not more to gain by this work than all the nations together. Finally, England, it is said, must dread the reduction in the number of vessels employed in Indian commerce which would result from the diminution of more than one-third in the duration of the voyage. And has not England proved in her experience of railways, by results which have surpassed the boldest anticipations, that the necessary consequence of shortening the distance and diminishing the duration of a journey, is the infinite augmentation of intercourse and circulation. One cannot understand why those who entertain this fear do not advise the English Government to direct, that the voyage to India now shall be viâ Cape Horn, for that would employ still more ships than the way by the Cape of Good Hope and furnish better sailors.

“If, as is not unlikely, the difficulties with which I am threatened should be brought forward, public opinion, so powerful in England, will soon do justice to interested opposition and superannuated objections.”

Her Majesty’s Government concluded with the United States, on the 19th of April, 1850, a treaty of neutrality for the projected canal through the American Isthmus. The cabinets of London and Paris are now on such intimate terms as to make it a matter of no difficulty for them to agree upon a convention, if it suited their political interests to do so, relative to the passage of the Isthmus of Suez, assimilating it to that of the Dardanelles. The other powers would not fail to give in their adhesion to the convention, which would be open to them.

In this manner commercial navigation would be guaranteed against the chances of war, and military armaments could neither remain in nor pass through the Isthmus without the permission of the Sovereign of the country.