If the result of this investigation should be such as to place the difficulties and facilities of each route on a par, it will then follow that a gain in time of from four to six weeks would be effected in navigating to or from India, &c. by the proposed Canal, as compared with the Cape of Good Hope route.
Before concluding this part of the subject, I think it well to advert to another objection which may possibly be raised against the Canal passage, namely, the difficulty of tracking a vessel of heavy burthen through the Canal, from the Mediterranean to the Red Sea, against a current of three to four miles an hour, which would be the velocity of the stream constantly flowing from the Red Sea to the Mediterranean.
To this may be answered, that the same northerly winds which prevail as already stated, for the greater part of the year, in the upper or northern part of the Red Sea, also blow across the Isthmus, and consequently the vessel would be for the most part able to stem the current by using her sails. In default of this, a sufficient number of dromedaries would track a vessel of almost any size, or posts placed along the banks of the Canal for warping would effect the object on occasions, which would be of but rare occurrence, of a failure of wind.
It is to be considered also, that as the beds of the Bitter Lakes and of the Lake Timsah, would form two very extensive basins in the course of the Canal, nearly half-way between the Mediterranean and the Red Sea, these would become halting places or inland ports, and here steam tugs would no doubt, among other accessories, be found, should the Canal ever become a general channel of intercourse.
From the Red Sea to the Mediterranean the vessel would, of course, be carried along by the stream.
General Observations as to the Political, Commercial, and Moral Benefits which would be derived from the Accomplishment of the Undertaking.
In a political point of view, the facilities which the Canal passage, combined with steam navigation, would afford to Great Britain, as regards the government of her Indian empire and dependencies, are almost incalculable.
From Malta troops could be placed in Bombay in three weeks; in Ceylon and Madras in four weeks; and in Calcutta in five weeks. And by means of the frequent intermediate coast communication in India, which the extended and comprehensive plan of steam navigation anticipated to result from the opening of the Canal passage would afford, troops and stores could be rapidly moved from one station to another.
Let any military man compare this with the present mode of effecting similar operations. The long sea voyage by the Cape of Good Hope, of four or five months, in a sailing vessel;—the men worn out, and requiring almost as many months more after debarkation, to recruit their health and strength, so as to be fit for active duty;—the length of time, and great fatigue, in moving between distant military stations;—and I think he will admit, that India might, with the facility alluded to, be efficiently governed with one-half the number of European troop which is now required. The facility for despatching ships of war, and stores of all kinds, to or from India, &c., need only be glanced at to be at once appreciated. The stability of British power in India would be thus increased, while the cost of maintaining it would be considerably diminished.