A Journal of the Disasters in Affghanistan, 1841-2

by Florentia Wynch Sale

The General again begged of the Sirdar to permit him to return to his troops; but without avail.

Johnson, by the General's desire, wrote early in the day to Skinner, to come to the Sirdar. This letter and two others, it is to be feared, he never received. A report was brought in that Skinner was wounded, but not dangerously; the Sirdar expressed much sorrow; poor Skinner died of his wound the same day.

Until 12 o'clock crowds of Ghilzyes with their respective chiefs, continued to pour in from the surrounding country to make their salaams to Mahommed Akbar Khan, to participate in the plunder of our unfortunate people, and to revel in the massacre of the Europeans. From their expressions of hatred towards our whole race, they appeared to anticipate more delight in cutting our throats than in the expected booty. However, on a hint from the Sirdar, they changed the language, in which they conversed, from Persian to Pushtoo, which was not understood by our officers.

The Sirdar, to all appearance, whilst sitting with Johnson, endeavoured to conciliate them; but it very probably was only done as a blind to hide his real feelings.

In two instances, the reply of the chiefs was,—"When Burnes came into this country, was not your father entreated by us to kill him; or he would go back to Hindostan, and at some future day bring an army and take our country from us? He would not listen to our advice, and what is the consequence? Let us now, that we have the opportunity, take advantage of it; and kill those infidel dogs."

At about 12, the Sirdar left them, and went on the top of a hill in rear of the British bivouac. He did not return till sunset; and in reply to the anxious inquiry when Mahommed Shah Khan would return, they were always told immediately. Frequent assurances had been given that the troops had been supplied with food and water; but subsequently they learnt that neither had been given them in their dire necessity.

The Sirdar returned at dusk; and was soon followed by Mahommed Shah Khan, who brought intelligence that all was finally and amicably arranged for the safe conduct of the troops to Jellalabad. The Sirdar said he would accompany them in the morning early. By the General's request, Johnson wrote to Brig. Anquetil to have the troops in readiness to march by 8 o'clock: he had also commenced a letter to Gen. Sale to evacuate Jellalabad (this being part of the terms). Suddenly, and before the first note was sent off, much musketry was heard down the valley in the direction of the troops; and a report was brought in that the Europeans were moving off through the pass followed by the Ghilzyes. All was consternation. At first the Sirdar suggested that he and the officers should follow them: in this the General concurred. In a few minutes the Sirdar changed his mind; said he feared their doing so would injure the troops, by bringing after them the whole horde of Ghilzyes then assembled in the valley. He promised to send a confidential servant to Meer Afzul Khan at Gundamuk (two miles beyond Soorkhab) to afford them protection; and agreed to start with them at midnight, as being mounted they would overtake the others before daybreak. When about to separate for the night, the Sirdar again altered the time of departure to the first hour of daylight. Remonstrances were of no avail; and our party were too completely in the power of the enemy, to persist in what they had not the power to enforce.

Mahommed Akbar Khan told Johnson, after Mahommed Shah Khan went out to consult with the chiefs of the pass, that the latter were dogs and no faith could be placed in them; and begged Johnson would send for three or four of his most intimate friends, that their lives might be saved in the event of treachery to the troops. Gladly as he would have saved his individual friends, he was under the necessity of explaining to the Sirdar that a sense of honour would prevent the officers deserting their men at a time of such imminent peril. The Sirdar also proposed, that in the event of the Ghilzyes not acceding to the terms, he would himself, at dusk, proceed with a party of horsemen to the foot of the hill where our troops were; and, previous orders being sent to the commanding officer for all to be ready, he would bring every European away in safety, by each of his horsemen taking up one behind him: the Ghilzyes would not then fire upon them, lest they should hit him or his men. But he would not allow a single Hindostanee to follow; as he could not protect 2000 men (the computed number).—Johnson interpreted all this to the General: but it was deemed impracticable; as from past experience they knew how impossible it was even to separate the Sipahees from the camp followers. Four or five times during the day they heard the report of musketry in the direction of our troops; but they were always told that all fighting had ceased. This was subsequently proved to be a gross falsehood. Our troops were incessantly fired upon from the time that the General and the other officers quitted them to the time of their departure, and several hundreds of officers and men had been killed or wounded. The remainder, maddened with cold, hunger, and thirst, the communication between them and the General cut off, and seeing no prospect but certain death before them by remaining in their present position, determined on making one desperate effort to leave Jugdaluk. Snow fell during the night.

My narrative now continues from information furnished by a friend remaining with the remnant of this ill-fated army.—They halted this day at Jugdaluk, hoping to negotiate an arrangement with Mahommed Akbar Khan and the Ghilzye chiefs, as before stated: but the continual firing, and frequent attempts made by the enemy to force them from their position during the day, but too well indicated that there was little or no chance of negotiations being effectual to quell hostilities, and admit of their resuming their march in safety: on the contrary, there appeared an evident determination still to harass their retreat to the very last.

Near the close of the day the enemy commenced a furious attack from all sides. The situation of our troops at this time was critical in the extreme: the loss they sustained in men and officers had been great during the day, and the survivors had only been able to obtain a scanty meal of camel's flesh: even water was not procurable without the parties proceeding for it being exposed to a heavy fire. The men, under all this suffering, perishing with cold at their post, bravely repelled the enemy; and would then have followed them from under the dilapidated walls had they been permitted to do so. During this conflict Capt. Souter of the 44th, anxious to save the colours of his regiment, tore one of them from its staff, and folding it round his person, concealed it under the poshteen he wore: the other was in like manner appropriated by Lieut. Cumberland; but finding that he could not close his pea-coat over it, he reluctantly entrusted it to the care of the Acting Quartermaster-Sergeant of the 44th regiment.