Handbook for Spies

by Foote Alexander

A really suspicious-minded person might think that the whole thing was a gigantic double-cross by the Germans, who could have supplied Selzinger with a vast amount of authentic information in the hope that the occasional piece of false information would be accepted as well. There is one scrap of intelligence to support this thesis, and one scrap only. At the time of Timoshenko's Kharkov offensive in 1942 the Russians based this offensive almost entirely on the information that Lucy supplied. In this case the Russians found themselves in a trap and heavy losses ensued. If this had been one of many incidents resulting from Lucy's intelligence, the thesis that the whole thing was a German strategic double- cross would be more tenable. However, this was the only occasion that his information turned out not to be genuine. It is almost inconceivable that the Germans- if they had controlled the source of Lucy's original intelligence - would not have attempted to cash in on it to a greater extent. This did not happen and I think that this excludes the double-cross hypothesis. It is of course possible that Selzinger's intimate contact with the Swiss General Staff may have helped to supplement his information. Selzinger may not have been above peddling to the Russians such information as he obtained in his capacity as an "evaluater" of Swiss intelligence- his own sources in Germany having failed him.

The only clue that Selzinger ever gave as to his sources was when I saw him after my release from prison, when he stated that the purge which resulted from the attempt of July 1944 had considerably reduced the number of his sources. He did manage, however, to produce formidable documentation which he asked me to take with me to Paris for transmission to the Soviet Embassy there, and the purge and the resultant almost complete elimination of any potential resistance movement in Germany had obviously merely embarrassed and temporarily inconvenienced him rather than removed his sources. We can thus rule out any super-patriotic German general as the source.

Really, anyone's guess is as good as mine. If the source was a German double-cross it was a very badly conceived one. If it was the Bendlerstrasse they managed to continue very active even after sentence of death by the People's Court. If it was the Swiss they certainly showed more efficiency than they did in the elimination of our network.

Let the matter be left there. It is sufficient for my purpose - as it was for the Centre - that Lucy produced the "goods" and that on all occasions save one these were accurate, speedy, and complete. The war on the eastern front was fought largely on them and the intelligence produced led to victories for the Allies. I can only suggest that further enquiries be directed to Selzinger himself. As will be seen, he was arrested in June 1944 and released some three months afterwards with a certificate from the Swiss General Staff testifying to the services that he had performed and guaranteeing him immunity in the future. He is therefore presumably still a resident of Switzerland. His services in the past cannot be denied - he produced the answers and protected his sources, and one asks no more of a secret agent. His efforts, if any, in the future may be equally interesting. It is to be hoped that his skill at penetrating into the heart of general staffs remains confined to Germany - if his employers remain the same.

PRELUDE TO WAR

I have interrupted the story of my own activities in order to give a picture of a typical Soviet spy network and also to explain our own. Such background "briefing" is essential for the clear understanding of what follows. Without some background knowledge of the workings of a Russian spy organisation and the cardinal principles involved, many of my actions and the precautions that we took would appear meaningless and stupid. Anyone who has read so far will now appreciate the essential and elementary security precautions that were taken and the way that our sources were contacted. Later on it will be seen how criminal disregard for these "simple little rules and few" led the organisation into disaster.

The period of my career as an active spy when I was in direct wireless communication with the Centre in Moscow falls quite naturally into two parts. The first comprises the first few months of the spring of 1941, between the time that I at last established communication with Moscow on March 12 and the invasion of Russia by Germany on June 22. The second period is from the entry of Russia into the war until my arrest on November 20, 1943. The first period was really a continuation of the halcyon days of peace, after the outbreak of war in September 1939 when Philips, Sonia, and I had little to do and did it on the whole very well. The flurry caused by the fall of France had subsided, and Rado's communications were secure, thanks to the activities of Sonia and myself. He had one set working in Geneva operated by the Hamels and I was also in touch with the Centre from Lausanne. Life was pleasant and easy in Switzerland that spring, and I enjoyed it and the leisure to the full- it was the last leisure I was to have for some time.

In those easy, carefree days I had contact with Moscow twice a week only. Twice a week at one o'clock in the morning I would settle down at my transmitter and send off what little I had and receive Moscow's replies. I was not at that time asked to do any espionage work myself nor to go out and attempt to recruit sources. I was the substitute resident director and as such had to remain in the background; the Centre was perfectly content to know that I was there; that communications were secured and that if anything happened they could call upon me if necessary.

On instructions from the Centre I concentrated upon establishing myself so firmly in Lausanne that there would be no possible danger of my presence arousing suspicion. This was not easy, for in the middle of the war there were not a great number of British subjects of military age resident in neutral Switzerland. In normal times the Centre will often put a resident director into his country for two years before they ask him to take over any work: he spends the entire two years in building himself an impressive cover. I had to do this as quickly as possible, and in time of war. My fellow Englishmen varied from retired army officers and civil servants, who had settled down in Switzerland on their pensions and been caught by the war, to the riffraff of the Riviera, who had been swept out of France by the German invasion and had taken refuge in Switzerland where they lived precariously on their wits, the black market, and such remittances as they could get from home. The latter were not an attractive crowd but they turned out in the end to be useful to me- though quite unconscious that they were indirectly assisting the Red Army. I understand that I ended up with the reputation of being a mildly eccentric English millionaire who had managed to salt away a portion of his fortune abroad and who on the whole shunned the company of his fellow men. The reputation of wealth was essential as otherwise I might have had awkward questions from the Swiss police as to the source of my funds; indeed at times my finances were precarious, while at others I had tens of thousands of Swiss francs concealed in my flat. My reputation as a recluse was not ill deserved. If anyone has ever tried to encipher messages for half the night and transmit them for the other half he will understand the reason why for the rest of the day I was inclined to keep to my flat - and my bed.

At this time Rado's transmitter was capable of taking all the traffic that had to be sent, so I was not used as an overflow channel. Indeed, the only espionage assignment that the Centre gave me that spring was the task of preparing an economic report on Switzerland. This I agreed to do, but in fact did nothing about it as I had no qualifications nor indeed any sources at that time to produce such a thing. Moscow used occasionally to enquire solicitously as to its progress and I used to reply equally encouragingly but did nothing but look round in a vague sort of way for someone suitable to "ghost" such a report for me. Luckily, before Moscow became too querulous the German invasion took place and such academic matters were shelved.