Handbook for Spies

by Foote Alexander

All this was reported to the Centre over my set-  which was now the only link the network had with Moscow. The director expressed concern, but stated that Lucy's information was so important that we must continue working despite the arrests, and he ordered Rado and me to make every effort, with the aid of the local Party, to recruit new operators and construct new sets.

Rado was frantic with worry and anxiety- worry over the breakdown of the organisation and anxiety concerning his personal safety. He had cause for anxiety, for he had broken practically every security precaution in the espionage code. Fearing that he was being tailed, he had, some time previously, deposited all his records with Hamel, who had a secure hiding place built into his flat. These records contained not only all the financial details of the network but also copies of telegrams which had been sent, often with the encoded version attachéd to them. As if this were not sufficient, he had also been idiotic enough to leave a copy of his code book there, and this, too, fell into the hands of the police. He feared, not without reason, that his code was compromised and that, with the material captured, the Swiss would be able to read all the back traffic that he had sent, which they had picked up through their monitoring of the sets. This meant that not only was I the only physical link with the Centre but also that my code was the only one which could be used.

The police haul had been even better than this. Among the messages that they discovered was one giving the details of a new Swiss Oerlikon cannon which was still on the secret list, and from the messages the Swiss were able after some study to discover that the source of much of the military information was none other than their trusted military evaluator, Lucy himself. Thus not only was Rado guilty of espionage against Swiss interests, which would make the Bupo doubly anxious to get to the bottom of the affair, but his ill-considered actions had imperilled our most valuable source as well. I also shrewdly suspected that, among the other miscellaneous financial papers, the police would find clear pointers towards me and the rest of the network. My fears were not ungrounded as subsequent events showed.

A few days later Rado reported that the Geneva Communist Party had been able to make contact with the Hamels and Bolli through the agency of a prison warder who was a secret member of the Party. Hamel told us that he had been shown a photograph of me and told that the original was the head of the entire network. They did not know then of the existence of Rado - or so it appeared. (The photograph of course was the one supplied by Lorenz.)

Rado had gone to ground in Berne, but soon after he plucked up courage and went back and lived openly at his flat. He noticed, however, that it was under observation, or he thought it was, and went to ground again in the flat of a couple of Party sympathisers in Geneva.

All this was reported back to the Centre, who ordered me to take control of the entire group, and the director stated that he had given orders to Rado to put me in touch with his two main cut-outs, Pakbo and Cissie. Although Rado had now ceased to use his cipher, the Centre still sent occasional messages in it for him. They regarded their codes as unbreakable unless the key fell into the wrong hands and could not believe that an old hand like Rado had been so foolish as to hand the whole thing to the Swiss on a plate- as he had done.

Rado agreed to put me in touch with Pakbo, but said that Cissie declined to have any contact with me. He said that owing to the visit of the two presumed German agents to her flat a month or two back she feared that she would be compromised if she was in direct touch with me. That was Rado's story; but I learnt after my release that it bore little relation to die truth. In fact, Cissie had asked to be put in touch with me but this Rado had refused to do. The reasons were not difficult to understand. Rado wished at all costs to keep control of the organisation and in order so to do was prepared to disobey the director's orders. He also knew that it would be extremely embarrassing to him were I to meet Cissie and compare notes- especially on finance. Rado had been indenting on me for large sums of money to pay Cissie and her agents but had been keeping a large proportion of this money for himself. This discrepancy would immediately come out when we met- as it did a year later.

As a result Rado stated that he would continue to receive the Lucy information through Cissie and pass it on to me through a cut-out. He also said that he would act as cut-out between Jean Beauchamp and me. Jean was the son of a Communist leader and was busy recruiting wireless operators for the time when we could once again start up new sets. We also arranged for a place of conspiracy for Jean and me in case of emergency.

Rado therefore suggested that the best thing for the network and himself would be for him to take refuge in the British Legation (there was, of course, no Soviet representation in Switzerland and the nearest Soviet official was in Ankara or London). Once there, with him safely inside the hedge of diplomatic immunity, the network could continue functioning as before- with the one difference that the British would have to be brought into the picture. Rado himself was not in touch with the British but Pakbo, through his cut-out Salter, the Balkan service attaché, made the approach and Rado received the reply that the British were prepared to harbour him if necessary. The Swiss end of the deal was therefore settled and he had only to square the Centre. I therefore passed on to the Centre Rado's request that he should be allowed to retire from the world and take refuge with the British. Almost by return transmission I received a most emphatic "No." The Centre added that they could not understand how such an old hand as Rado could even think of making such a suggestion, as "the British would track down his lines of communication and use them for themselves."

This idea of Allied co-operation rather shook Rado, but it was not in the least inconsistent with the attitude that the Centre had adopted on previous occasions. Once, in 1942, Rado had had in his hands certain documents and plans which would have been of great value to the British as well as to the Russians, but the material was so bulky that it was impossible for us to pass it over the air. He therefore had suggested that it be handed over to the Allies - through a suitable and secure cut-out of course. The Centre's reaction was immediate. Rado received instructions to burn the information at once. From the director's point of view there was little difference between information falling into German or British hands. It was Russian information and if it could not be passed to the Centre, then the right place for it was the wastepaper basket- however valuable it might be to Russia's allies.