History of the Zulu war and its origin

by Frances Ellen Colenso

In point of fact, the Lieut.-Governor had no power to form a court such as that by which Langalibalele was tried, consisting of his excellency himself as Supreme Chief, the Secretary for Native Affairs, certain administrators of native law, and certain native chiefs and indunas. Besides which the Lieut.-Governor was not only debarred by an ordinance of the colony[23] from sitting as judge in such a court, from which he would be the sole judge in a court of appeal, but had already committed himself to a decision adverse to the prisoner by having issued the proclamation of November 11th, 1873, declaring that the chief and his tribe had “set themselves in open revolt and rebellion against Her Majesty’s Government in this colony,” and “proclaiming and making known that they were in rebellion, and were hereby declared to be outlaws,” and that “the said tribe was broken up, and from that day forth had ceased to exist,” and by further seizing and confiscating all the cattle and property of the said tribe within reach, deposing Langalibalele from his chieftainship, and otherwise treating him and his tribe as rebels.

His Excellency, therefore, could not possibly be looked upon as an unprejudiced judge of the first instance in the prisoner’s case; nor could the Secretary for Native Affairs, Mr. Shepstone, by whose advice and with whose approval the expedition had been undertaken. As to the minor members of the court, they could hardly be expected to have an independent opinion in the matter, especially the “native chiefs and indunas,” who knew very well that they would be liable to the accusation of disaffection themselves if they ventured to show any bearing towards the prisoner, or to do otherwise than blindly follow the lead of their white “brother-judges” (!) and masters.

The native names gave a satisfactory air of justice to the proceedings of the court in English eyes, but in point of fact they were but dummy judges after all.

Not only, however, was the court wrongly constituted, but its proceedings were irregular and illegal. It was called, and considered to be, a native court, but in point of fact it was a nondescript assembly, such usages of either native or supreme court as could possibly tell on the prisoner’s side (notably the use of counsel) being omitted, and only those which would insure his conviction admitted.

It was not the practice of the colony for serious crimes to be tried before a native court. But in this case they were obliged to run counter to custom for the reason given in a previous note, that most of the separate charges against the chief could not be recognised as crimes at all in an English court of law. At the same time the sentence finally given was one quite beyond the power of the court to pronounce. Clause 4 of the ordinance limits the power of the Supreme Chief to “appointing or removing the subordinate chiefs or other authorities” among the natives, but gives him no power to sentence to death, or to “banishment or transportation for life to such place as the Supreme Chief or Lieut.-Governor may appoint.” When Langalibalele had been “removed” from his chieftainship, and himself and the bulk of his tribe “driven over the mountain out of the colony” by the Government force, as announced in the bulletin of November 13th, 1873, the cattle within the colony seized, and many of the tribe killed in resisting the attempt to seize them, the Supreme Chief, under native law, had expended his power; while banishment is a punishment wholly unknown to Kafir law, as is plainly stated in “Kafir Laws and Customs,” p. 39.

Again, throughout the trial, the prisoner was assumed to have pleaded guilty, although in point of fact he had merely admitted that he had done certain acts, but desired witnesses to be called whose “evidence would justify or extenuate what he had done,” a plea which in any ordinary court would be recorded as a plea of “Not guilty.”

The native members of the court, also, were made to sign a judgment, the contents of which had been “interpreted” to them, and their signatures “witnessed,” by which the prisoner is declared to have been “convicted, on clear evidence, of several acts, for some of which he would be liable to forfeit his life under the law of every civilised country in the world.” The absurdity of this is palpable, since it was impossible that these men should know anything of the law of any civilised land; it is plain, therefore, that in pretending to agree with assertions, of the meaning of which they were totally ignorant, they were under some strong influence, such as prejudice against the prisoner, undue fear of the Supreme Chief, or desire to please him—one of them being “Head Induna of the Natal Government,” and another the “Induna to the Secretary for Native Affairs.”

To turn to these crimes, “for some of which he would be liable to forfeit his life under the law of every civilised country in the world”—to which statement His Excellency the Supreme Chief, the Secretary for Native Affairs, and the Administrators of Native Law have also signed their names—we find that the charges run as follows:

1. “Setting at naught the authority of the magistrate in a manner[24] not indeed sufficiently palpable to warrant the use of forcible coercion to our (civilised) laws and customs.” Which charge we may at once dismiss as absurd.

2. “Permitting, or probably encouraging, his tribe to possess fire-arms, and retain them contrary to law.”