History of the Zulu war and its origin

by Frances Ellen Colenso

“The falsehood of the Zulu king with regard to the Utrecht land question,” says Mr. Brownlee, “is quite on a par with his other actions. After misleading the Natal Government upon the merits of the case, it is now discovered on the clearest and most incontrovertible proof[112] that a formal cession was made of this disputed land to the Transvaal Republic.”

The special correspondent of The Cape Argus, however, writes about this time as follows: “Dunn states that Cetshwayo does not, even now, know fully the contents of the ultimatum, and still less of the subsequent memorandum.[113] The document was read over once, and its length was such (2222, pp. 203-9)—six pages of the Blue-book—that the messengers could not possibly fix the whole of it in their memory.” True, a copy was given to Dunn himself; but, for sufficient reasons of his own, he did not make known the contents of the document in person, but sent word to the king by his own messengers, between whom and the indunas there was a considerable discrepancy. According to Dunn, Cetshwayo was in a great fury upon hearing the word of the High Commissioner (? as to the maintenance of Boer “private rights” over his land). He reproached his adviser with having thwarted his purpose to exact satisfaction at the hands of the Dutch, and doubly blamed him for having represented the English as just in their intercourse and friendly in their intentions. Until this time he had thought, as Dunn himself had, that the congregation of troops upon his borders represented nothing but an idle scare. But he saw at length that the English had thrown the bullock’s skin over his head, while they had been devouring the tid-bits of the carcass.

The three causes alleged in the ultimatum for war—the raid of Sihayo’s sons, the assault on Messrs. Smith and Deighton, and the proceedings of Umbilini—occurred long after Sir B. Frere had been preparing for war, in the full expectation that the Border Commission would decide against the Zulu claims, and that Cetshwayo would not acquiesce peacefully in such a decision. It would seem, indeed, from his remarks on the subject (Correspondence, Letters II. and IV.), that he would have even set aside the decision of the Commissioners, if he had found it possible to do so. Although he failed in doing this, he sought to attain practically the same end by means of a remarkable “memorandum,” prepared and signed by himself—not submitted to Sir Henry Bulwer, but “prematurely” published in the Natal newspapers.

The memorandum in question was on the appointment of a Resident in Zululand, and, as Sir Bartle Frere himself says, “it was intended to explain for Cetshwayo’s benefit what was the nature of the cession to him of the ceded territory,” and it contained the following clause: “It is intended that in that district (the late disputed territory) individual rights of property, which were obtained under the Transvaal Government, shall be respected and maintained, so that any Transvaal farmers, who obtained rights from the Government of the Republic, and who may now elect to remain on the territory, may possess under British guarantee the same rights they would have possessed had they been grantees holding from the Zulu king under the guarantee of the great Zulu council.”

The whole of the disputed territory had been apportioned in farms to Transvaal subjects, and without doubt every one of these farms would immediately be claimed, since their value would be immensely raised by the fact that in future they would be held “under British guarantee.” Therefore, to thus maintain the farmers upon them without regard to the wishes of the Zulu king and nation was simply to take away piecemeal with one hand what had just been given as a whole with the other.

This “memorandum” was hailed with triumph by some of the colonial papers, and the news that, after all, the Zulus were to get no solid satisfaction from the award, soon circulated amongst all classes, not excluding the Zulus themselves.

It was upon this subject that the “Correspondence” between Sir Bartle Frere and the Bishop of Natal, already referred to, commenced. In December, 1878, the High Commissioner was good enough to invite the Bishop, both by message and personally, to “criticise” his policy towards the Zulus. The invitation, indeed, came far too late for any arguments or information, which the Bishop might be able to afford, to be of the very slightest use. However, the High Commissioner desired criticism, and received it in a series of letters, which—except the last two, withheld for some reason best known to himself—were published, with Sir B. Frere’s replies, in the Blue-books.

The Bishop pointed out that, under the interpretation of this memorandum, “the award gives back the land in name only to the Zulus, whereas in reality Ketshwayo will have no control over it; he will not be able to exercise authority over his own people living on it, without coming into collision immediately with their Boer masters, who would fiercely resent any intrusion on his part on their farms; he will not be able to send any of his people to live on it, or any of his cattle to graze on it, or even to assign places in it to such of his people as may elect to move from the Boer to the Zulu side of the new boundary.”[114] To which Sir Bartle replies, that he had “a strong impression[115] that, if Cetshwayo were simply told the disputed land was assigned to him, he would at once conclude that it was his in full Zulu sovereignty;” which he assumed to be impossible with regard to any land which had once been under the British flag, while to eject a settler who had bought the land from the Transvaal Government, in the belief that it could maintain him upon it, he regarded as an “unjust and immoral act.” In point of fact, the land in question could only have been looked upon as “under the British flag,” in trust for the rightful possessors, and the farmers had settled upon it in the full knowledge that the title to it was in dispute; while, even had it been otherwise as to the latter point, the only just claim that could be raised would be against the Boer Government, or its representative, and certainly not against the right of the Zulu people to be restored to actual occupation of the land.

But that from the first, and long before he left Capetown for Natal, the High Commissioner was preparing for war with the Zulus, is evident from his despatch and telegram of January 26th, 1878 (quoted from at page 179), in the former of which he speaks of the delay caused by the border inquiry being no disadvantage, as, besides other reasons, it “will increase our means of defending whatever we may find to be our unquestionable rights;” and in the latter he says again: “I hope the delay caused will not be great, and whatever there is will have compensating advantages, for I have some hopes of being able to strengthen your hands.”

These phrases, indeed, might merely refer to Sir Bartle Frere’s desire to be “ready to defend ourselves against further aggressions;” but certain statements made by Commodore Sullivan show that he had already in view the invasion of Zululand.