Sir Bartle Frere, in his despatch of 30th June, 1879 (P. P. [C. 2454] p. 137), seeks to prove that the time of moving across the border was “well chosen,” and accorded with information received, yet the fact remains that advice was given that the most favourable time for military operations in Zululand was between the periods of summer rains and winter grass-fires—i.e. the months of March, April, and May. In spite of Sir Bartle Frere’s pleas, we must hold that no competent “military critic” would recommend invading an enemy’s country during the rainy season, when rivers are in flood, plains in many cases marshes, and roads almost impassable; especially if the invading forces were required to move with a ponderous waggon-train.
Lord Chelmsford himself proves the case: he writes (January 12th) on the day after crossing the border: “The country is in a terrible state from the rain, and I do not know how we shall manage to get our waggons across the valley near Sirayo’s kraals.”—(P. P. [C. 2242] p. 43).
And again on January 14th, from the head-quarter camp, Zululand, near Rorke’s Drift, he writes: “Between this camp and Greytown alone, a distance of some seventy miles, three rivers are now impassable, and waggons have to cross by ferries, a laborious operation requiring more skilled labour than we at present have available.
“The road at various points requires the most constant supervision, and in some parts the heavy rain frequently dislodges huge boulders from the hill-sides overhanging the roadway, and in many places watercourses become torrents after an hour’s rain.
“Beyond this camp towards the Izipezi Hill (my first objective point) the road will require great labour to make it passable; but strong working-parties have already been at work. The transport difficulties are augmented by the great mortality in oxen; this is inevitable, but it will probably decrease in a few weeks’ time” (ibid. p. 47).
It is believed that the first project of operations was to advance in three lines on Ulundi—from the Lower Tugela, Rorke’s Drift, and Blood River—the columns to move forward by short marches, entrenching strongly at each halting-place, doing no injury to the Zulu people, and thus inducing them to submit quietly. This wise and consistent idea was unfortunately never even attempted.
On the 8th January, 1879, Lord Chelmsford writes: “All the reports which reach me tend to show that the Zulus intend, if possible, to make raids into Natal[120] when the several columns move forward.... The strength of the three columns, Nos. 1, 3, and 4, is only just sufficient to enable them to advance.”—(P. P. [C. 2242] p. 26).
The directions for the various columns were, briefly—No. 1. To cross the Tugela at Fort Pearson and encamp on the Zulu side; when ordered to advance, to move on Etshowe, and there, or in its neighbourhood, to form a depôt, well entrenched.
No. 2. To form a portion of No. 1 Column, but act separately, reporting to Colonel Pearson; to remain on the Middle Tugela frontier till an advance is ordered, and Colonel Pearson has reached Etshowe.
The defence of the frontier was to rest with the Colonial Government; but on the 8th January the General altered the instructions for No. 2 Column, and directed two-thirds of it to move up to the Sand Spruit Valley for the protection of the Umsinga border, and to operate in conjunction with No. 3 Column. The third battalion to remain at Middle Drift.