On the 17th the General made a reconnaissance as far as Isandhlwana; and on January 20th No. 3 Column moved from Rorke’s Drift and Bashi Valley, to the spot selected for the camp to the east of Isandhlwana Hill. The post at Rorke’s Drift (where the Buffalo was crossed)—of vital importance to the safety of the column—was left with a garrison of one company of 1-24th Regiment, but without any attempt whatever at entrenchment: nor were any defensive precautions taken at Helpmakaar, the store depôt in Natal, twelve miles from Rorke’s Drift. The march to Isandhlwana was accomplished “without much difficulty,” but “half a battalion 2-24th was obliged to halt short of this camp owing to the oxen being fatigued.” They bivouacked for the night in the open.
The position of the camp is thus described: “At the spot where our road crossed ... we had a small kopje on the right, and then about fifty yards to our left rises abruptly the Isandhlwana Mountain ... entirely unapproachable from the three sides nearest us, but on the farther, viz. that to the north, it slopes more gradually down, and it is there connected with the large range of hills on our left with another broad neck of land. We just crossed over the bend, then turned sharp to the left, and placed our camp facing the valley, with the eastern precipitous side of the mountain behind us, leaving about a mile of open country between our left flank and the hills on our left, the right of the camp extending across the neck of land we had just come over, and resting on the base of the small kopje described beforehand.”
The camp was formed in the following order from left to right: 2-3rd Natal Native Contingent, 1-3rd Natal Native Contingent, 2-24th Regiment, Royal Artillery, mounted troops, and 1-24th Regiment. “The waggons were all placed between the camp and the hill at the back, and behind them, immediately against its base, the head-quarters’ tents were pitched with their waggons beside them.”... “Not a single step was taken in any way to defend our new position in case of a night or day attack from the enemy.”[122]
On the same day (20th) the General reconnoitred on the “waggon-track, which skirts Inhlazatye Mountain, as far as a place called Matyana’s Stronghold,” at a distance of about twelve miles, but saw nothing of the enemy. “Not having time to properly examine the country round this peculiar stronghold,” the General ordered that next day two separate parties should move out from the camp at an early hour; one of mounted men under Major Dartnell to reconnoitre on the road he had taken, whilst two battalions of Native Contingent under Commandant Lonsdale worked round the Malakata Mountain: the orders being that these officers were to effect a communication on the Inhlazatye range, and then return to camp.—(P. P. [C. 2252] pp. 74, 75).
At about ten o’clock the Zulus were found in force by the mounted men; the contingent being on a range of hills distant about five miles. The enemy appeared anxious to fight, but Major Dartnell did not think it prudent to engage without supports. The Zulus occupied a large kloof, and whenever the mounted men approached they came out in large numbers. A small body were sent up close, under Mr. Mansel, to try and make the Zulus show their force, when they advanced throwing out the “horns,” and tried to surround the party, following them down into the open, where Major Dartnell and the remainder of the mounted troops were. The whole then retired and joined the contingent, about three miles from the kloof.
In the evening, says Major Clery, “a message arrived from Major Dartnell that the enemy was in considerable force in his neighbourhood, and that he and Commandant Lonsdale would bivouac out the night,” which they were permitted to do.[123]
The wisdom of this may be doubted, as the Native Contingent seemed particularly liable to alarm; twice they “were seized with panic, rushing about everywhere, the night being very dark. They knocked us down,” writes an officer, “and stampeded our horses, causing the greatest confusion. If the Zulus had come on we should all have been cut to pieces.”
“That night Major Dartnell sent off messengers to Lord Chelmsford that he had marked the Zulus down in a kloof, and asked for two companies of infantry to be sent out as a support, and that he would attack the Zulus in the morning.”