How a court of inquiry, assembled without the power, apparently, of asking a single question, was to throw much light on the causes of the disaster, does not appear. Its scope was limited to the doings at the camp; and under any circumstances it could not well criticise the faults of the General. The proceedings of this court of inquiry can therefore only be considered as eminently unsatisfactory.
We might here leave this painful subject, were it not for the undisguised attempts that have been made to throw the blame on the dead.
In considering the question of blame, we must first put before us the circumstances in which the camp defenders found themselves when they were required “to defend the camp.”
Now the orders given to Lieut.-Colonel Pulleine are stated by Major Clery, senior staff-officer of No. 3 Column, thus:—
“Before leaving the camp I sent written instructions to Colonel Pulleine, 24th Regiment, to the following effect: ‘You will be in command of the camp during the absence of Colonel Glyn; draw in (I speak from memory) your camp, or your line of defence’—I am not certain which—‘while the force is out; also draw in the line of your infantry outposts accordingly, but keep your cavalry vedettes still far advanced.’ I told him to have a waggon ready loaded with ammunition ready to follow the force going out at a moment’s notice, if required. I went to Colonel Pulleine’s tent just before leaving camp to ascertain that he had got these instructions, and again repeated them verbally to him.”—(P. P. [C. 2260] p. 81).
As regards the force left to defend the camp, there were no instructions to form a defensive post; the General did not think it necessary, though to him was the almost prescient remark made: “We should be all right if we only had a laager.” He saw no danger; he was about to move his camp on, and a laager would be useless work, so he put the suggestion on one side with the remark: “It would take a week to make.” Thus Lieut.-Colonel Pulleine was left, and he had no reason to anticipate danger, till, almost without a moment’s warning, he found the camp threatened by an overwhelming force; he then, after trying in vain to check the enemy’s right, endeavoured to hold the donga and broken ground close in front of the camp, where his men found some cover; the camp itself being absolutely indefensible.[150] Colonel Durnford, as we have seen, reached the camp about 10.30 A.M., before which time Major Chard says: “The troops were in column ... out of camp,” and he saw Zulus “on the crest of the distant hills,” and several parties moving to the left towards Rorke’s Drift. Colonel Durnford takes out his mounted men to (as he thinks) assist his General, and to see what the enemy is about.[B]
Again, some assert that the action was brought about by Colonel Durnford’s Native Horse in the Ingqutu Hills. Even had it been so, yet this officer’s duty distinctly was to feel and reconnoitre the enemy.[151] When the Zulu army moved forward to the attack, he, with his handful of men, fell slowly back, gaining all the time possible for the camp defenders.
Taking the whole of the circumstances of the day, we may conclude that, had the enemy remained hidden on the 22nd, we should probably have lost the entire column instead of part; but the account given by an English Officer with one of the troops that first saw the enemy, and other accounts from Zulus, seem to make it clear that the Zulus were moving on the camp when they came in contact with the horsemen. That they had no intention of remaining hidden is shown by their unconcealed movements on the hills throughout the morning.[152]
Now, whether these defenders did or did not take the best measures “to defend the camp” when it was attacked, the primary causes of the disaster were undoubtedly these: