THE HOUTHULST FOREST
I wish I could omit all reference to the operations in Flanders 1917. Surely no one can be found to take much pride in the results of this part of the campaign. Judged by the map alone between May 1, 1917, and May 1, 1918, it will be found that we actually lost ground in Flanders, and that we were at the last hard put to it to retain any footing there at all.
It is difficult to know what motives, political or military, led to our pressing an attack with such colossal fury on this part of the line. Perhaps the Channel ports at Ostend and Zeebrugge were the prize we hoped to gain. Be that as it may, the result of our attack was to bring about a conflict of unparalleled intensity. The bulk of the English heavy artillery seemed to be concentrated on the one side and the bulk of the enemy's heavy artillery on the other. In a country like Flanders the ground is bad enough in foul weather; but where it is churned up for miles with the heaviest of shells, it becomes impossible to use tanks and next to impossible to use infantry.
Moreover, the Germans had superiority in the air. They had concentrated on aircraft the effort which we had expended on perfecting the tank. The one can be used effectively in wet weather, but the other cannot. The German had another defensive surprise for us. Owing to the nature of the ground the deep dugout was practically an impossibility. In the place, therefore, of this the German devised the concrete blockhouse or 'pill-box' as it was called. For miles behind their front line the country was dotted with pill-boxes, which could defy the tank and all but the largest kinds of shells. As soon as our operations started the rain streamed down, making conditions ten times worse for the attacking force.
All honour to those that gallantly stormed the muddy slopes of Passchendaele; to the wonderful engineers that conquered the squalid quagmires of Langemarck and Zonnebeke; to the gunners that stuck to their guns under a rain of bombs and shells, and to the transport drivers that fed them. It is a tale of wonderful gallantry and heroic endeavour. But when all is said and done, one is bound to look at the result.
On reaching the area round Proven the 50th Division was allocated to the Fifth Army (General Gough), and received orders to prepare to take part in an attack on the enemy's line between the Houthulst Forest and Passchendaele. On October 21, the day after our arrival at Proven, I went to the Fifth Army H.Q. to get all the maps and information I could relating to the new front. The Army H.Q. were in a large château north of Poperinghe, and when I got there I was received by the Colonel in charge of Intelligence with every kindness. He got me several maps, gave me the files of intelligence to glance over, and advised me to visit the Air Squadron at Proven for aeroplane photographs. He also offered to turn out a Staff car to take me back, but this kind offer I declined. My next visit was to the office of the Air Squadron, where they had a file of all photographs relating to our front. I was able to secure several useful copies, and the promise of some more. After this I returned to our camp to work on the air photos. On October 23 we marched to Proven and entrained there, getting out at Elverdinghe. A short march took us to a camp of wooden huts a little south of the château, where the 50th Division had their battle H.Q. When we arrived the huts were quite empty of all furniture; but in a short time the Brigade pioneers had made a table and forms to use in the mess. It was decided that only the General, Brigade-Major, and Signalling Officer should go forward to battle H.Q., an old German pill-box called Martin's Mill, between Widjendrift and Langemarck. The rest of the Brigade Staff were to remain at rear H.Q. at Huddersfield Dugouts on the Yser Canal close to Bard's Causeway. At this time I was much worried by what appeared to me to be an attempt to tap the information of the Brigade as to the details of the forthcoming attack. Naturally an Intelligence Officer has to be discreet at all times, but especially so at times like this. I simply record my impression although I cannot give any details.
On October 24 I went to the rear B.H.Q. at Huddersfield Dugouts. They were in the northern bank of the Yser Canal about half a mile south of Boesinghe. The front was approached by means of several long duck-board tracks, in places more like wooden bridges than the ordinary trench footboards. In the morning I did my best to investigate where these tracks started, not altogether an easy matter in an entirely strange country. In the afternoon I was asked by the Staff-Captain to see that the hot food and tea and rum for the use of the troops next morning were ready for delivery to the carrying-parties, and that the O.C. carrying-party knew exactly what to do. I found that the food &c. was ready packed up in the hot food containers by the four transport officers, but I had great difficulty in finding the officer in charge of the carrying-parties. After waiting about for over two hours I did get in touch with him. And by nightfall I had the satisfaction of seeing the hot food set off with this carrying-party up one of the tracks leading to the front. We obtained guides for this party from the 50th Divisional Signals, who gave us every assistance in their power.
The attack took place next morning about dawn, after a heavy artillery bombardment, and in the rain. Of this attack the Brigade has no need to be ashamed, although by the afternoon of the same day the remnants of its brave soldiers were withdrawn to the starting point. The 7th N.F. on the left had a shorter distance to go than the rest, but on their left flank was the Forest of Houthulst full of German snipers. On the right were the 4th N.F. and in the centre the 5th N.F.
Each battalion had to attack across a treacherous swamp, and each was confronted by a row of unbroken concrete pill-boxes, carefully concealed from aerial observation. Each battalion made ground, but each battalion was mowed down in heaps by the machine-guns in the pill-boxes. I have nothing now to give as an estimate of the casualties, except the officer casualties of the 7th N.F. Twelve officers of the 7th N.F. went over the top that morning, and one returned alive, Lieut Affleck. The others were all killed. It gives some idea of the spirit of these gallant fellows, when I relate that Lieut Affleck was preparing a further attack on the German pill-boxes at the time he was ordered to return with the remnants of the shattered brigade. The three battalions all suffered the heaviest losses, but I have now no details except those I have given above. Lieut. Odell, the Brigade Signalling Officer, and his men did wonders in keeping the battalions in touch with B.H.Q. during the battle, and for his great personal gallantry on this occasion he received a Bar to his M.C. The shattered remnants of the battalions were drawn out of the fighting zone and given billets not far from the Yser Canal. Even here bad luck followed the 5th N.F., for a long-range shell crashed into one of the huts at Rose Camp and caused forty more casualties. In the transport lines on the west side of the Yser Canal Capt. Neville, the Q.M. of the 7th N.F., was killed by a bomb next day. An old soldier with a wonderful record of service, he had preferred to stick to his battalion instead of taking promotion. I have already called him the prince of quarter masters. I had also to lament him as a very kind and generous friend.
We now received orders to retire to the rest area about Ondank, and on October 26 I was sent to take over a camp for B.H.Q. On the way I called at D.H.Q. at Elverdinghe Château, where I was very courteously received by the 'Q' Staff—Col. Cartwright and Major McCracken—who made many sympathetic inquiries after the officers in the Brigade.