To return, however, to the movements of the army. On the 26th May the head-quarters moved forward in the direction of Salamanca, on approaching which place columns of the enemy’s infantry were observed, halted at each side of the town, a part of their cavalry being, however, on the left bank of the river to watch the movements of the Allies. As the latter advanced, the cavalry retired across the bridge into Salamanca, but the infantry for a considerable time remained unmoved. In the meantime, Sir Rowland Hill’s Cavalry and Captain Beane’s troop of Horse Artillery were ordered to push for the ford of Santa Martha, a little above the town. As soon as the French saw these troops approach the river, they moved off with their whole force, which included about 2500 infantry, two or three squadrons of cavalry, and three or four guns. General Fane, who was in command of Sir R. Hill’s Cavalry, passed the river in a moment, and came up with the French before they had gone three miles from Salamanca. They were retiring by squares along the Arivalo road, which leads up the Tormes by Aldea Langua; and, on overtaking them, the Horse Artillery opened upon their squares with considerable execution. The pursuit was thus continued for five or six miles, the Horse Artillery cannonading them from every available point. The Artillery fire was interfered with by the repeated interposition of the Cavalry between the guns and the enemy; but was nevertheless very efficient. According to Colonel Dickson,—of 400 killed, wounded, and prisoners, lost by the enemy,—100 were victims to the Artillery fire alone; and the squares were so shaken by it, that, if the regiments moving on the flank had pushed on, the whole force might have been captured. Lord Wellington, however, seeing that the pursuing Cavalry were somewhat exhausted, desisted from further pursuit. The head-quarters halted at Salamanca on the 27th May, and orders were issued for their transfer to the other army, north of the Douro. On the 28th, therefore, the head-quarter staff proceeded to Almeida, and on the 29th to Miranda, crossing the Douro at a ferry near the latter place. Lord Wellington, himself, remained one day later at Salamanca; and on the 29th proceeded the whole distance to Miranda. On the 30th the head-quarters were moved to Carvajales, and on the same evening the Esla was reconnoitred, and preparations made to cross it on the following morning. Small parties of the enemy were seen on the opposite bank with two guns. Early on the morning of the 31st, the Hussar Brigade, Gardiner’s and Webber Smith’s troops of Horse Artillery, and two regiments of Infantry crossed,—upon which the French parties immediately retired. The Infantry found the greatest difficulty in crossing,—the river being both deep and rapid,—and several men were drowned. A pontoon bridge was therefore made in a couple of hours, over which the rest of the army passed, with the exception of the Cavalry, Artillery, and waggons, which forded the river. A special pontoon bridge was made for the 18-pounder brigade, over which it passed with safety. On the 1st June head-quarters proceeded to Zamora, and the army completed the passage of the Esla,—the French evacuating Zamora as the Allies approached.
“Thus,” wrote Colonel Dickson, “we succeeded in our manœuvre of turning the Douro, and getting possession of that river without sustaining the smallest loss. It has been a bold one; but, by his Lordship’s rapidity in moving the army, and transferring himself from one point to the other, I think the French did not succeed in discovering our real intention until it was too late for them to hinder it. Otherwise, we found the Esla such an obstacle, that if they only had had ten or twelve thousand men on that river, the passage of it would have been a serious operation to us, and could not have been effected without either great loss of time or of men, and probably both.”
On the 2nd June, the French abandoned Toro, and Wellington’s head-quarters proceeded there,—remaining over the 3rd, on which day, and on the 4th, the force which had advanced by Salamanca, under Sir R. Hill, crossed the Douro. On the 4th, the army moved forward in three columns,—the right, under Sir R. Hill, in the direction of Valladolid; the centre upon La Mota, and the left under Sir Thomas Graham towards Rio Seco. The head-quarters proceeded to La Mota on the 4th, to Castro Monte on the 5th, and to Ampudia on the 6th; the French abandoning Valladolid, as the Allies advanced, and retiring upon Palencia and Duenas. The armies continued to keep within a day’s march of one another: indeed, when the Allies reached Palencia, on the 7th June, the rear-guard of the enemy was clearly visible from the high ground. On the 12th (the pursuit still going on steadily, and Wellington continuing this, his greatest, march in the most persevering, relentless manner) the French army had reached Monasterio and the neighbourhood of Burgos,—but indicated no sign of discontinuing its retreat. Warned by past experience, Wellington had decided to take no active measures against Burgos, but merely to blockade it with part of the Spanish army, leaving the English troops undiminished. In the meantime, Sir Thomas Graham, with the left column of the army, inclined to his left in the direction of the upper part of the Ebro; with the view, it was believed, of turning or crossing that river. The events of the next few days, however, modified matters very much. On reaching Villa Diego, Lord Wellington ascertained that the Castle of Burgos had been blown up by the French, and was in utter ruins. Sir Richard Fletcher, of the Engineers, accompanied by Colonels Dickson and May, and Major Frazer of the Artillery, penetrated into the place, although the French rear-guard was still close at hand, and brought back the report. Joseph Buonaparte had meditated taking up a position at Burgos, but it having been pronounced unwise, he continued to retire on Vittoria. His army—which was known to be en route for France—was embarrassed with huge convoys of spoils,—and crowds of followers, male and female, who were unwilling to be left in Spain, unprotected by the French troops. Lord Wellington now executed a very brilliant Colonel Dickson to D.-A.-G. dated 19 June, 1813. strategical manœuvre,—the crossing of the Ebro. The route by which he abruptly moved his army was unfrequented and considered impracticable. The descent to the river by the Puente de Arenas was by a very narrow and steep pass, opening into a small but fertile valley, entirely surrounded by high mountains, with the river running through it. The sortie from the valley of Puente de Arenas was by a road running for a considerable distance close to the river, with stupendous rocks overhanging on either side. Had this movement been foreseen, a very small body of the enemy could have impeded the passage of the army. The advantages of this manœuvre were many. The Cust’s ‘Annals of the Wars.’ French communications with the coast were cut off, and a new base was opened for the operations of the Allies. The English fleet entered Santander, and commissariat communication was opened with the coast. Wellington was also in a position to threaten the communications between Vittoria and the Pyrenees, and the French found the English already in rear of their right. An engagement took place between Sir Thomas Graham and the French General, Reille, who had been detached to protect the communications between the French army and their own country; and the Colonel Dickson to D.-A.-G. 19 June, 1813. Light Division—with which Lord Wellington himself was—succeeded in surprising General Mancune’s division on the march,—killing a good many, dispersing one brigade, and capturing an immense quantity of baggage, and 300 prisoners. But these were merely the preliminaries to a battle, which, in its results, was unsurpassed in the whole narrative of the Peninsular War. Writing on the evening of the 19th June, from Subijana de Morillas, three leagues south-west of Vittoria, Colonel Dickson said: “We can see the whole French army on their march to Vittoria;—the column is not more than six or seven miles off. To-morrow we expect to move forward upon Vittoria, which, I think, must lead to something.”
In proceeding to discuss the share of the Royal Artillery at the battle of Vittoria, it has unfortunately to be premised that the most valuable letter on the subject has been mislaid, or lost. In writing to General Macleod after the Dated 23 June, 1813. battle, Colonel Dickson said: “I know Frazer has given you some account of it, so I will not enter into further details at present, except on our own matters.” And in two subsequent letters, he said: “Frazer’s letter will have explained everything.” Now, in the published letters of Sir Augustus Frazer, this letter is not to be found; nor is there much in his allusions to the battle in his other letters to assist the Artilleryman in tracing the services of his Corps. The loss of the letter is, to a certain extent, compensated by details given in subsequent letters from Colonel Dickson, but still remains irreparable.
It would be beyond the province of this work to describe the battle of Vittoria, as a whole. In the pages of the general military historian such a description can be found. In these, the regimental statistics alone need be reproduced. The general plan of the battle is, doubtless, familiar to all:—the plain in front of Vittoria, into which—as into a trap—Joseph Buonaparte poured all his troops and convoys;—the one road available for the retreat of his forces to France, which was menaced—but not with sufficient decision—by Wellington’s left;—the confusion in the space between the French army and the town of Vittoria, where mobs of terrified fugitives were mingled with heaps of vehicles and stores;—the three-handed assault of the Allies, advancing with steadfast purpose from three quarters at once;—the frequent Artillery duels, in which the Artillery on both sides so greatly distinguished themselves;—the grand final effort of the French artillery, Napier. when “more than eighty guns, massed together, pealed with such a horrid uproar, that the hills laboured and shook, and streamed with fire and smoke, amidst which the dark figures of the French gunners were seen, bounding with a frantic energy;” and then the wild rout, the headlong flight of an army leaving its guns and everything behind it;—the shrieks of women, the terror of men, rising so vividly before his mind as he wrote, that Napier exclaimed, “It was the wreck of a nation!” But no such ambitious description is required in detail from the mere regimental historian. What is demanded from him is the narrative, from old records that have never seen the light, of the share taken by his corps on this eventful day.
Official Report to the Master-General, dated 23 June, 1813.
Let the distribution of the various troops and brigades of Artillery at Vittoria first be given. Colonel Dickson was in command, assisted by the following field officers:—
Lieut.-Colonel Hartmann, K.G.A., commanding the reserve Artillery.
Major Carncross, with Sir Rowland Hill’s column.
Major Buckner, with column of 3rd and 7th Divisions.
Major Frazer, commanding the Horse Artillery.
The troops of Royal Horse Artillery were distributed as follows:—
Captain Webber Smith’s, with the Reserve.
Major Ross’s, with Light Division.
Captain Beane’s, with General Fane’s Cavalry.
Major Gardiner’s, with the Hussars.
Captain Ramsay’s, with the Cavalry Division.