Four marching companies, in all 714 officers and men—with 67 horses.
One of these companies was stationed in the Mediterranean.
An addition to Colonel Robe’s force of a doubtful value was received from Gibraltar. Lieut.-Colonel George Ramsey was ordered from Gibraltar with three companies to meet the Artillery expected from England, and a car brigade of guns, as it was termed, was issued from the Ordnance stores, for the service. Two of the companies, and Colonel Ramsey, were sent back to Gibraltar immediately on their arrival in Cadiz:—only one, Captain Morison’s[15] being allowed to proceed in charge of the guns. Colonel Ramsey, however, had time to inspect the car brigade which had been issued to him, and his official report on it was not complimentary to To D. A. G. from Cadiz, 21 July, 1808. the store-keepers. A similar brigade, it would appear, had been sent to Sicily, a few weeks before; and the clerk of stores had hopelessly confused the two. The shafts for the howitzers had been sent with the 6-pounders; seven gun-wheels had been put on board for use with the waggons,—although not interchangeable,—and one waggon was entirely useless. The stores were inadequate and unsuitable; and there was neither a commissary, nor an artificer, with the detachment. A little further vacillation on the part of the authorities led to two companies leaving Gibraltar for Portugal immediately after the return of those under Colonel Now 1 Battery, 6 Brigade. Ramsey; and one of these, Captain Skyring’s, had the good fortune to join Colonel Robe in time for the battle of Vimiera.
Colonel Robe’s force anchored in Mondego Bay on 28th July; and on the following day Sir Arthur Wellesley, who had preceded the army, and had been engaged in diplomatic as well as military duties, arrived, and gave orders for the disembarkation. The French withdrew from the coast, and the inhabitants showed symptoms of co-operation with the English, which were, however, sadly neutralised by the conduct of their rulers; while Sir A. Wellesley pressed forward, on the 9th August, to Leiria, hoping to cover the disembarkation of the additional troops which he now knew were on their way from England, and perhaps at the same time to strike an effective blow, as near to Lisbon as possible, with the force under his command. This would have the effect of inspiring the Portuguese with courage; of asserting the right of the English to control the military operations of the Allies; and of disarranging the plans of the French. The English army was augmented at Lavos on the 6th August by General Spencer’s contingent; and was divided into six brigades, under Generals Hill, Nightingale, Crawford, G. O. dated Lavos, 7 Aug. 1808. Bowes, Ferguson, and Fane. A demi-battery of Artillery was attached to each brigade; howitzers being attached to the 1st, 2nd, 5th, and 6th Brigades, and the 9-pounders being kept in reserve. On the line of march, the Artillery always moved in front of the brigades to which they were attached, and the Artillery of the reserve followed the Infantry.
The advance of Sir Arthur Wellesley was perfectly successful; he succeeded in cutting the line of communication between Generals Loison and Laborde, and in inducing the French Commander-in-Chief, Junot, to quit Lisbon, and take the field with the reserve. The cowardice and self-interest of the Portuguese leaders robbed him, however, at a critical moment, of several thousand troops; so that in his first engagement with the enemy he had the assistance of no more than 1650 Portuguese. That engagement was the one known as the combat of Roliça—fought on the 17th August, with superior numbers on the side of the English, but against a General, Laborde, who was not only very able, but also occupied a position of great natural strength.
The attack of the English, who, with the Portuguese, numbered 14,000, was made in three columns, the left commanded by General Ferguson,—the right composed of the Portuguese,—and the centre, consisting of three brigades, commanded by Sir Arthur in person. The Royal Artillery had 18 guns, one half of which came into action to cover the advance of the Infantry. So determined was that advance, and so critical did General Laborde’s position become, as the left column, under General Ferguson, closed in upon his right, that he fell back to a new and parallel position, on the heights of Zambugeira. The steep heights, and dense brushwood, which had to be traversed in the advance of the English, rendered the attack of this new position a more difficult and costly one, and the losses of the 9th, 29th, and 82nd Regiments were especially heavy. The ardour of the troops was, however, irresistible; and Laborde again fell back, handling his troops with the utmost skill. In a very short time, after one or two attempts to make a stand, the Napier. French were in full retreat—“leaving three guns on the field of battle, and the road to Torres Vedras open to the victors.”
The loss of the French was admitted by themselves to be Wellington Supplementary Despatches, vol. vi. p. 116. 600 killed and wounded; but it was probably much greater. Sir Arthur Wellesley, writing on the following day, said the loss had been reported to be 1500; and Colonel Robe, in his despatch to the Ordnance, said that the loss of the French far exceeded that of the English, which amounted to 479 killed and wounded. The loss of the Royal Artillery on this occasion was, as Colonel Robe wrote, irreparable. Captain Henry Geary, an officer of great promise and experience, Col. Robe to D. A. Gen., R.A. 18 August, 1808. was killed. “He was, by his own desire, and as senior Captain, in charge of guns with the Light Brigade, and was killed while pointing his gun within one or two hundred yards of the enemy. I regret him as an officer, for he was invaluable; and as a friend and old fellow-campaigner, by no means less. His loss to his family cannot be appreciated; but it will always be a comfort that he died as he had lived, in the very act of doing his Napier, vol i. p. 591. duty to his country, and a true Christian.” The force of Artillery under Colonel Robe’s command at Roliça numbered 660 of all ranks.
The next engagement between the French and English forces took place under singular circumstances. Sir Arthur Wellesley had been reinforced by the brigades under Generals Ackland and Anstruther,—thus bringing his force up to 16,000 men, besides 660 Artillery, and 240 Cavalry,—exclusive of the Portuguese under Colonel Trant. The greatest number which Junot could bring against this army could—it was known—hardly exceed 14,000. Further English reinforcements being known to be on the way, Sir A. Wellesley decided on assuming the offensive. Unfortunately, Sir H. Burrard, one of the three Generals sent out by the English Government to assume the command, arrived on the night of the 20th August, and Sir A. Wellesley was obliged to wait on him for orders. No arguments that he could employ could persuade Sir H. Burrard to attack before the arrival of the expected reinforcements; and Sir Arthur parted from him with feelings of the most bitter disappointment. Fortunately for him, and for the army, Junot, who by this time had reached Torres Vedras, resolved himself to assume the offensive; and to attack the English in their position near the village of Vimiera. The battle commenced at seven o’clock on the morning of the 21st August, and deserves a special mention in this work. For at Vimiera, for the first time, as Napier and Oust show, did the French realise the difference between the English forces and those with whom they had hitherto been contending;—for the first time did they appreciate those qualities with which they were so soon to be familiar: “the stolid firmness and resolute thrust of the Infantry, and the wonderful skill and precision of the Artillery.” No chronicler of this battle fails to speak of the “murderous fire of Robe’s Artillery;”—a fire which told with admirable effect at the most critical periods of the engagement. The number of guns present was small,—only 18, as at Roliça; but on this occasion all were engaged,—the reserve as well as the divisional Artillery being brought into play.
The right wing of the English army consisted of the 1st Brigade, under General Hill; the centre, of the 6th and 7th, under Generals Fane and Anstruther; the left, of the 2nd, 3rd, 4th, and 8th, under Generals Ferguson, Nightingale, Bowes, and Ackland; and the reserve was composed of the 5th Brigade, under General Crawford.
The attack of the French was made with great gallantry, in spite of many difficulties caused by the broken and wooded nature of the ground, and was directed against the English centre in the first instance, and mainly against General Fane’s brigade. That officer, wisely availing himself of a discretionary power granted him, and seeing that the position was a favourable one for the employment of his Artillery against the advancing columns, brought up the guns of the reserve at once, and with those of his own division formed Cust. a battery, which played on the advancing foe with “such a shower of shell and grape as might have been sufficient to stop any troops;” and although the French troops did reach the summit of the hill on which the English stood, they were, as Napier writes, so “shattered by the terrible fire of Robe’s Artillery,” that they fell an easy prey to the gallant charges of the 50th Regiment. At another part of the line, where skirmishing between Anstruther’s brigade and the French was going on, the Artillery played an equally important part. A column of Grenadiers had been sent forward by Kellermann to share in this part of the battle, Napier. and “coming at a brisk pace, these choice soldiers beat back the advanced companies of the 43rd Regiment; but to avoid Robe’s artillery, which ransacked their left, they dipped a little into the ravine on the right, and were immediately taken on the other flank by the guns of the 4th and 8th Brigades; then, when the narrowness of the way, and the sweep of the round shot, were crushing and disordering their ranks, the 43rd, rallying in one mass, went down upon the very head of the column, and with a short but fierce struggle, drove it back in confusion.” Yet again: in the attack upon General Ferguson’s brigade made by Solignac, who expected to find a weak force on the left to oppose him,—but found it strengthened with the same forethought and skill as marked, in days coming on, the tactics of Wellington at Waterloo,—we read of the “powerful artillery which swept away their foremost ranks.” As the reader finishes the account of this battle, and reads of the French retreating in confusion, leaving thirteen of their guns on the field, he can scarcely realise that the whole Artillery force of Sir A. Wellesley was little more than the captured guns represented. How much of the effect of this force, small as it was, was due to the individual exertions of all ranks may be gathered from the following extract from Colonel Robe’s despatch to the Ordnance:—“Never Col. Robe to D. A. Gen. Vimiera, 21 Aug. 1808. was man better supported by his officers and soldiers than I have been. I would not change one of them, from the Major to the youngest subaltern, for anything in the world; and only regret my son was not with me. My men are staunch and the admiration of the army.” It may interest the professional reader to know that great part of Colonel Robe’s report after Vimiera was occupied with praises of Shrapnel’s spherical case, of which he begged large additional supplies. He concludes with a sentence which proves the entente cordiale which existed between himself and his superiors. “Nothing but the unexampled assistance and attention of Sir A. Wellesley, and the general officers, could have brought this artillery into the field in an efficient manner; and I am proud to say they have never yet stopped an hour for us.”