The force in the Mediterranean garrisons, which was considered available in event of sudden demands from the Peninsula, appears in the following tables (see pp. 271 and 272), which also show the names of the senior officers. With these the statistics for the year to be treated in this chapter will terminate, and the consideration of the campaign be resumed.

The campaign of 1810 in the Peninsula was, in one sense, the least active of any during the war. Napoleon certainly made a great effort to completely subdue the country, and to expel the English armies. For this purpose, Marshal Massena was placed in command of the French troops; but the duty proved to be beyond his powers. It is doubtful if in any period of the Duke of Wellington’s military career he displayed more ability, more patience, more foresight, than he showed during the first nine months of the year 1810. Not merely had he to contend with local influences, but he failed to secure the requisite support from the English Government. There was at home a fear of losing power, which led English statesmen to commit unworthy actions, and to display a nervousness in administration, which demoralized such of their agents as were not above the ordinary standard. The wisdom of publishing the private letters of a great man is certainly questionable; but once published, they become the historian’s legitimate property. From the letters of the Duke of Wellington we have a Gurwood’s Despatches of the Duke of Wellington. graphic picture of the Government in 1810. “What,” he wrote to Admiral Berkeley, “can be expected from men who are beaten in the House of Commons three times a week? A great deal might be done now, if there existed in England less party, and more public sentiment—and if there was any Government.” Again, in pleading his inability to carry out certain operations, he urged, in a letter to the Right Hon. H. Wellesley, that he would have been able to do so, “if the Government possessed any strength, or Gurwood’s Despatches of the Duke of Wellington. desire to have anything done but what is safe and cheap.” The same hands that applauded the conqueror at Talavera strove, in timorous anxiety, to drag him back from any further operations. The terror of the French armies, which had obtained possession of the Portuguese Government and people, seems to have reached London. The Government despatches to Lord Wellington breathed nothing but advice to guide him when he should be expelled from Portugal. While he was ensuring in a masterly manner the safety of Lisbon, they were urging on him the claims of Cadiz. Their letters and the tone of the public press swelled the despondency, the presence of which in Portugal Lord Wellington lamented; and his protests, assuring the Government that he had left nothing undone,—whether the event should be defeat or victory,—were treated as idle words, or as the heated expression of a mere soldier’s hopes. Had Wellington been a weaker man, the lines of Torres Vedras had been got ready in vain, the battle of Busaco had never been fought, and the unpaid arrears of the French troops would have been liquidated by the plundering of Lisbon and Oporto.

INDEX.
A.Battalions and Corps.B.Colonels.C.Field Officers.
D.Captains.E.Subalterns.F.Surgeons and Asst.-Surgs.
G.N.C. Officers.H.Gunners.I.Drivers.
J.Artificers.K.Drummers & Trumpeters.L.Total.
M.Horses.N.Mules.
Stations.Data of Last Returns.Colonels, Field Officers, and Captains of Companies.A.B.C.D.E.F.G.H.I.J.K.L.M.N.Remarks.
Gibraltar.1st July, 1810.Major-General Smith31······2··········5····N.B. At Ceuta,1 captain, 1 subaltern,3 N.-C. officers,and 11 gunners.
Lieut.-Colonel Ramsay2··1
Lieut.-Colonel Wright5··1
Captain Godby1····13··1487····2107····
Captain Dodd2····12··17117····4141····
Captain Smyth4····22··1181····2100····At Tarifa, 1 subaltern,6 N.-C. officers, and61 gunners included inthe general total.
Captain Morrison8····23··1386····2105····
Captain Birch10····23··13102····2120····
Captain Fead10····23··13101····1120····
Total in Gibraltar.··12815281576····13698····
Malta.1st June, 1810.Colonel Bentham711····1··········8····A detachment of 1 subaltern,2 N.-C. officers, and25 gunners belonging tothese companies servingin Sicily, and not included thegeneral total.
Lieut.-Colonel Harris2··1
Captain Vivion2····23··1393····2113····
Captain Reynell5····23··1388····2108····
Captain Carey8····22··1071····186····
Total in Malta··1168136252····5310····
Sicily.1st May, 1810.Lieut.-Colonel Lemoine5··1····4··········6····At Zante,2 captains,2 surgeons,13 N.-C. officersand 80 gunnersincluded in thegeneral total.
Lieut-Colonel Dickinson10··1
Captain Gamble6····12··1399····1116····
Captain Williamson8····23··1498····2119····
Captain Fraser8····23··1498····2119····
Captain Pym8····22··1399····1117····
Captain Hickman8····22··1499····1118····
Detachment of Artillery from Malta········1··225······28····
Captain BussmanK.G.A.····221161053962175····
Lieut. G. SmithR.A.D.······1··5··322··4010945
Total in Sicily.····21118591623718983810945

But his difficulties were not confined to the chilling advice of the Government. At a time when he required the best men in the army to aid him, the exercise of home patronage inflicted on him the most incapable assistants. Not merely did he suffer from useless subordinate staff officers, but even his general officers were not always what he wished. Supplementary Despatches, vol. vi. p. 582. “Really,” he wrote to Colonel Torrens, “when I reflect upon the characters and attainments of some of the general officers of this army, and consider that these are the persons on whom I am to rely to lead columns against the French Generals, and who are to carry my instructions into execution, I tremble; and, as Lord Chesterfield said of the Generals of his day, ‘I only hope that when the enemy reads the list of their names, he trembles as I do.’” And at the very time that these men were being sent out to him, he was debarred from offering reward, in the shape of promotion, to any one under his command whose gallantry might seem to him to have earned it. No subject is more frequently alluded to in his letters than this. The Government would gladly make political capital out of his successes,—would greedily gather votes by making appointments to his army, but declined to strengthen him by trusting his military knowledge, or increasing his legitimate authority.

But the aggravation to which he had to submit in 1810 did not cease here. While the French were advancing into Portugal, and the English Government as little realised the strength of the lines which Wellington had prepared for his troops as Massena himself, the cry was always to embark,—to quit Lisbon,—to devote his energies to Cadiz; yet when strategical reasons and absolute necessity compelled him to leave Ciudad Rodrigo to its fate, the same voices, in querulous terror, remonstrated with him on his inaction. When he gained the victory of Busaco, the first idea with the Government was, not recognition of his merits, but political capital. And when, after a fruitless and self-destructive residence before the lines of Torres Vedras, Massena was obliged to retire from Portugal, who so loud in their cries for pursuit as the very men who had scoffed at the bare possibility of offering resistance to the French invaders?

The year 1810 was, however, not merely a year which tested the marvellous ability and patience of Wellington;—it was also the year which placed on the Portuguese troops the seal of ability to face their dreaded French enemies. At Busaco, the courage of the Portuguese, under English discipline, was nobly manifested,—and the value of this discovery Supplementary Despatches, vol. vi. p. 606. was beyond expression at that most critical time. As Lord Wellington said, the battle had the best effect in inspiring confidence in the Portuguese troops; it removed an impression, which had been general, that the English intended to fight no more, but to retire to their ships; and it gave the Portuguese a taste for an amusement to which they were not before accustomed, and which they would not have acquired in a position less strong than that of Busaco. Had the battle been productive of no other gain than this, it ought to have found favour with a Government, whose members desired that their successes might be “cheap.”

When the campaign commenced, the head-quarters of the English army were at Celorico; and Almeida and Ciudad Rodrigo were organized for defence. The latter city, which was defended by Spaniards, capitulated on the 10th July, after a month’s siege; and Almeida, a small place with a Portuguese garrison, followed suit on the 28th August. During the siege of the latter place, the combat of the Coa, as it was termed, took place; and, as the Chestnut Troop took part in it, it deserves some notice. Crawford, who commanded the Light Division, and had the outpost duties to perform, had retired before the French, after the fall of Ciudad Rodrigo, under the walls of Almeida. The position which he took up was very dangerous. The river Coa, crossed by a single bridge, was in his rear, and an open country in front. He had been ordered to cross this river on the approach of the French, but had foolishly remained—with a small force of 5000 men and one battery of Artillery, the Chestnut Troop—awaiting the arrival of Ney’s force, of more than three times the number. Regardless of the fire from the guns of Almeida, Ney availed himself of Crawford’s blunder, and attacked him with vehemence. The crossing of the bridge, now absolutely necessary, was most difficult, and could not have been effected but for the gallantry of the regiments, and the precision of the fire of the Chestnut Troop, which had been sent across the bridge early in the affair to occupy some rising ground, and to cover the retreat of the other troops. The bridge was crowded by the retiring columns of the English, so as to be almost impassable; and when, ultimately, the whole had succeeded in crossing, the pursuing columns of the French blocked the passage in a similar manner, and, under a heavy fire, were reduced into heaps of killed and wounded, level with the parapet of the bridge. A Cust. tremendous storm of rain, which set in, flooded the pans of the French muskets, and put an end to the engagement, which, in point of losses, had been on both sides very severe. Of the Artillery on this occasion, Napier wrote that it played on both sides across the river and ravine, the sounds repeated by numberless echoes, and the smoke, slowly rising, resolving itself into an immense arch, spanning the whole chasm and sparkling with the whirling fuzes of the flying shells. Cust, in his ‘Annals of the Wars,’ describes the Chestnut Troop, from the high ground, sending well-directed shot over the heads of the skirmishers. The gallant officer who ‘Memoirs of Sir H. Ross,’ pp. 11, 12. commanded the troop wrote as follows: “General Crawford ordered a retreat. Lieutenant Bourchier, of the Artillery, brought me the order to retire, as rapidly as in my power, across the bridge, and to get my guns into position on the opposite heights. At this time we had five guns in action.... Our fire was excellent, and broke them two or three times.” Captain Ross’s brother, an officer of Engineers, who was serving with the army, writes of this combat of the 24th July: “Hew’s guns did their duty.” The loss on the English side during this engagement was over three hundred killed and wounded; that of the French was over a thousand.

But a battle on a larger scale has now to be mentioned. Lord Wellington retreated towards Coimbra, followed by Marshal Massena on the north hank of the Mondego. The English General resolved to make a stand on the Sierra de Busaco, a high ridge which extends from the Mondego in a northerly direction about eight miles. In the battle which followed, Lord Wellington displayed an ignorance of Artillery tactics, from the results of which he was happily saved by the intelligence and gallantry of the representatives of that arm. This want of knowledge, which he never overcame, was the cause of a not unfrequent irritation against Artillery Capt. T. B, Strange, R.A., on Practical Artillery. as an arm, and a tendency to depreciate its value. At Busaco, instead of massing his Artillery in reserve until the attack should develop itself, the guns were placed, as a rule, in the easiest parts of the position, where it was supposed the French would attack; and they were massed in these positions so as to form an excellent mark for the enemy’s fire. This was more especially the case with Major Arentschild’s 6-pounder and 9-pounder brigades of Portuguese Artillery. Fortunately, the Artillery was well served, and, ‘Life of Sir J. Burgoyne,’ vol. 1. as Sir John Burgoyne wrote, “the guns had great effect.” Captain Thompson’s company of the 7th Battalion—now D Battery, 11th Brigade, Royal Artillery, was of essential service, although it was broken up into divisions during the MS. Letter among Cleaveland’s MSS. battle. Captain Lane, who was 2nd Captain of the company, thus describes the conduct of one division: “My men did their duty. Lieutenant F. Bayley’s conduct was admirable. It was the first time he had been in action, and no old soldier could have acted better. The French Voltigeurs (37th Regiment) came close to the guns; and one was killed only eight paces off. An immense column showing themselves in the ravine, we, with three cheers, gave them a few rounds of case and round-shot together, at about seventy paces distance, which drove them back.” The same officer, who was quoted above as alluding to the services of his brother’s troop at the Coa, wrote of Busaco: ‘Memoirs of Sir H. D. Ross.’ “I will venture to assert that the greatest loss the enemy sustained was by our Artillery; and the guns that had the most duty, and, I believe I might say, that were best placed for effect—even if nothing is said of the admirable manner in which the guns were fought—were those of Hew’s troop.... Several officers who remained on the field the day after the retreat, among others General Crawford himself, were convinced, more than those who only looked on it from the heights, of the immense slaughter the enemy sustained from the Shrapnel shells thrown from my brother’s guns, aided for a short time by those of Captain Bull’s troop.” This opinion, which, coming from a brother, might perhaps be considered more indulgent than just, was confirmed by the great historian of the war. In the resistance offered to the attack of Loison’s division, Napier says that Ross’s guns were worked with incredible quickness, and their shot swept through the advancing columns. The attack having failed, Crawford’s Artillery, with which was the gallant Chestnut Troop, was equally useful against the attack of Marchaud’s division, which followed. “It heavily smote,” writes Napier, “the flank of Marchaud’s people in the pine-wood; and Ney, who was there in person, after sustaining this murderous cannonade for an hour, relinquished that attack also.” Lord Wellington to Lord Liverpool, dated Coimbra, 30 Sept. 1810. Well might Lord Wellington say, “I am particularly indebted to ... Brigadier-General Howorth and the Artillery.”

The force under Lord Wellington’s command on this occasion did not exceed 50,000, and extended over a distance of eight to ten miles. The French are estimated by Napier to have been 65,000 in number; but Wellington considered that Ibid. dated Pero Negro, 3 Nov. 1810. they exceeded that number by 5000 men. The French loss amounted to 4500 killed and wounded, while that of the Allies was under 1300, the English having lost 631, and the Portuguese 622. The absence of Artillery on the side of the French, who overrated the difficulties of the ground, and the great activity shown in the use and service of the guns of the Allies, accounted for the great difference in the number of casualties. Much of the efficacy of the fire of the Royal Artillery was due to the use of Shrapnel’s spherical case-shot,—a projectile which was daily increasing in favour,—with no one more than with Lord Wellington himself. Dated Sabugal, 23 Feb 1812. “At the battle of Busaco,” wrote Major May to Colonel Shrapnel, “your shells were of the utmost use, and their destruction plainly perceived from the heights.”