The 5th of June was a very disheartening day. The progress in the breach of the south attack was little more hopeful than on the 4th; and before afternoon the batteries were reduced—principally by their own fire—to nine serviceable guns. Major Dickson, therefore, proceeded to Lord Wellington, and obtained his permission to bring six iron 24-pounders from Elvas to the south attack. The breach in San Cristoval made by the north attack made apparent progress, but was not yet deemed practicable. Here, also, one or two of the guns showed symptoms of giving way.
On the 6th June, Lieutenant Hawker of the Royal Artillery was killed in the north attack:—a gallant young officer, of whom Major Dickson wrote, “He has never been out of No. 1 Battery from the commencement of the fire.” In the south attack, a steady fire was kept up from the nine serviceable guns during this day, and more progress was made in breaching the wall, than had been effected during the two preceding days. Before night, the breach was practicable for a single person. In the evening, the breach at San Cristoval was also considered practicable for an assault, which accordingly was ordered, but repulsed. The enemy had previously cleared the breach, leaving a certain portion of the wall standing perpendicular: and their fire was so warm that the troops could not face it at the breach for any time. Attempts were made to escalade at one or two other points, but the ladders were too short; so the party had to retire with a loss of 130 men.
On the 7th June, another battery of the south attack, No. 3, was completed; and the iron guns, having arrived from Elvas, were mounted during the night. The breach on this side was a little improved, but the resistance of the wall was far in excess of Major Dickson’s expectations.
On the 8th June, under a fire from 16 24-pounders in the south attack, the breach on that side seemed large enough to admit several persons abreast. On the north side, the fire continued, but the breach was not yet deemed again practicable. During the night of the 8th, grape-shot was fired from the south side, but the Portuguese grape was extremely bad, and the enemy was successful in clearing away all the rubbish from the breach, in spite of the fire, leaving to view a considerable height of wall yet uninjured. A quantity of 3-pounder shot was therefore brought up from Elvas, which, when tied up in bags containing eight or ten each, formed a better description of grape. Various guns in both attacks showed symptoms of distress during this day.
On the 9th June, there were only twelve or thirteen guns left serviceable on the south side after the day’s firing, but the breach was decidedly larger, and grape was fired all night to prevent the enemy working at it. On the north side, there were only eight or nine guns left undisabled in in the evening, but the breach at San Cristoval was pronounced practicable; and another attempt was made, at 9 o’clock, to carry it by assault. It was, however, again repulsed; for it was found that, notwithstanding the appearance of the breach, there was a perpendicular wall about 6 or 7 feet high still standing, which had been concealed from view by the counterscarp: and the enemy had taken every precaution to keep it clear of the débris of the breach. The gallantry of the assailants was as great, as the defence Major Dickson to D.-A.-G. 26 June, 1811. of the French was resolute. The ladders were thrown down,—grenades thrown among the stormers in great abundance, and masses of stone hurled down upon them. With the loss of 150 men, the assailants were obliged to retire.
On the following morning it was found that the grape-shot from the south attack had been successful in preventing the enemy from working at the breach, and preparations for resuming the battering had been ordered, when Major Dickson received a summons from Lord Wellington. He met him Dickson’s MSS. with Colonel Fletcher on the north side: and they were informed that he had decided on raising the siege. He mentioned his reasons; but he particularly pointed out the impossibility of getting possession of San Cristoval without advancing to the crest of the glacis;—the still difficult situation of the main breach on the south side;—the imprudence of attempting it, even when practicable, without first having Cristoval;—the strong entrenchments which the enemy had had time to construct within the breach;—and finally the approach of the enemy in such force that prudence would not allow him to be caught by them in the midst of a siege. Major Dickson to D.-A.-G.c Elvas, 13 June, 1811. Soult was at this time in force at Llerena, and Drouet’s corps was reported as having joined him; while the Northern French army under Marmont was also in motion.
Major Dickson immediately set to work, and by the evening of the 12th the whole of the guns, stores, and ammunition were either in Elvas again, or at such a distance as to be in perfect safety in all circumstances.
“Thus,” wrote Major Dickson to General Macleod, “ended this siege, in which everything that artillery could do was done, considering our miserable means; and this Lord Wellington was good enough to express, both to Colonel Framingham and myself. The brass guns could not stand the necessary fire, and their destruction, I am of opinion, was considerably occasioned by the lowness of the shot, which generally had so much windage that you could put your fingers in between the shot and the bore.... On the whole I have to observe that our batteries were too far off.... The whole principle of the attack was founded on the supposed weakness of the Castle wall, which it was thought could be beat down at a distance. On discovering the difficulty of this, the batteries were thrown forward as far as they could, at the same time avoiding the fire of the modern fronts, nor could they be advanced farther until Cristoval was in our hands. Indeed, if that had been carried, I think we should have got the place.... Lord Wellington was good enough to say that everything that could be done on our parts, had been done.”
The casualties among the Artillery during the siege were as follows:—
Officers, Royal Artillery Lieut. E. Hawker, killed. Lieut. W. Saunders, wounded. Officers, Portuguese Artillery Captain Barreiros, wounded. Lieut. Lopez, wounded dangerously.
Killed. Wounded. N.-C. officers and men, Royal Artillery 0 4 N.-C. officers and men, Portuguese Artillery 6 28 Total 6 32 The total loss of the Allies amounted to 118 killed, and 367 wounded and taken prisoners.