2. Avoid a premature commencement of the fire. Long firing exhausts the men's energy, expends the ammunition, fouls the pieces, destroys the soldier's confidence in his weapon, and emboldens the enemy.
3. So, a fire upon an enemy while under cover, as in a wood, would be virtually thrown away. If his fire from such a position causes us any loss, he had better be shelled, or driven away by skirmishers, according to circumstances.
4. The practice of hostile regiments exchanging for a considerable time a musketry fire at a distance, is highly objectionable, as it causes a great sacrifice of life without corresponding results. Instead of standing in line for ten minutes, receiving and returning fire at a distance of three hundred yards, it would be much better to clear this space at double quick in two or three minutes, and close with the enemy; for, in returning his fire, we can do him no more harm than we receive, while nothing decisive is accomplished. The case is, of course, different where our own troops are behind cover, while the enemy's are exposed.
5. But in special cases, as where we have to cover a flank movement of our second line, or of the reserve, or to await a force coming to our support, it may be necessary to keep up an incessant fusillade, without regard to losses received.
6. Fire in action is of two kinds: the fire at will, and the fire by volleys; the former kind being the rule, the latter the exception. Although the fire at will is the one principally used, there are very strong objections to it.
(1.) The men load and fire as individuals, and generally with great rapidity, and under more or less excitement, rarely stopping to take a deliberate aim. The consequence is, that very few shots take effect, and the fire is, for the greater part, wasted, as is shown by the well-established fact that, in every engagement, for every man killed or disabled, there have been from three to ten thousand musket or rifle bullets fired.
(2.) Except on windy days, a cloud of smoke soon collects in front of a line firing at will, hiding, more or less completely, the enemy from view. The fire being then at random, it is, of course, unreliable.
(3.) The fire at will leads to a rapid and enormous consumption of ammunition. To show how serious is this objection also, it is only necessary to consider in how many instances victory has been turned into defeat by the premature exhaustion, by one or more regiments, of their ammunition.
(4.) As a necessary consequence of this rapid consumption of ammunition, the pieces soon become fouled, and thus, to a great extent, useless.
(5.) Troops under a musketry fire at will, soon become accustomed to it, and its incessant din produces on them a stunning effect, which deadens, in no small degree, their sensibility to danger.