[1036]. τῶν κακῶν ἐπὶ τὸν θεὸν ἀναφέρουσιν, ὧν τὸ τέλος κατάρας ἐγγύς. It is evidently intended for a quotation from Heb. vi. 8, which however puts it rather differently as ἐκφέρουσα δὲ ἀκάνθας καὶ τριβόλους ἀδόκιμος καὶ κατάρας ἐγγύς, ἧς τὸ τέλος εἰς καῦσιν. “But that which beareth thorns and briers is to be rejected and is nigh unto cursing; whose end is to be burned.” The Khuastuanîft or Manichaean confession mentioned later repeats this phrase about God not being the creator of evil as well as of good. See p. [335] infra.
[1037]. Hegemonius, Acta, c. VII. p. 9, Beeson.
[1038]. En Nadîm in Kessler, op. cit. pp. 386, sqq. Kessler’s translation of En Nadîm, which is given in the first Appendix to the work quoted, differs slightly from that of Flügel and depends on a somewhat better text than the last-named. It is therefore used when possible in the remaining notes to this chapter. Flügel’s book, however, has the advantage of a commentary of some 300 pages marked with great erudition, and must still be consulted by anyone wishing to be acquainted with its subject.
[1039]. Plutarch, de Is. et Os. c. XLV., says, however, that “evil must have a principle of its own,” so that it cannot be the work of a benevolent being. As he is generally supposed to have taken his account of the Persian teaching from Theopompos of Chios, who was at the Court of Ptolemy about 305 B.C., his evidence is against those who, like M. Cumont, would make the “Zervanist” opinion, which assumes a common principle for good and evil, pre-Christian. Yet the point does not yet seem capable of decision, as Plutarch may here be only giving us his own opinion.
[1040]. Casartelli, op. cit. p. 44.
[1041]. This is really the crux of the whole question. If the idea could be traced back to the philosophers of Ionia (e.g. Heraclitus of Ephesus) and their theory of eternal strife and discord being the cause of all mundane phenomena, it is difficult to say whence the Ionians themselves derived it, save from Persia. We can, of course, suppose, if we please, that the Persians did not invent it de novo, but took it over from some of their subjects. Among these, the Babylonians, for instance, from the earliest times portrayed their demons as not only attempting to invade the heaven of the gods, but as being in perpetual warfare with one another. But the very little we know of Babylonian philosophy would lead us to think that it inclined towards pantheism of a materialistic kind rather than to dualism.
[1042]. En Nadîm, in Kessler, op. cit. p. 387; Flügel, op. cit. p. 86.
[1043]. The likeness of this to the cosmogony of the Ophites and their successor Valentinus is of course marked (cf. Chaps. [VIII] and [IX] supra). Manes may have borrowed it directly from Valentinus’ follower Bardesanes, whose doctrines were powerful in Edessa and Mesopotamia in his time, or he may have taken it at first-hand from Persian or Babylonian tradition. That Manes was acquainted with Bardesanes’ doctrines, see n. 7, p. [280] supra.
[1044]. En Nadîm in Kessler, op. cit. p. 387; Flügel, op. cit. p. 86. Flügel’s text adds to these members other “souls” which he names Love, Belief, Faith, Generosity, and Wisdom. Kessler substitutes Courage for Generosity and seems to make these “souls” the members’ derivatives.
[1045]. See last note.