[71] Distinctions as to United States notes, coin, currency, legal tender, etc., are brought out in Juilliard v. Greenman, supra; Hepburn v. Griswold, 8 Wallace, 603 (1869); Parker v. Davis, 12 Wallace, 79 (1871); Trebilcock v. Wilson, 12 Wallace, 687 (1871).
[72] Knox v. Lee, Parker v. Davis, 12 Wallace, 554 (1871).
[73] An account of the struggles of political parties, and of the successive decisions of the Supreme Court as to Legal Tender Acts belongs to the history of the law rather than to a statement of the essentials of present constitutional law. Accounts of this struggle, available in histories of the United States, may be compared with Justice Stephen J. Field’s account in J. Norton Pomeroy’s Some Account of the Work of Stephen J. Field as a Legislator, State Judge, and Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States (1881), (Edition by George C. Gorham, 1895) pp. 65–86. Mr. Justice Field’s dissenting opinions from the decisions of the Supreme Court which sustain the constitutionality of the Acts are based largely on his conception of the principle of the obligation of a contract as contained in the Constitution respecting “gold and silver coin.” For the history of the Acts, the decision of the Court invalidating them (1869); the increase of the membership of the Court (1870); the reversal of the earlier decisions (1871), and the final decision in Juilliard v. Greenman (1883), consult Rhodes, vi., 268, 270–273, and Note.
[74] Art. i., 10: 1.
[75] Briscoe v. Bank of Kentucky, 11 Peters, 257 (1837).
[76] Darrington v. The Bank of Alabama, 13; Howard, 12 Briscoe v. Bank of Kentucky, supra.
[77] Art. i., 8: 6.
[78] Id. 5, 10: 1.
[79] United States v. Marigold, 9 Howard, 560 (1849); Fox v. Ohio, 5 Howard, 410.
[80] In re Rapier, 143 U. S., 110 (1892); Battle v. U. S., 209 U. S., 36.