[91] Barron v. Baltimore, 7 Peters, 243 (1833).
[92] Metropolitan R. R. Co. v. District of Columbia, 132 U. S., 1 (1889).
[93] Ft. Leavenworth R. R. Co. v. Lowe, 114 U. S., 525 (1885).
[94] Art. iv., 3.
[95] Dorr v. U. S., 195 U. S., 138 (1904); Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U. S., 197 (1903); Dooley v. U. S., 183 U. S., 151 (1901); Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U. S. (1901); Rasmussen v. U. S., 197 U. S., Weems v. U. S., 217 U. S., 349. (But see dissenting opinions in above cases.)
[96] Downes v. Bidwell, supra, and cases and laws therein cited and quoted.
[97] Idem.
[98] There are powerful dissenting opinions in the various Insular Cases. The chief objection to the unlimited control of insular territory by Congress is that Congress itself, by the Constitution, possesses only limited powers. How can a limited Congress exercise unlimited powers?
[99] Downes v. Bidwell, supra. (The Court cites, in confirmation, the history of Congress and of the British Parliament.)
[100] Bank of Commerce v. New York City, 2 Black, 620 (1862) quoting from McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheaton, 431 (1819). The principle is laid down in the decision that “the sovereignty of a State extends to everything which exists by its own authority, or is introduced by its permission; but it does not extend to these means which are employed by Congress to carry into execution powers conferred on that body by the people of the United States.” Id. 429.