Father Duffy's story

by Francis Patrick Duffy

But nobody knew for certain whether the enemy would make more than a rear guard action at the Ourcq. His general line still constituted a salient and his ultimate line was sure to be the Vesle or the Aisne. It takes time to get Artillery up and in place. And the Germans might slip away scot free on account of our too great caution in following him. Miles to right and left allied troops, mainly French, were hammering at both sides of the salient. It was the duty of those who followed the retreating enemy to see that his retirement with guns and other property should not be too easy a task.

In our progress to the slopes above the Ourcq there was little resistance in the path of our brigade. The night of the 27th, General Lenihan established brigade headquarters at the Château de Foret. The Ohios were in the forest in brigade support, as the first plan was to send in one regiment. Our second battalion was in regimental reserve and was held by Anderson in the woods to the left of the road, his principal officers being Lieutenant Keveny, Adjutant, and in command of the four companies, E, F, G, H, Captains Baker, Kelly, Prout and Finn. Colonel McCoy had established his post of command near the church at the northern end of Villers sur Fere. With him was the Headquarters Company under Captain Michael Walsh, and nearest to him was the third battalion under Major McKenna, with Lieutenant Cassidy, Adjutant, and Companies I, K, L, M, commanded by Captains Ryan, Hurley, Merle-Smith and Meaney.

Major Donovan with the first battalion, Lieutenant Ames, Adjutant, and the Companies A, B, C, D, commanded by Lieutenant Baldwin, Captain Reilly, Captain Bootz and Lieutenant Connelly with our Machine Gun Company under Captain Seibert, had gone forward on the night of the 26th and relieved the French west of Beuvardes. On the afternoon of the 27th they had passed east through the Foret de Fere and had come out on the crest over the river between Villers and Sergy, the lines being widely extended to keep in touch with the Iowas on the right. Here we witnessed the first operation of cavalry in our battles. A small squadron of French cavalry came out of the woods and proceeded down the road south of the river in the direction of Sergy with the intention of drawing the enemy fire. It was a beautiful sight to see the animated group of horses and men tearing down the road, but a spectacle that did not last long, as very shortly they drew a powerful enemy fire and after some losses cantered back to the woods with their main object accomplished. Our Infantry was thus drawn into the battle but with little opportunity to accomplish much as the enemy were relying principally on heavy shell fire. Of ours, Company C suffered the greatest losses, as Corporal Morschhauser, William V. Murtha and John F. Ingram were killed and Sergeant John F. Vermaelen with Frank Dunn, William Ryan and Harry Fix mortally wounded. Major Donovan drew his battalion back behind the reverse slope of a hill where it was protected from observation by trees, and there ordered them to dig in for the night.

He had detached Company D, under Lieutenant Connelly, to find and maintain liaison with the French on the left. The Lieutenant got in touch with our own 3rd Battalion which was already coming up on that side. Lieutenant Burke of D Company, with Eugene Brady, kept on to find the French to the westward, but just as he started out he received a dangerous and painful wound in the leg. He stopped only long enough to have it tied up and then, in spite of protest, he insisted on carrying out his task. He tramped over fields and through woods for four hours that night before his work was complete and there was no danger of the derangement of plans, and then permitted them to carry him back to the hospital. His wound was so severe that it took months and months to heal, but Burke is the kind of soldier who will carry out any task he is given to do, if he has to finish it crawling.

In the early hours of Sunday, July 28th, the disposition of the regiment was as follows. Colonel McCoy with his Headquarters Company, Major McKenna’s Battalion with Company D of the 1st Battalion, and a Company of the Wisconsin Machine Gunners were in the town of Villers sur Fere and in the orchards east of it. Major Donovan with Companies A, B and C, and our Machine Gun Company were further east in the direction of Sergy. Our 2nd Battalion was two miles behind and to the west, the Ohios being still further west on the same line. A battalion of the Alabamas had come up behind Major Donovan to take the ground he had occupied between Villers sur Fere and Sergy. In front of Sergy the Iowas were already set. West of Villers sur Fere the ground was held by the French, their main effort being concentrated on the capture of Fere en Tardenois. It was reported through the night that they already had that town, but they did not cross the river until well on into the next morning.

Under normal battle conditions Colonel McCoy would not have been justified in having his Post of Command right up with the advance elements of his regiment as they went into battle. But he was a bold as well as a careful commander, and he felt that he could best handle the situation by being where he could see just what was going on.

For two days the situation had been changing from hour to hour. First it was planned to have Major Donovan relieve the forward elements of the French Infantry on Friday night. Then on Friday morning came a corps order for the 42nd Division to attack on Saturday morning. It was then arranged between General Menoher and the French Division Commander to have two battalions of ours, Donovan’s and McKenna’s, relieve the French that night. As we have seen, the order to attack was recalled and the relieving battalions were sent back. But the two division commanders decided that the relief should be effected and that these two battalions should take the front line with Anderson in support and the 166th in reserve. On Saturday came word that the enemy had withdrawn with the French Division to our left in pursuit. The 166th were to relieve them when the situation settled.

On Saturday morning came General Order 51. “Pursuant to orders from the Sixth (French) Army, 42nd Division will attack at H. hour, under cover of darkness, night of July 27-28.” The four infantry regiments were to attack abreast, a battalion of each being in line. “The attack will be in the nature of a surprise, and consequently troops in the attack will not fire during the assault, but will confine themselves to the use of the bayonet.”

At 1:00 P. M. Saturday, July 27th, the order was given to execute the relief and await further instructions. Our advance elements were already on the way and the 1st Battalion of the Ohios came up in the rear of the 10th French Chasseurs to make reconnaissance with the purpose of relieving them.

An hour after midnight General Lenihan received a message from Colonel MacArthur containing an order from our 1st Army Corps, that the attack be made before daylight and without artillery preparation, reliance being placed chiefly on the bayonet to drive the enemy from his position. Cavalry were to be in reserve to follow up. General Lenihan ordered all of our three Battalions to take part in the attack.