The failure of Fremont, Banks, and McDowell in the Shenandoah Valley convinced President Lincoln of the desirability of consolidating their armies under a single head. By order of June 26 the “Army of Virginia” was created, and Maj. Gen. John Pope, who had won recent successes in the West, was given the command. Shortly thereafter, Gen. Henry W. Halleck was recalled from the West to be made general in chief of the Federal armies.
To Pope was entrusted the responsibility for covering Washington, protecting the Shenandoah Valley, and so operating against the Confederate communications at Gordonsville and Charlottesville as to draw off heavy detachments from Richmond, thereby relieving the pressure on McClellan. On July 14, Pope ordered an advance on Gordonsville. Lee, anticipating the movement, had ordered Jackson to this point the day before.
On August 7, Jackson, having been reinforced by A. P. Hill, moved toward Culpeper in the hope of capturing the town and using it in a series of operations against Pope. Two days later he fell upon Banks at Cedar Mountain in a sharp but indecisive encounter.
Lee now learned that McClellan had been ordered to evacuate the Peninsula and reinforce Pope. Appreciating the necessity of striking Pope before he could be joined by such heavy reinforcements, Lee moved with Longstreet’s corps to reinforce Jackson. Pope’s force now numbered about 47,000 effectives, while Lee had approximately 55,000.
Lee’s Operations Along the Rapidan and Rappahannock
Pope’s center was now at Cedar Mountain, his right at Robertson’s River, and his left near Raccoon Ford on the Rapidan. Thus stationed, his army was directly opposite Gordonsville where Jackson’s force had recently arrived. On Clark’s Mountain (a high hill opposite Pope’s left) the Confederates had established a signal station. From here, stretching for miles, could be seen the white tents of the Federal encampment dotting the Culpeper tablelands. Spurs from Clark’s Mountain paralleled the Rapidan to Somerville Ford, located about 2 miles from Raccoon Ford.
Lee was quick to appreciate the advantage this topography afforded him. Massing his troops behind Clark’s Mountain he might move under its protecting screen, fall upon Pope’s left at Somerville Ford, and cut off his retreat to Washington. The opportunity held bright possibilities of success, and August 18 was set as the date for the initiation of the movement. Unforeseen delays postponed the movement until the 20th. Worse still for the Confederates, Stuart’s adjutant general was captured, bearing a copy of Lee’s order.
Thus warned, Pope withdrew his army behind the Rappahannock. Lee followed closely on the 20th, crossing to the north side of the river. Pope took up an advantageous position where he stood fast during 5 days of feints and demonstrations as Lee sought eagerly for an opening on the right. In the meantime, Stuart had captured Pope’s headquarters. Thus, Lee learned that 20,000 troops, composing the corps of Heintzelman and Porter and the division of Reynolds, were within 2 days’ march of the front. Within 5 days other expected reinforcements would swell Pope’s numbers to about 130,000 men.
The situation was so desperate as to demand a bold expedient. Quickly, Lee made his decision. Jackson, with Stuart’s cavalry comprising about 24,000 men, was to be sent on a wide flanking movement of Pope’s right for the purpose of destroying his communications with Washington. Commenting on this decision, Henderson, the English biographer of Jackson, says “we have record of few enterprises of greater daring.”
