89.—Everyone blames his memory, no one blames his judgment.
90.—In the intercourse of life, we please more by our faults than by our good qualities.
91.—The largest ambition has the least appearance of ambition when it meets with an absolute impossibility in compassing its object.
92.—To awaken a man who is deceived as to his own merit is to do him as bad a turn as that done to the Athenian madman who was happy in believing that all the ships touching at the port belonged to him.
[That is, they cured him. The madman was Thrasyllus, son of Pythodorus. His brother Crito cured him, when he infinitely regretted the time of his more pleasant madness.—See Aelian, Var. Hist. iv. 25. So Horace— ——————"Pol, me occidistis, amici, Non servastis," ait, "cui sic extorta voluptas Et demptus per vim mentis gratissimus error." HOR. EP. ii—2, 138, of the madman who was cured of a pleasant lunacy.]
93.—Old men delight in giving good advice as a consolation for the fact that they can no longer set bad examples.
94.—Great names degrade instead of elevating those who know not how to sustain them.
95.—The test of extraordinary merit is to see those who envy it the most yet obliged to praise it.
96.—A man is perhaps ungrateful, but often less chargeable with ingratitude than his benefactor is.
97.—We are deceived if we think that mind and judgment are two different matters: judgment is but the extent of the light of the mind. This light penetrates to the bottom of matters; it remarks all that can be remarked, and perceives what appears imperceptible. Therefore we must agree that it is the extent of the light in the mind that produces all the effects which we attribute to judgment.