At the same time, and as the thunder follows the lightning, the court of Rome learnt that the threat had been followed by performance. Upon the express order of the Emperor Napoleon, Civita Vecchia had been occupied by two regiments of the Neapolitan army. The districts of Benevento and Ponte-Corvo, surrounded by the kingdom of Naples, and belonging to the Holy See, were erected into principalities in favor of Talleyrand and Marshal Bernadotte. Cardinal Fesch was recalled. He quitted Rome after a warm altercation with the Pope. A few days later, and in the vain hope of ameliorating political relations becoming more and more difficult, Cardinal Consalvi gave in his resignation. He wrote to Cardinal Caprara, perpetual papal legate at Paris and completely subject to the imperial authority: "If any one had told me when I was negotiating the Concordat that in a short time I should appear to the French Government in the light of an enemy, I should have thought I was dreaming. But I am too much attached to the Holy See, to my sovereign, to my benefactor, and to my country, not to consider myself as compelled to dispel by my retirement the evils which might result from my presence. His Holiness consents to my resignation. His object has been to satisfy the emperor, and give him a proof of his desire to preserve harmony with his government by removing everything that might compromise it."

The sacrifice of Cardinal Consalvi was useless, and passed unnoticed. Napoleon required from the Holy See not only submission to his will, but the acceptance of his principles. The caution of the court of Rome irritated him more and more. He frightened Cardinal Caprara with a violent scene: "Write that I demand from his Holiness a declaration without ambiguity, stating that during the present war, and any other future war, all the ports of the pontifical states shall be closed to all English vessels, either of war or commerce. Without this I shall cause all the rest of the pontifical states to be occupied, I will have the eagles fixed up over the gates of all its cities and domains, and, as I have done for Benevento and Ponte Corvo, I shall divide the provinces possessed by the Pope into so many duchies and principalities, which I shall confer upon whomsoever I please. If the Pope persists in his refusal, I will establish a senate at Rome; and when once Rome and the pontifical states shall be in my hands, they will never be out of them again." Already the revenues of Civita Vecchia had been seized by Generals Lemarrois and Duhesme. "By what right do you do this?" demanded an employé of the pontifical treasury. "You serve a little prince and I serve a great sovereign," replied the officer; "in that you can see all my right." Such was throughout Europe the foundation of the right of the Emperor Napoleon. The governor of Civita Vecchia, Mgr. Negreta, had been seized by force in his residence, and sent back to Rome without an escort. Personal communication no longer existed between the Pope and the emperor. The letter of Pius VII., sent by the hands of Cardinal Caprara, remained unanswered. Alquier alone, who had succeeded Cardinal Fesch at Rome, still informed Napoleon as to the state of feeling there. An old Conventional, intelligent and moderate, the Minister of France, reported to Talleyrand, then Minister of Foreign Affairs, "People are strangely mistaken as to the character of the sovereign pontiff, if they have thought his apparent flexibility was yielding to all that they were striving to impress upon him. In all that pertains to the authority of the head of the Church, he takes counsel with himself alone. The Pope has a mild character, but very irritable, and susceptible of displaying a firmness proof against any trial; already they are openly saying, 'If the emperor overturns us, his successor will re- establish us.'"

On the morrow of the battle of Jena, when the ruin of the Prussian monarchy had added new lustre to the splendor of Napoleon's victories, the emperor wished to make one last effort in order to establish an absolute dominion over that little corner of Italy which still preserved an independent sovereignty. For more than a year he had not accepted any direct communication with the court of Rome: he commanded the attendance of Mgr. Arezzo, Bishop in partibus of Seleucia, formerly papal nuncio in Russia, and who then happened to be at Dresden. The prelate was admitted to the emperor at Berlin, in the cabinet of the great Frederick: he has preserved a textual account of his conversation with Napoleon. "What did you have to do with Russia?" "Your Majesty is aware that there are in Russia 4,000,000 of Catholics. It is for that reason that the Pope maintains a representative there." "The Pope ought not to have a minister at St. Petersburg; the Greeks have always been the enemies of Rome, and I do not know by what spirit of madness Rome can be possessed to desire the good of its enemies rather than of its friends. You are about to quit Dresden, and repair to Rome. You are my enemy. In the first place, you are not a Sicilian for nothing. I do not mean by that that you have spoken abusively of me, but you have desired that I should come to nothing, that my armies should be beaten, and that my enemies should triumph. You are not the only one to wish me evil; at Rome people think no better than elsewhere. The Pope is a holy man, whom they make believe whatever they please. They represent my demands to him under a false aspect, as Cardinal Consalvi has done, and then the good Pope is roused up to say that he will be killed rather than yield. Who thinks of killing him, bon Dieu? If he will not take the course I wish, I will certainly deprive him of his temporal power at Rome, but I shall always respect him as the head of the Church. There is no necessity that the Pope should be sovereign of Rome. The most holy Popes were not so. I shall secure him a good appanage of three millions, upon which he can properly keep up his position; and I shall place at Rome a king or a senator, and I shall divide his states into so many duchies. In reality, the main point of the matter is, that I wish the Pope to accede to the confederation; I expect him to be the friend of my friends, and the enemy of my enemies. In fifteen days you will be at Rome, and will peremptorily signify this to him." "Your Majesty will permit me to repeat to him that which has been already said to him so many times: that the Pope, being the common father of the faithful, cannot separate himself from some to attach himself to others; and his ministry being a ministry of peace, he cannot make war against anybody, nor declare himself the enemy of any one whatever without failing in his duties and compromising his sacred character." "But I do not claim at all that he should make war against anybody. I wish him to shut his ports against the English, and that he should not receive them into his states, and that not being able to defend his ports and fortresses he should permit me to defend them. Rest assured that at Rome they have lost their heads. They have no longer there the great men of the time of Leo X. Ganganelli would not have conducted himself in this style. I wish to be in safety in my own house. The whole of Italy belongs to me by right of conquest. Let the Pope do what I wish, and he will be recompensed for the past and for the future. I only forewarn you that all must be completed before the 1st of January: if the Pope will consent, he will lose nothing; if he will refuse, then I shall take away his states. Excommunications are no longer in fashion, and my soldiers will not refuse to march wherever I send them. Call to mind Charles V., who kept the Pope prisoner, and who made him recite prayers for him at Madrid. I shall take the same course if I am brought to bay."

Mgr. Arezzo having asked for some prolongation of the delay: "Ah well! I give you till February," replied the emperor; "but let everything be finished before February." "And where will it be necessary to send the ambassador of the Pope? to Berlin, to Warsaw, to St. Petersburg? Your Majesty moves so quickly!" Napoleon began to laugh. "No, to Paris," said he.

It was in fact at Paris, in the month of October, 1807, when the victory of Friedland had delivered Russia, like Prussia, to the influence of Napoleon, that the envoy of the Pope succeeded in obtaining an audience— not of the emperor, but of Champagny, his new Minister of Foreign Affairs. New difficulties had aggravated the bitterness of the relations between France and Rome. Pius VII., however, had perceived that the requirements of the emperor, so absolute in their harshness, would not yield to his moderate and passive resistance. He had authorized his French representative, the Cardinal de Bayanne, to make an important concession. "The last demands of his Imperial Majesty," wrote Cardinal Casoni, Minister of State, on the 14th of October, "are limited as regards the English to the closure of the ports. The holy father has every reason to think that his adherence ought to be limited to this closure; but if anything else is required of him he will consent to it, provided that it does not compel him to engage in actual war, and that it does not injure the independence of the pontifical sovereignty. It will he desirable then that your Eminence and the cardinal legate, to whom this despatch is common, should be on your guard, to concert the explanation and import of these words in order to satisfy his Imperial Majesty as the holy father desires, but at the same time not to impose upon his Holiness an obligation opposed to his duties and his honor."

This was a good deal to grant, and it curtailed considerably the formal declarations of neutrality so often repeated by the court of Rome. Napoleon required still more, and his secret thoughts were not in accord with his public declarations. The obstacles to the free choice of an ambassador; the requirements with regard to the full powers which were to be conferred on Cardinal de Bayanne; the forcible hindrance to the journey of the latter, arbitrarily detained at Milan; the systematic neglect of his requests for an audience—clearly proved the decision taken to obtain all or nothing—to subjugate or break the pontifical power. The last offers of the Pope fully satisfied the demands of the emperor, as expressed by Cardinal Fesch, Talleyrand, and Napoleon himself again and again. Champagny declared that these concessions were no longer sufficient. The Pope was to engage himself to make common cause with the Emperor Napoleon, and to unite his land and sea forces with those of France in all wars against England. The ports closed against the English; the care of the ports of Ostia, Ancona, and Civita Vecchia confided to France; 2000 men of the French troops maintained at Ancona at the cost of the Holy See; and concessions without reserve on the subject of the number of French cardinals, as of the consecration of Italian bishops—such were the conditions of the convention presented to the Cardinal de Bayanne by Champagny. A few other articles, treating of the spiritual power, and which had been abandoned at the request of Cardinal Fesch, remained as a menace suspended over the head of the negotiator, in case his submission should not be sufficiently prompt and complete. General Lemarrois had already taken possession of the duchy of Urbino, of the province of Macerata, of Fermo, and Spoleto. The Cardinal de Bayanne was still negotiating, but the order for his recall had been sent from Rome (9th of November, 1807). "God and the world will do us justice against the proceedings of the emperor, let them be what they may," wrote Pius VII.

The exactions of Champagny had heaped up a measure which was already overflowing. In full Consistory, and without any hesitation on the part of either Pope or cardinals, the proposals were unanimously rejected. "This is the fruit of our journey to Paris, of our patience, of the forbearance which has led us to make so many sacrifices, to suffer so many humiliations. If such pretensions are persisted in, you must immediately demand your passport, and come away." Such were the instructions sent on the 2nd of December to the Cardinal de Bayanne by the holy father. The orders sent by the emperor to his agents did not wait long for a response. Already for some time past very considerable forces had been grouped to the north and south of the pontifical states, under the orders of General Miollis. Six thousand Frenchmen were destined for this expedition. A Neapolitan column of 3000 men was to occupy Terracina. All the movements of the troops had been carefully calculated and foreseen; the care of watching over their execution was confided to Prince Eugène and the King of Naples. The emperor wrote to Champagny on the 22nd of January, 1808:

"On the 25th of January the French army will be at Perugia; on the 3rd of February it will be at Rome. The express, setting out on the 25th, will arrive at Rome on the 1st of February, and will thus carry your orders to Signer Alquier two days before the troops arrive. You ought to make known to Signer Alquier that General Miollis, who commands my troops, and who appears to be directing his course towards Naples, will stay at Rome and take possession of the castle of St. Angelo. When Signer Alquier shall become aware that the troops are at the gate of Rome, he shall present to the Cardinal Secretary of State the subjoined note: 'The arrival of General Miollis has for its aim the protection of the rearguard of the army of Naples. On his way, he presents himself at Rome to give force to the measures which the emperor has resolved on taking to purge this city of the scoundrels to whom it has given asylum, and consequently to all the enemies of France.' You will put in cipher in your despatch the following paragraph: 'The intention of the emperor is to accustom by this note, and by these proceedings, the people of Rome and the French troops to live together, in order that if the court of Rome should continue to show itself as insensate as it now is, it might insensibly cease to exist as a temporal power without any notice being taken of it.' Nevertheless, whilst desiring to avoid disturbance, and to leave things in statu quo, I am prepared to take strong measures the first time the Pope indulges in any bull or manifesto; for a decree shall be immediately published, revoking the gift of Charlemagne, and reuniting the states of the Church to the kingdom of Italy, furnishing proofs of the evils that religion has suffered through the sovereignty of Rome, and making apparent the contrast between Jesus Christ dying on the cross and His successor making himself a king!"

It was not without a certain uneasiness that the emperor was preparing thus to use violence against an unarmed sovereign, and historical decrees were not the only arms on which he expected to rely. "The slightest insurrection that may break out," wrote he to Prince Eugène (February 7th, 1808), "must be repressed with grape-shot, if necessary, and severe examples must be made."

No insurrection broke out; the Pope and his followers had resolved upon giving to the world a startling demonstration of the material powerlessness of the Holy See in presence of brute force. Whilst General Miollis was entering Rome, on February 2nd, 1808, at eight o'clock in the morning, disarming the pontifical troops in order to seize upon the Castle of St. Angelo, the Pope was officiating in the chapel of the Quirinal, surrounded by the Sacred College. The palace was invested by the troops, and cannon were pointed at the walls; the cardinals went forth without tumult or protest. The French officers were not a little surprised to see them get into their carriages and retire without letting any trace of annoyance be visible on their countenances. [Footnote: Memoirs of Cardinal Pacca.]