General Dupont appealed to his lieutenants, general officers, and colonels; all declared that the soldiers would not fight. The general-in- chief surveyed the ranks some moments; his courage failed him entirely. "Our honor is saved," repeated the members of the council of war, "we have done yesterday all that men could do." One resource remained to them, to die to the last man in endeavoring to rejoin General Vedel. They had the misfortune not to try this last and glorious chance. The capitulation was resolved on. Don Castaños entertained the French officers while hatred shone in the eyes of all his staff. Polite, and full of attention to the vanquished, the Spanish general remained wholly inflexible. All the divisions of the army of Andalusia, engaged or not in the battle of Baylen, were to be comprised in the capitulation.
The conditions were about to be signed, the French troops were authorized to retreat on Madrid; the Barbou division alone commanded by General Dupont, was to be disarmed. At the same instant a letter from General Savary to General Dupont was brought by the mountaineers, into whose hands it had fallen. The aide-de-camp of the emperor announced a general concentration of the troops of the south at Madrid, and General Dupont was ordered to take the road to La Mancha. The Spaniards could not allow their victory to serve the designs of the emperor. General Castaños immediately declared to the French negotiators that the conditions were changed, and communicated to them the letter of General Savary. Overwhelmed by this new blow, General Marescot and his companions saw themselves forced to give up the Barbou division prisoners of war; the two other corps were to be transported to France under the Spanish flag; the officers retained their baggage, but the knapsacks of the soldiers were to be submitted to examination. "All Spaniards believe the sacred vessels of Cordova are in the bags of your soldiers," said General Castaños.
While the wretched negotiators accepted a capitulation which delivered them to their enemies, Vedel had proposed to General Dupont to attempt a new attack; he sent at the same time one of his aides-de-camp to plead the cause of his division. At one time Dupont authorized Vedel to save, at any price, his troops, and those of General Dufour's, by taking in forced marches the road to Madrid. Already Vedel had obeyed, and hastened across the defiles of the Sierra Morena, but the news of his departure was not long in coming to the camp of the Spaniards. They accused the French of breaking the truce, and threatened to immediately massacre the Barbou division, which found itself at that time completely surrounded. The Spanish negotiators broke out into fury, overwhelming with insults the unhappy officers charged to treat with them. Heroism had disappeared from their souls. They hastened to the tent of the general-in-chief, still plunged in melancholy dejection. He gave way at last, and to his eternal dishonor, and that of the men who tore from him this cowardly concession, he sent to General Vedel the order to retrace his steps, and to submit with his soldiers to the lot the capitulation reserved for him.
Like General Dupont, Vedel consulted his lieutenants. At first all refused a submission which would lead to their destruction. A new messenger came, throwing on them all the responsibility of the inevitable massacre of their comrades. They gave way, and with despair in their souls they slowly retraced their steps; as the sole solace to their sufferings they still retained their arms, while they saw their unhappy comrades defile before the Spanish army laying down their muskets at the feet of the victors. During three days the troops had not received any food; the Spaniards had counted on hunger as well as defeat to lead the French to capitulate. At last they got some food, and soon the columns began their march. The ports of embarkation had been fixed upon.
They advanced slowly, for from all the towns, villages, and scattered houses, flocked multitudes in fury, who insulted the frightful misfortune of our soldiers. General Castaños, moderate in his triumph, had said to the French negotiators, "De la Cuesta, Blake, and myself, were not of the same opinion as the insurgents. We yielded to the national movement; but this movement is becoming so unanimous that it has a chance of success. Let Napoleon not insist upon an impossible conquest, let him not force us to throw ourselves into the arms of the English. Let him give us back our king, and the two nations will be forever reconciled."
It was in fact the same thought, clothed in offensive language that Thomas de Morla, the chief of the insurrection at Cadiz, flung at General Dumont when he complained of the bad treatment undergone by his soldiers. "Your excellency forces me to express truths which must be bitter to you. What right have you to insist on the execution of a treaty concluded in favor of an army which entered Spain under the mask of alliance and friendship, which has imprisoned our king and his family, sacked his palaces, assassinated and robbed his subjects, ravaged his country, usurped his crown? How it would rouse the populace to know that a single one of your soldiers was the possessor of 2180 livres!"
The pillage of Cordova had been exaggerated by the public imagination, and served the chiefs of the insurrection to justify their want of faith. The entire army of Andalusia was detained under various pretexts. The Junta of Seville refused to ratify the capitulation. The divisions of Dufour and Vedel saw their army taken away, and 20,000 men of those French troops, who up to the present time had been accustomed to victory, remained during long years prisoners of war, subjected to the worst treatment, slowly decimated by sickness and sorrow. Spain first gave to the world the spectacle of a successful resistance to the oppression the Emperor Napoleon had made to weigh upon all nations.
We understand by sad experience the astonishment and anger which seized upon our armies everywhere when they heard of the capitulation of Baylen. This name has remained fixed as an indelible stain on the memory of the men who concluded it in a moment of despair, after numerous faults, of which the most unpardonable cannot be imputed to them. Perhaps in his secret thought, Napoleon began to foresee the difficulties of the enterprise he had undertaken against Spain; perhaps he comprehended his error, but his indignation was excessive, and broke out in his words as well as letters. There was also a shade of discouragement when he wrote to King Joseph, on the 3rd August, "My brother, the knowledge I have that you are struggling, my friend, with events foreign to your habits as well as to your natural character, pains me. Dupont has dishonored our flag. What stupidity! What baseness! Those men will be taken by the English. Events of such a nature require my presence at Paris. Germany, Poland, Italy, all join together. My sorrow is really great when I think that I cannot be at this moment with you, and in the midst of my soldiers. I have given orders to Ney to go there. He is a man of honor, zeal, and thorough courage. If you get accustomed to Ney, he might command the army. You will have 100,000 men, and Spain will be conquered in the autumn. A suspension of arms, made by Savary, might perhaps lead to commanding and directing the insurgents; we shall hear what they say. I think that, so far as your personal likings go, you care little for reigning over the Spaniards."
At the moment when Napoleon was writing these lines, King Joseph retreated before the enemy, and abandoned his capital. Deprived of the succor that General Dupont was to have brought, the defenders of Madrid did not consider the concentration of troops sufficiently considerable to protect the Castiles against the ever-rising flood of the national insurrection. "The emperor could hold his own here," said Savary, "but what is possible to him is not so to the others." It was resolved to make a stand on the line of the Ebro; King Joseph quitted Madrid, abandoned by the intimate servants of his household, as well as by a certain number of his ministers. 2000 domestics of the palace had fled for fear of being forced to follow the royal retreat. Burgos not appearing to be a retreat sufficiently sure, the monarch and his little court soon established themselves at Vittoria. After a second assault, as sanguinary and without result as the first, General Verdier, recalled to the Ebro, found himself obliged to abandon the siege of Saragossa. Already the position of the French in Spain became defensive, and the fears of King Joseph increased. "I can only repeat, once for all, that nearly all the grand army is marching, and that between this and autumn Spain will be inundated with troops," wrote the emperor, on the 9th of August. "You must try to preserve the line of the Douro to maintain a communication with Portugal. The English are not much, they never have more than a quarter of the troops they announce. Lord Wellesley has not 4000 men. Besides, they are intended, I believe, for Portugal."
It was in truth on Portugal that the efforts of England were directed at this moment, as she discerned clearly that there lay the true road to Spain. In Galicia, as well as Andalusia, the Spanish insurgents had refused the active intervention of the English. Sir Arthur Wellesley, who at first appeared before Corunna, contented himself by furnishing the suspicious Spaniards with ammunition and money, and on the 1st August he appeared at the mouth of the Mondego, in Portugal. His fleet carried 10,000 English troops. A reinforcement of 4000 men was shortly expected.