World's Best Histories — Volume 7: France

by François Guizot; Madame de Witt

In the night between the 11th and 12th two English battalions had crossed the Douro at Avinto, three leagues above Oporto, collecting all the vessels which were to be found on the river, and descending the course of the stream under cover of the darkness. The army of Sir Arthur Wellesley had meanwhile occupied the suburbs of the left bank, concealing his movements behind the heights of La Sarca. Marshal Soult was ignorant of that operation. At daybreak a small body of picked men, boldly crossing the river within sight of our soldiers, took possession of an enclosure called the Seminary. Entrenching themselves there, and constantly receiving new reinforcements, the English made a desperate defence against the attempts of General Delaborde. The main body of the enemy's army beginning to fill all the streets of Oporto, the marshal at once sounded retreat, and the wounded and sick were left to the care of the English. When, on the evening of the 12th, the army reached the town of Baltar, Soult learned that the roads by Braga had been intercepted, as well as by the valley of the Douro. General Loison, unable to force the passage of the Tamega, had evacuated Amarante. The roads from the north would bring the army back to the suburbs of Oporto. The marshal, not wishing to risk a fresh encounter with the enemy, at once made up his mind to sacrifice without hesitation his baggage, ammunition, artillery, and even the greater part of the treasure of the army, to enter the mountain passes, and join at Guimaraens the divisions which had preceded him. When at last the army reached Orense, after seven days' marching, varied by small skirmishes, the soldiers were exhausted and depressed. Portugal was for the second time lost to us. Marshal Soult immediately marched towards Galicia, which had for two months been the theatre of Ney's operations, and freed Lugo, while that marshal was making a brilliant expedition in the Asturias along with General Kellermann. The two chiefs made an arrangement as to the measures to be taken against the insurgents who had assembled at St. Jago under the orders of the Marquis Romana; after which Soult was to march upon Old Castile as far as Zamora, to be near the English, who were said to be threatening the south of Portugal. Ney proposed to attack Vigo, where General Noriena had fortified himself, supported by the crews of several English vessels. From the very first, since the junction of the two armies, both officers and soldiers had exchanged keen and bitter recrimination. A better feeling, however, had reappeared, and the mutual good-will of the chiefs for each other silenced the ill-disposed. After their separation, Ney freed St. Jago; but after advancing to the suburbs of Vigo, and seeing its strong position, he waited for the result of Soult's movement against Romana.

Several days having elapsed, he learned that, after driving Romana back to Orense without fighting, and staying several days at Montforte, the marshal had taken the road to Zamora, without replying to the letters of his companion-in-arms. From information received from Lugo, Ney was persuaded that Soult's project had long been premeditated, and that he had of deliberate purpose broken the bargain stipulated between them. His anger burst forth with a violence proportioned to the frankness he had shown when treating with Soult, and this anger was shared by the officers and soldiers of his army. He at once determined to evacuate Galicia, which was threatened both by the English and the Spanish insurgents. Leaving a strong garrison at Ferrol, Ney slowly advanced towards Lugo, where he collected the sick and wounded left by Soult, and then returned to Astorga, in the beginning of July. He wrote to King Joseph: "If I had wished to resolve to leave Galicia without artillery, I could have remained there longer, at the risk of being hemmed in; but, avoiding such a mode of departure, I have retreated, bringing with me my sick and wounded, as well as those of Marshal Soult, left in my charge. I inform your Majesty that I have decided not to serve again in company with Marshal Soult."

King Joseph now had a most troublesome complication, and a position that daily became more serious. At one time, in April, he was in hopes of seeing his affairs right themselves again, in spite of the absence of all news of Soult's operations in Portugal. Marshal Victor, urged by the King of Spain and by his staff to obey the emperor's instructions and invade Andalusia, had crossed the Tagus in three columns, and, reforming again on the Guadiana, had, after passing that river, joined near Medellin Don Gregorio de la Cuesta, who retreated for several days before him. A severe battle having dispersed those large forces of the Spanish insurgents, on the 28th March, the marshal took up his position on the banks of the Guadiana, at the very time when General Sebastiani, at the head of two divisions, was defeating the army of Estremadura at Ciudad Real, and driving it back to the entrance of the Sierra Morena. There they awaited the movement ordered in the instructions given to Soult, the pivot of the whole campaign, projected by Napoleon before his departure for Paris. It was in Germany, just after the battle of Essling, that the emperor learned of the check caused to all his combinations by Soult's immobility at Oporto. Obstinate in directing himself the operations of armies at a distance, without the power of taking into account the state of public opinion, and without any knowledge of all that had occurred between the departure of the couriers and the arrival of peremptory orders no longer suitable to the situation, the emperor conceived the idea of concentrating three armies under one man. Making all personal considerations bend to the order of seniority, he entrusted the command to Marshal Soult, thus investing him with supreme authority over Marshals Mortier and Ney. The order reached Madrid at the moment when the leaders of the armies were most keenly antagonistic. "You will send a staff-officer to Spain," Napoleon had written to the minister of war, "with the orders that the forces of the Duke of Elchingen, the Duke of Trevisa, and the Duke of Dalmatia will form only one army, under the command of the Duke of Dalmatia. These forces must only move together, to march against the English, pursue them incessantly, defeat them, and throw them into the sea. Putting all considerations aside, I give the command to the Duke of Dalmatia, as being senior in rank. These forces ought to form from 50,000 to 60,000 men, and if the junction is promptly effected, the English will be destroyed, and the affairs of Spain arranged finally. But they must keep together, and not march in small parties. That principle applies to every country, but especially to a country where there can be no communication. I cannot appoint a place for the armies to meet, because I do not know what events have taken place. Forward this order to the king, to the Duke of Dalmatia, and to the two other marshals, by four different roads."

Whilst thus writing, constantly and justly apprehensive of the danger caused by the English army, Napoleon was still ignorant of the evacuation of Portugal. "Let your instructions to them be, to attack the enemy wherever they meet him," he said three days previously to General Clarke, "to renew their communications with the Duke of Dalmatia, and support him on the Minho. The English alone are to be feared; alone, if the army is not directed differently, they will in a few months lead it to a catastrophe."

The order sent by the emperor necessarily assisted in bringing about the catastrophe of which he was afraid. Marshal Soult, being deceived as to the plan of the English, and meditating an attack upon Portugal by Ciudad Rodrigo, wished to concentrate large forces for this purpose. He sent for Marshal Mortier, who was posted at Villacastín, where he covered Madrid, and demanded reinforcements from Aragon and Catalonia. The latter troops were refused him, and Generals Suchet and St. Cyr had great difficulty in keeping those two provinces in respect. Marshal Jourdan had foreseen the attack of the English on the Tagus, and was anxious about the position of Marshal Victor, isolated in Andalusia. Like the other leaders, the marshal acted independently, without attending to the orders from Madrid: he found himself compelled to fall back upon Talavera.

He was not to hold that post long. In spite of the extreme difficulty experienced by Sir Arthur Wellesley in maintaining a good understanding with his Spanish allies, he had marched to attack Marshal Victor, to whom King Joseph was sending reinforcements as quickly as he could. About 22,000 English soldiers were now on the field, reduced to such scarcity of provisions and money as to cause pillage and disorder, in spite of their commander's anger. Don Cuesta, with about 40,000 men under his orders, had been appointed, much against his will, to occupy the mountain passes. A Spanish army of 30,000 men, collected by General Venegas, was expected to join the two principal armies. On leaving Madrid, with the forces at his disposal, King Joseph had impressed upon Soult the necessity of attacking the enemy's rear, so that the Anglo-Spanish army might be crushed between superior forces. The marshal announced his departure.

Victor had had time to fall back upon Vargas, behind the Guadarama. Sir Arthur Wellesley crossed the Alberche, a tributary of the Tagus, and as soon as he found himself in presence of the enemy, wished to offer battle, urging Cuesta to join him in attacking Victor before the arrival of the enemy's reinforcements. The Spanish general declared that his honor was at stake in holding his positions, and absolutely refused to fight. The English alone, had not men enough at their disposal to contend with the French troops. Scarcely had the latter commenced their retreat when the Spanish, suddenly seized with the ardor of battle, rushed in pursuit, complaining that the "rascals withdrew so fast," wrote Cuesta to Wellesley, "that one cannot follow them in their flight." "If you run like that, you will get beaten," replied the English general, scornfully, annoyed at seeing himself perpetually thwarted in his able plans.

In fact when the Spaniards, a few days afterwards, at last engaged with the French, Marshal Victor's advance-guard were sufficient to drive Cuesta back as far as the English battalions, which had been prudently told off to support him. The fighting was gallant on the part of our troops, and helped to excite their ardor. King Joseph was urged to join battle: he feared an attack on Madrid, which he had been compelled to leave undefended, and reckoned upon the rapid movements of Soult, who had received orders to advance with all haste from Salamanca to Placentia. He had no experience of war, and neglected to take into account the chances of delay and the loss of troops during the march. Marshal Victor was daring, full of contempt for the Spanish troops, and ignorant of the qualities of the English army, which had not for a long time been seen on the continent. The French army advanced upon Talavera, which was strongly held by Sir Arthur. Hampered by the obstinacy and want of discipline of his Spanish allies, the English general had relinquished all attempts at daring, entrenching himself on the defensive. Marshal Soult had not arrived, being unable, he wrote, to effect his operation on the enemy's rear before the beginning of August. On the 27th of July, however, on occupying the ground before the English positions at Talavera, Victor gave orders to attack a height which was badly defended, and was driven back with heavy loss. Marshal Jourdan insisted on a delay of a few days, to allow Soult time to arrive; but the anxiety of King Joseph, and Victor's impatience, gained the day, and on the 28th, at daybreak, they attacked the mamelon, already threatened on the 27th.

Our troops gained the top under the English fire, but Sir Arthur had doubled the ranks of those in defence, and a terrible charge under General Hill compelled the French again to abandon the position.

The check was serious, and the soldiers began to be discouraged. By common consent, and without orders given by the leaders, the fight ceased. The English and French crowded on the two banks of a small brook which separated the two armies, and all quenched their thirst, without suspicion of treason or perfidy, and without a single shot being fired on either side. The French generals again discussed the question of resuming hostilities. "If this mamelon is not taken," exclaimed Victor, impetuously, "we should not take any part in a campaign." King Joseph, deficient in authority both of position and character, gave way. Sir Arthur Wellesley, seated on the grass at the top of a hill, surveyed the enemy's lines, and the defences, which he had just strengthened by a division, and a battery of artillery obtained with great difficulty from Cuesta. Till then the English had borne the brunt of the fighting; on General Donkin coming to tell Sir Arthur that the Spanish were betraying him, the general-in-chief quietly said, "Go back to your division." The attack was again begun, and this time directed against the whole line of the English positions, while Village's brigade turned the mamelon to assail them in flank.