General features of crises
4. Irregular in time, and unlike in their immediate occasions, crises show some general features. The chief of these are told in the brief story of the course of prices. Crises are less severe in countries with less developed money and credit systems. They are harder in the United States and England than in Germany, harder in Germany than in France, harder in western Europe than in eastern Europe, harder in Christendom than in heathendom. They are less severe in rural districts, where prosperity depends more on crop conditions, and business has in it less of financial speculation. Their effects are least felt in the staple industries, for when hard times come, people economize on the less essential things. The glove-factory, the silk-factory, the golf-club-factory are more likely to close than the flouring-mill. They are felt less by classes with fixed incomes than by those with variable ones. They affect wages and salaries less than profits. The rate of wages is affected only in a moderate degree, but laborers suffer in the loss of employment. The money-lender who has eliminated chance as far as possible and has taken a low rate of interest loses little; the risk-taker who draws his income from dividends on stock probably loses much.
§ III. VARIOUS EXPLANATIONS OF CRISES
Glut theories of crises
1. Over-production and under-consumption theories are those most widely held. In the first annual report of the United States Commissioner of Labor (1886) is given a long list of theories, more or less wild, that have been advanced in explanation of crises. It is simply a catalogue, not a logical grouping. Most of the views can be classed as under-consumption or over-production theories, which are but two aspects of the same idea. One view is that too many things are produced, another that too few are consumed. The over-production theorist, seeing that warehouses are filled with goods that cannot be disposed of for what they cost, that factories are shut down and men are out of employment for lack of demand, declares that productive power has grown too great. The under-consumption theorist, seeing the same facts, says that the trouble is lack of purchasing power. He admits that there are people who would like to buy these things, but he asserts that such people lack money because production grows faster than wages, wages being fixed, as he believes, by the minimum of subsistence—a theory akin to the iron law of wages. In both over-production and under-consumption theories the inequality of demand and supply is looked upon as a general one. There is supposed to be not merely an unequal and mistaken distribution of production, but a general excess of productive power.
Defects of glut theories
The wide vogue held by these views would justify a fuller discussion and disproof of them here, did space permit. It must suffice to indicate merely that they have the same taint of illogicalness as the "fallacy of waste," the "fallacy of saving" and, still closer likeness, the "fallacy of luxury." They overlook the fact that an income, either of money or of other goods, coming even to the wealthiest, will be used in some way. It may be used either for immediate consumption or for further indirect use in durable form. Through miscalculation there may be, at a given moment, too many consumption goods of a particular kind, but the durable applications can find no limit until the inconceivable day when the material world is no longer capable of improvement. At the time of a crisis, there is unquestionably a bad apportionment of productive agents, and a still worse adjustment of their valuations, but these in no wise negative the basic economic fact of the scarcity of wealth.
Money theories of crises
2. Another group of theories explains the crises as being due to money, either too much or too little. The unregulated issue of bank-notes has been assigned as the cause of crises, especially under the circumstances accompanying such crises as those of 1837 and 1857 in America, when bank-note issues chanced to be the agency most marked in the undue and unsound expansion of credit. The issue of government paper money, leading to inflation and speculation, is assigned as a cause leading up to such a crisis as that of 1873, following our Civil War. The reverse view is taken by the advocates of a cheap and plentiful money. They say that these crises were caused, not by the expansion, but by the reduction of bank-notes; for example, not by the inflation of prices through the issue of greenbacks in 1862 to 1865, but by the contraction of the currency from 1866 to 1873.
Their inadequacy