3. The main object of international bimetallism is to prevent the fluctuations of the standard of deferred payments. Commercial dealings between gold-using and silver-using countries are of great magnitude, and the use of different standards leads to many difficulties. Fluctuations in the ratio of the two metals occasion much uncertainty and loss to individual traders. The rise in the value of gold meant an increase in the burden of the public debts of silver-using countries which collect their revenues in silver, but which must pay their debts, principal and interest, in gold.

Its theory

The theory of bimetallism is that the government can act on the value of the two metals through the principle of substitution. The metal tending to become dearer will not be coined, the other will be coined in greater quantities. The degree of influence that can thus be exerted on the value of the two metals depends on the size of the reservoir of the metal that is rising in price. When it all leaves circulation, the law on the statute book permitting it to be coined becomes a mere sounding phrase. In such a case there is bimetallism de jure, but monometallism de facto. The greater the league of states, the greater is the likelihood that the scheme will work. The economic theory of bimetallism was recognized by a majority of economists to be abstractly sound, but the political difficulties in the way of international agreements are great, and have proved to be insurmountable.

§ III. THE FREE-SILVER MOVEMENT IN AMERICA

Conditions leading to the demand for free-silver

1. International bimetallism, despite many efforts, failed of adoption. This brief proposition sums up the history of the movement, from 1878 to 1892, to form a league of states and an agreement for international bimetallism. International conferences were held, and taken part in by the leading financiers of the world. France at first favored the policy, and the United States was always foremost in advocating it, while England in the main was opposed. Some of the advocates of bimetallism argued that the fall of prices was due not alone to economic forces, but also to a money conspiracy which had influenced legislation to introduce and continue the gold standard. This, of course, was strenuously denied. It is true that the commercial classes found gold the form of money most suitable to large business, and no doubt class interests entered into the question in some measure. The difficulties of the debtor class in America were peculiarly great, owing to the inflated paper currency, from 1862 to 1879, which had made our conditions quite abnormal. In the period of speculation following the Civil War an enormous mass of debts had been accumulated. The hopes of thousands of tillers of the soil suffering from a fall in prices, and of the great debtor class, clamoring for relief, were centered upon the success of this movement. Banking and other large business interests in general opposed it.

Purpose of the free-silver movement

2. The plan of the free-silver advocates was to legalize national bimetallism in the United States at a ratio between gold and silver very different from the market ratio. Gold had become, long before 1860, the real standard of our money system, and after 1873 it was the only metal admitted to free coinage. Silver, little by little, was losing purchasing power in terms of gold, until from being worth, in 1873, one sixteenth as much, ounce for ounce, it became, in 1896, worth but one thirtieth as much as gold. It must be recognized that the power of silver to purchase general commodities fell much less than the change in its ratio to gold would indicate, gold having risen in terms of most other goods as well as of silver. Nevertheless, the proposal to open the mints to free silver at sixteen to one in the year 1896 meant a sudden and marked cheapening of money. The prime purpose was to lighten the burden of debts by making the standard of deferred payments cheaper. It was at first a debtors' movement, but to succeed it had to enlist the support of other large classes of voters. And thus, by force of political necessity, but doubtless in large part naïvely, it developed into the more sweeping theory that wages, welfare, and prosperity called for a larger supply of money independently of the effect on debts.

The free-silver theory

In its extreme form the free-silver plan was a fiat scheme, for some of its supporters believed that by the mere passage of the law the two metals could be made to bear to each other any ratio desired. But its most intelligent and high-minded advocates (who were moved to its support by a sincere sympathy and concern for the distressed agriculturalists) recognized fully that the force of the law was limited by economic conditions. The extreme opponents of the plan, ignoring the evident fact that the adoption of a metal as a standard money is one of the most essential of the market conditions, denied that government action could in any way affect the value. Most of the arguments presented on either side in the political campaigns showed little evidence of a sound theory of money. The victory of the gold standard in 1896 and 1900, it would seem, was due more to the well-founded fear that a sudden change of the money standard would cause a panic, than to a thorough understanding of the question.