Y. said that night, after going to bed, every time he shut his eyes he could see the man’s head as it was when it was at last severed from the body, and that it was several nights before he could sleep without starting up again thinking he saw the same thing. A few weeks after this had happened, the dead man’s son went to the Amir, and said that Y. had called for his father late one night, intimating that the Amir Sahib wanted him, and the two of them had gone out together, and since then his father had not been seen. The Amir told him it was true, but to keep his mind at rest, for his father had been sent a long journey on a special mission and, God willing, he would come back. The relatives of men got rid of in this way, however, soon guessed the fate of those missing, and for their own sakes kept quiet lest they too should be taken away and never return.

The Amir’s object in getting rid of men who might cause disturbance was not only to prevent trouble during his own reign, but also to prepare the way for the peaceful accession of his son to the throne, and his thoroughness in carrying out all he did has made it very unlikely that if Ayoob Khan or Yakoob Khan returned to their country they could get together a following of sufficient numbers to cause any serious trouble. It was to prevent disturbances after his death that the Amir kept all his sons in Kabul, and put them in charge of various official departments, instead of making them governors of different provinces as former Amirs had done, for that was the cause of the fighting among the sons for supremacy and rule when the father died, because each son as the governor of a province had money and an army to help him in a struggle for the throne, and as each brother wanted it a good deal of fighting always ensued, and caused much bloodshed and misery in the country from time to time.

The history of Afghanistan shows how brother fought brother, and sons their father, one killing or blinding the other in a fierce desire to rule supreme, and the foresight of the Amir prevented a repetition of these horrors on his death. When that occurred there was no one but Sirdar Habibullah who had any chance as a candidate for the throne, and having been the head Sirdar for many years, and having also represented his father, who was seldom in good health, on many official occasions, he was looked upon by the leading men of the country as the one to succeed to the throne, and consequently received their support. This, together with his immediate occupation of the fortified palace of Arak, whereby he gained control of the treasury and the stores of modern arms and ammunition as soon as his father was dead, made him master of the situation, and there was no one likely to give him trouble except the Queen-Sultana, the mother of his half-brother, Mahomed Omar Khan, who was then about twelve years of age, and she was at once shut out of Arak, where she usually occupied the harem-serai built for the use of the Amir’s chief wife, and had to live in her private palace, Gulistan serai, which is situated on the Deh Afghanan side of the city. Here she was kept nominally in great honour as the chief wife of the late Amir, but practically a prisoner, for all her chief and confidential servants were taken from her and others in the Amir’s pay sent in place of them, and no one was allowed to go and see her, while all entrances to her palace, excepting the principal gate, were bricked up. The Amir and Sirdar Nasrullah Khan were particularly urgent in their orders to Mrs. Daly, the lady doctor in Kabul, that she should not visit the Queen-Sultana or hold communication with her, and they apparently feared that she might be induced to take or send a letter from the queen to the Indian Government, asking for aid in placing her own son on the throne; and, though the Indian Government might not take any notice of her letter, yet such action might prejudice the new Amir in their eyes. Also those officials and army officers who were possessed of any influence, and were inclined to side with the Queen-Sultana, were bought over by the new Amir, and were raised to higher rank.

The army, however, was seething with discontent, and a rising was feared and indeed imminent; but a promise, which was afterwards ratified, of an increase of pay all round kept them from any open act of insubordination, although there was a good deal of muttering for a long time, and the soldiers freely expressed their opinions and said they wanted any other government but that of the reigning family. The want of reliance in the Government among the people was shown by open acts of robbery with violence in different parts of the country, the like of which had been unknown for many years, and it expressed the indifference of the people to the constituted authority. This want of reliance in, or objection to, the existing Government was further shown by the attacks on the Europeans resident in the country, one of whom was shot from behind and killed by the officer of his escort for a slight so trivial as to induce a doubt as to whether the man acted entirely on his own initiative, or had been prompted by those who hoped thereby to cause complications with other powers prejudicial to their own Government.

At the time I left Kabul, the revenue of the country was barely sufficient to pay for the army, and it has been for many years gradually dwindling in amount, and the Amir was in great need of money. Also no arrangement had been come to with the Indian Government regarding the continuance of the subsidy which was paid the former Amir, and the present ruler, for fear of refusal, dared not ask for it prior to arrangements being made for the continuance with himself of the terms of alliance made with his father. Lord Curzon was insistent in his requests for the Amir to visit him in Peshawar, in order to settle all matters in a personal interview; but with the people in a state of unrest, and so many matters of importance to the internal government of the country requiring immediate settlement and action, the danger of leaving Kabul at that time was too great for the Amir to risk. The Russian Government offered to present him with many field-guns, rifles, and ammunition, but the offer was declined, for the Russians are feared and distrusted, and their encroachment on Afghan territory is greatly resented. Some of the officials, however, appeared to be in favour of Russian help, for they said that if the English Government did not help the country there were others who would, and there were those who endeavoured to persuade the Amir into accepting Russian help.

About this time an Afghan general came in from the Russian frontier, and it was generally said that he brought with him two Russians, dressed like Afghan slave boys, of high family. Nothing was definitely known of this; but at the time it was said that these Russians were in Kabul, the Amir went to stop a week or two at his summer palace at Hindeki, some six miles south of the city, taking with him none but a few trusted officials and friends, and it was peremptorily ordered that while there he was to be left undisturbed, and no one but those who were sent for were to go to him. This general afterwards changed a large amount of Russian money in the city, and from that time Russian notes could be bought in the bazar, and as it was the first time since his accession to the throne that the Amir had stayed at Hindeki, or any other place except in the Arak stronghold, and as nothing definite was publicly known of what transpired, or indeed anything at all of what the Amir did while he was at Hindeki, it was all very unusual, for all that the Amir does, except when in his harem, is commonly known and discussed, and a good deal is known of what he does there.

It will be seen that the Amir’s position for some time after his succession was a difficult one, and there are still many elements of danger to be overcome. He has neither the experience nor self-reliance of his father, and what he may do in a critical time, or how he would emerge from the test of danger and adversity, cannot be forecast; but as the ingredients which go towards the making of anarchy and rebellion are not wanting in the country, time will probably give the answer.

Afghanistan is frequently described as a buffer state between India and Russia, but it is a buffer which the rolling forward of either power would readily crush. The bulk of the people are in a discontented condition, for with high taxation driving them from their lands to seek work as coolies, food yearly growing dearer, and epidemics common, it is likely enough that they would welcome any change as a change for the better, and until the Amir has a grasp on the people equal to that of his father, an invading power would not have an altogether combined Afghanistan to contend against, in spite of the Amir’s widely distributed pamphlets on Jihad.

The Amir, and those with him, rely a good deal on Jihad (religious war), which is to be preached by the mullahs in case an invading army crosses the frontier, and pamphlets on the subject have been printed and distributed all over the country. But as matters now stand, the people, although extremely fanatical, can hardly be relied on to fight very vigorously, or for any length of time. The army is supplied with modern field-guns, rifles, and ammunition, but, although of a modern pattern, they are few in number, and are not equal to those of other countries in range and accuracy. The army is also wholly untrained as compared with the troops of the two great powers on either side of them, and its officers have no more knowledge of modern warfare than the rank-and-file. It is only in the natural difficulties offered by the mountainous description of country to the effective movement of troops and transport of heavy guns that the Amir could hope to offer any serious opposition to an invading army, and it is unlikely that after the first stand made against the invader they would risk further battle. They would be more likely to resort to the guerilla methods common to them, cutting up small detachments and harassing the rear and lines of communication; but the larger the invading army, the less effective would these methods be.

As a means of keeping unruly tribes in order, the Afghans are best left to govern themselves. Their methods of quelling rebellion and disorder are more ruthless, and therefore more effective and lasting, for the description of people dealt with than are the humane methods of other people. Amir Abdur Rahman, after killing off the bulk of a nation (men, women, and children) for rebelling against his authority, has had the remainder transported to a distant part of the country, where, rid of former associations and by intermarriage with other people, they have lost their old traditions, and settled down quietly to the new order of things. Should the English (or other power) occupy the country, the cost of an army of occupation, which would be necessary to keep the people in order, would probably equal that of the Indian army, until a new generation had grown up, more adaptable and willing to accept the altered condition of affairs.