On this subject he frequently expressed himself, and persistently urged measures then untouched as the only means which would insure success. He said when he made known his plans to his always noble-hearted friend, Frederick Douglass, he gave him encouragement, adding that he was no soldier himself, but had given two sons to the war.
There were others to whom he made these measures known, though not the plans by which he intended placing them before the president, among them we find the names of John Jones, Esq., of Detroit, his colleague “in office,” Dr. Amos Aray, once associated with him, Mr. George Vosburg, a man of sterling worth among his people, Dr. Willis Revels, of Indianapolis, and others not unknown to fame.
In his zeal he endeavored to induce the leading politicians among the colored people to unite upon some settled policy by which they should be governed, and to this end he addressed a letter through a paper supported by them in New York, invoking a national convention of the representative men, for the purpose of defining their position in relation to the war; but it failed to meet the general approbation.
He saw the progress of the war producing contingencies, challenging policies, demanding of all some definite, immediate action. And the action of the president, apart from positive constitutional obligations, was based upon these. Under such circumstances, what need was most demanded was reliable, adequate means. These were best adapted to the desired end, and suggested by such as applied in person to the president.
He said, that “to wait upon the president at such a time to obtain anything from him could only be realized by having something, or plan, to offer the government, or it would be demonstrating an expression of Mr. Lincoln, with cap in hand, and ask, ‘Mr. President, what have you to give me?’ when the reply invariably was,’Sir, what have you to offer me?’”
He saw at one time one of the possible contingencies of the war was an indication of foreign intervention. The government had its own methods and measures of meeting this event; but, aside from this, any aid would be acceptable. Where could this be found? Could it be made available? and who will offer it? were questions of importance with the government.
In view of the menacing attitude presented by two of the greatest powers of the world, with a probability of others following them, he addressed a letter on the subject to the Anglo-African, setting forth what he considered the best measure to be adopted by the colored people to the interest of the country in the event of foreign intervention. Another and most momentous contingency he viewed from his stand-point was, the probability of the south calling the blacks to arms. This event, to every intelligent observer of the times, was from the first of as much importance to the government as that of foreign intervention. It was not least among the complicated problems awaiting the solution of the nation; for while all others might be met by the general usages and laws of war, diplomacy, and force of arms, the last could only be met by measures at once unprecedented, and peculiar to the method of meeting belligerents.
To present the means of meeting these ends was certainly of vast importance to the government.
Thus, in view of the threat of Jefferson Davis to arm the blacks, as slaves to fight for the establishment of a slave confederacy, he argued that some means should be devised in order to frustrate this design.
To many of the leading colored men of the North, and the old abolitionists, this was comparatively an easy task,—having originated that great scheme known as the Underground Railroad, which, for nearly forty years had baffled the comprehension of their foes—a scheme so well devised and skilfully conducted, that from one to forty were continually being passed out of every part of the far South to Texas, Massachusetts, and Canada.