Capt. Thomas A. Huguenin. From Johnson, The Defense of Charleston Harbor.
On November 6, the Confederate engineer at Fort Sumter reported the bombproofs (quarters) unhurt. Although the height of the mass of the fort was “diminishing visibly on the sides away from the city,” still, “when it gets down to the lower casemates [he wrote] it will have become so thick from accumulated debris as to resist further battering.” Two weeks later, Major Johnson found the fort stronger than ever, and casualties were “either among those carelessly exposing themselves, outside the bombproof, or obliged to do so when at work.” Indeed, casualties had been surprisingly low—only 2 men had been killed in the bombardment of August and only 22 more since the start of the second great bombardment; 118 had been wounded. Major Johnson did not “apprehend being run out by the big guns”; his chief anxiety was over “exposure to assault from barges at night.”
In mid-November such an attack seemed to be forthcoming. During the early hours of the 18th, the defenders of the fort had “four distinct alarms” as small boats approached within hailing distance; “all hands out each time and expecting a fight.” On the following night, a force estimated at 250 men approached within 300 yards of the fort, only to be driven off by the muskets of the aroused garrison.
But General Gillmore had merely ordered a “reconnaissance ... of the nature of a simulated attack, with a view to compel the garrison to show its strength.” Nor would he make another attempt. The next move remained up to the Navy.
Admiral Dahlgren continued to make no move. In any event, he could not advance until the repairs on the monitors were finished. As late as January 1864 these still were not complete. Meanwhile, in the face of reports of greatly strengthened harbor fortifications other than Fort Sumter, and increasingly concerned over the nature of the harbor obstructions, he was reluctant now to move forward without additional monitors. Defeat was always possible, and defeat for the Union’s “only ironclad squadron” might have serious consequences, not only for the blockade and Gillmore’s command on Morris Island, but for future operations elsewhere along the coast. In the meantime, “substantial” advantages had already been gained; the blockade at Charleston was tighter with Morris Island in Federal hands. To all this, the Navy Department agreed. Elsewhere, however, the war gathered momentum. In November, the North won decisively at Chattanooga.
The additional monitors, always promised, never seemed to arrive. On December 5, General Gillmore stopped the bombardment of Fort Sumter begun 41 days earlier. There seemed no great advantage in continuing, and it required considerable ammunition.
Stalemate—Spring of 1864
The general had made his last sustained effort against the fort. On only four other days in December did he fire any rounds at all. During the 4 months he remained in command the firing was intermittent, never more than “minor” in character. Meanwhile, forthcoming operations in Virginia required all the troops available. On May 1, 1864, General Gillmore departed for Fort Monroe with 18,000 picked men and quantities of valuable matériel.
General Grant’s operations required the services of the additional monitors awaited by Admiral Dahlgren. With the monitor force reduced to six by the foundering of the Weehawken in December, further offensive operations against Charleston seemed completely out of the question. In June, the ironclad frigate New Ironsides was withdrawn to the north.