ARCHIBALD WILLIAMS.
W.A. RICHARDSON.
By order No. 9 Colonel Taylor was also given command of the regular troops under orders for active service, viz.: Six companies of the Sixth Regiment Infantry, under the command of Major Riley, and the companies of the First Regiment Infantry from Fort Crawford, and Captain Harney’s Company of the First Infantry of the garrison of Fort Armstrong. Lieutenant Burbank,[[111]] Acting Quartermaster of the post, was ordered to store such clothing, provisions and stores as should be left by the troops under marching orders. Major Beall[[112]] was further charged with the safe-keeping of the three Indian prisoners then in confinement, which completed all arrangements for marching.
The volunteer army set out on the 10th and reached the Prophet’s village in the afternoon. Near that place the spies which Governor Reynolds had sent out on the 8th to reconnoiter and locate the enemy[[113]] met the army and reported that they had captured an Indian, who had truly informed them that Black Hawk was on Rock River, above Dixon’s Ferry, as had been previously reported. Disappointed at such a delay as the march to Black Hawk’s camp would incur, the men fired the Prophet’s village and burned every vestige of it–an act wholly unwarranted and useless. About twelve miles above the Prophet’s village the army camped, and, for reasons utterly inconceivable at this late day, decided to abandon all the cumbersome baggage and provisions and force a march to overtake the Indians. Whether the troops, who considered it part of their duty to dictate policies to their superior officers, clamored for such a move, or whether it emanated from the officer in command, has never been explained to this day, either in books or personal interviews had by the writer. Whiteside got all the blame for it, but I believe that his action was governed by pressure from the headstrong militia, who desired to accomplish too much in a limited time, and the passion of Governor Reynolds to manage the campaign to a rapid and glorious finish. It was an unfortunate act at best. Perishable property was piled up to waste, unprotected and regardless of future needs. With scarcely enough to last them in a forced march to another base, where abundance might await them, these impatient men marched into a wilderness where defeat might overtake them, with only rations enough to last for a period of three or four days. This criminal indiscretion was the first cause of dissatisfaction among the men. The commander should have known that those who urge the most haste have for all time been first to find fault when the first evidence of its indiscretion appears and at once vetoed the foolhardy move.
Whiteside was a famous old Indian fighter; brave as a lion and ready and eager at all times to meet an enemy; but he had never before handled a large body of men, and in this case at least it may be said that bravery alone was not an indisputable qualification for leadership. It rarely is. It later remained for James D. Henry, in a case almost forlorn, to terminate further moves like this injudicious one, and thereby end the war, as he did. After writing General Atkinson of the action, Governor Reynolds, with the troops, moved rapidly for Dixon’s Ferry, which was reached on the 12th, where James W. Stephenson, James M. Strode and others were found, all of whom stated that from scouts just returned it was ascertained beyond doubt that the Indians, who had fixed upon a point of rendezvous about thirty miles up the river, were at that time scattered over a large area, securing food, and in all probability recruits, and that an attempt to march against them would be useless at that moment. Governor Reynolds at once realized the force of the point and abandoned his projected attack and agreed to rest until Atkinson appeared, which he hoped would be very soon. The scouts sent out, and hereafter noticed, were sent to Shabbona’s village, and had it not been for the unfortunate action of Stillman, there probably had been no trouble in ending the campaign without loss of time or blood. But the country was covered with water, the ground was swampy and almost impassable to footmen, the river was high, and only by the most heroic efforts was it made possible to navigate the keel boats and Mackinaw boats upstream.[[114]] Men waded up to their middle to pull them along, and then only a snail pace could be accomplished. A change to the other side of the river was attempted, with no better results, and finally Atkinson was compelled to issue the following order:
“Headquarters, Right Wing, West. Dept.,
“Near Marie de Ogee, Rock River, 11th May, 1832.
“Order No. 15.