On the 18th, after ten days’ rations had been issued, Atkinson, by order No. 17, directed Whiteside to be in readiness to move up the river the following morning, while Col. Johnson was to remain with his battalion at Dixon’s as a corps of reserve until the return of the main army, which contemplated a movement after the Indians the following morning, or until further orders. Later in the day rumors of possible attacks caused Atkinson, for better security of the post, to order the company of Capt. James White to be in readiness to move to Fort Armstrong at any moment. The necessity for departure that day was not, however, apparent, but early the following morning the alarm along the frontier had grown to such proportions that not only was Capt. White ordered to proceed at once, but Capt. Seth Pratt’s company was added to the detail, under orders of Capt. White, to proceed at once down the river in the “large” keel boat with the sick and wounded, to report to Major Thomas J. Beall, then in command of Fort Armstrong, Major John Bliss being left at Dixon’s in charge of that post.
While many wild rumors were constantly afloat, no positive danger of attack was apprehended up to this time, but when a delegation of influential and reputable men from the settlements on the Fox and Du Page rivers met the army the following day, some distance up the river, and reported actual attacks and more in prospect, another order, No. 20, directed Col. Johnson, with Major Bailey and the four companies of Captains Covell, McClure, Pugh and Adams (then commanded by First Lieutenant Benjamin Briggs, who succeeded to the command), to proceed at once to those scenes, after first securing from Col. Taylor, while marching, two kegs of rifle powder and one hundred pounds of lead. This disposition left the three companies of Captains Eads, Barnes and Ball, under Lieut-Col. Stillman at Dixon’s Ferry.
To ascertain the route pursued by the Indians after Stillman’s defeat, a party composed of Elijah Iles and four others was ordered out. These men passed around the late camp a distance of eight or ten miles. A trail was found going in the direction of the Illinois River, which was followed some distance without results. The second night out they were alarmed by evidence which clearly proved the presence of Indians; pony tracks, leaves turned up by the feet of the ponies and other indisputable indications, which were followed by the sight of three Indians, evidently searching for them. These were eluded and the second night passed without event. Continuing the next morning a course down Rock River, Black Hawk’s late camp on that river was found about noon, deserted, with many canoes and other articles of Indian property left behind. Again striking out for the army, the little party reached it about night, when news of the murders at Indian Creek was received.
This scouting party learned that the trail toward the south was a ruse to divert the army from intercepting their march to the north, which the Indians covered with remarkable cleverness, a few of them going on to Indian Creek to participate in the murders, while the others returned north.[[132]]
On the 19th the army, ostensibly to pursue the Indians, moved twelve miles up the river from Dixon’s Ferry and there camped for the night. The following morning the march was resumed with more vigor, and by dark Stillman’s battlefield was reached almost simultaneously with an express bearing tidings of the murder of fifteen persons at the Davis settlement, twelve miles above Ottawa, on Indian Creek, which empties into the Fox about ten miles above its mouth. The effect of this staggering news was immediately to place the army in the best possible state of defense against attack, which might be made by the confederated tribes of Sacs, Foxes, Winnebagoes and Pottowatomies at any moment, as was then feared. Accordingly general order No. 21 was fulminated, and detachments were sent to Dixon’s Ferry and other points, as will be noticed hereafter:
“The order of encampment and the order of march observed by the mounted volunteers will be continued. Should the brigade be attacked in front on its march, the advance guard will, as far as practicable, maintain its ground until the line can be formed and come up to its assistance. Col. DeWitt and Col. Fry’s regiments will move up and form line to the front, 100 paces in rear of the advance guard and dismount; the regiments having been previously told off in squads of seven, the fourth man of each squad will take charge of the horses. The two regiments will then be formed on foot and advance to the attack. In an attack on the right flank, Col. DeWitt’s and Col. Fry’s regiments will form line on the right flank, with the battalion of spies on their right. In case of an attack in the rear, Col. Fry’s regiment, Col. James’ odd battalion, and Col. Thomas’ regiment will form line, facing to the rear.
“In the several formations directed, those regiments not named will remain in position, and be held in readiness to support the point of attack when ordered. Brig.-Gen. Whiteside will cause these dispositions for battle to be practiced as often as he may deem necessary. The piece of artillery will be brought into action as circumstances may require. Should the camp be attacked, they will be formed in front of their tents and in rear of the fires. The regiments thus posted will remain in their respective positions until otherwise directed by the commanding officer. The Spy Battalion will occupy the center of the camp, and be held in reserve, to be directed upon any point that may require support. At night, the fires will be made 40 yards in front of the line of tents; the guard will consist of four companies, one to be posted on the center of each front, 150 to 200 yards in advance. The sentinels will be posted at a proper distance, which will be varied according to the nature of the ground. If the guard should be attacked, it will maintain its position as long as practicable, and if forced to retire, will do so in good order under the direction of the officer of the day, who will instruct the guard when mounted as to its disposition in this event.
“By order of Brig-Gen. Atkinson.
“A.S. Johnston, A.-D.-C–A.A.A. Gen.”
This massacre was instigated by three of Black Hawk’s braves and executed by them with the assistance of about seventy disaffected Pottowatomies and Winnebagoes.[[133]]