Roman politics

by Frank Frost Abbott

3. On Constitutions

While it cannot be said that the constitutional development of England and of countries whose constitutions are like hers can be traced in all respects to Rome, it may be said with truth that the growth and character of their constitutions bear a strong resemblance to those of Rome, and that writers and political leaders, especially from the time of the French Revolution to our own day, have studied Roman political institutions and have applied the lessons drawn from their study to the political and constitutional questions of the day. In Rome under the Republic the people when they expressed their wish in the assembly were omnipotent, just as the decision of the English people voiced in Parliament is final. As it is in England, so in Rome the latest pronouncement of the popular will rendered null and void any previous enactment or statute in conflict with it. Rome had no formal written constitution any more than England has, but as in England such legal documents as Magna Charta, the Habeas Corpus Act, and the Parliament Act of 1911 are recognised as being more fundamental than the ordinary statute, so in Rome under the Republic the Laws of the Twelve Tables, the enactment that a citizen charged with a capital offence had the right of appealing to the people, and the principle that a lex, or action of the popular assembly, took precedence of a decree of the senate, were so embedded in tradition that no measure could be passed in violation of the principles underlying them. Under the Empire, however, we find a document which, so far as it goes, resembles somewhat a written constitution, viz., the “Law of Vespasian conferring the imperium.”[13] In this document we have a comprehensive and systematic recital of the fundamental rights, powers, and privileges of the Emperor. As we have just seen, Rome and England have not defined the functions of the several organs of the state and their relation to one another in a single document, with which all statutes, judicial decisions, and administrative acts must conform, to be valid, as the United States, France, Switzerland and most other modern nations have done. However, the laws, precedents, and customs which direct the public life of England and directed that of Rome in a sense make up their constitutions. Constitutions of this sort, as Bryce maintains in his Studies in History and Jurisprudence, are flexible. They bend but do not break under the temporary blasts of popular passion or emotion. They have grown up with the people and are part of the fibre of the people. Going back, as they do, into the past, they have the mystery and the dignity which antiquity gives them. The character of the Roman and of the English constitutions reflect the character of the two peoples and their likeness to each other. They bring out the practical qualities of the two nations, their respect for the past, and their ability to adapt their institutions to new conditions. One more point of similarity between Roman and Anglo-Saxon fundamental laws lies in the fact that both are concrete, and concern themselves little with political doctrines. Both peoples drove straight at specific abuses, without citing any principles of abstract right in justification of the proposed reform.

In one respect Roman government differed fundamentally from that of most modern states. The three functions of government which Montesquieu clearly recognized, the executive, legislative, and judicial, were not assigned to three different classes of officials with as much care as they are today. Of course this lack of differentiation is more noticeable in the early period than it is in the later, but it persists even into the Empire. The Senate, for instance, under the Empire not only legislated, but it nominally had the right to elect the Emperor and the magistrates, and also sat as a court to hear political charges made against members of the senatorial order. Although the threefold division of governmental powers was observed then only in part in the actual organization of the Roman state, it was recognized by Aristotle and by Cicero in their works on politics. The Greco-Roman doctrine on this subject was reaffirmed by Bodin and Locke, as Garner has pointed out in his Introduction to Political Science, before it was set forth as a fundamental principle of political organization in the Spirit of the Laws. The teachings of Montesquieu on this point became a part of the political philosophy of the French Revolution. In England Blackstone maintained, as Montesquieu had done, that there could be no public liberty when the right of making and enforcing the law was vested in the same man or the same body of men, or when the judicial power was not separated from the legislative and executive. The makers of the Constitution of the United States were profoundly influenced by Montesquieu and Blackstone, and probably no modern constitution exemplifies so well as does the American constitution the threefold division of powers recognized by Cicero. As the Supreme Court has said in one of its decisions: “It is believed to be one of the chief merits of the American system of written constitutional law that all powers entrusted to the government, whether state or national, are divided into three grand departments, the executive, the legislative and the judicial; that the functions appropriate to each of these branches of government shall be vested in a separate body of public servants, and that the perfection of the system requires that the lines which separate and divide these departments shall be broadly and clearly defined.”

If we should try to set down the valuable contributions which the Romans have made to modern political theory, or the achievements of the Romans which we may study with profit, or the political qualities in them which we may imitate to advantage, or the important political principles or institutions which we have inherited from them, we should think of the doctrines of popular sovereignty, of the equality and brotherhood of man, of the practical proof which they have given us of the value of a flexible constitution, of their teachings concerning the theory of the state, and of their introduction of the historical method of studying political institutions. Of all these contributions to modern civilization we have already spoken. We should also think of their devotion to the state, of their regard for law and tradition, of their wise opportunism which made their political thinking practical and concrete, of their development of a marvellous body of civil law, of their careful observance of the principle of local self-government, with its acceptance of local institutions and practices, and of their success in promoting law and order and a feeling of social solidarity, in improving material conditions throughout the world, and in governing and civilizing backward peoples. This is a long list, but in all these respects the political acumen of the Romans was noteworthy, and their achievements either lie at the basis of modern civilization, as we shall see, or may furnish us guidance in our political development. In our discussion of the different branches of the government, and of various fields of political activity, we shall have occasion to take up in detail many of these points which have not yet been mentioned.

4. The Legislative and Executive Branches of Government

i. RESEMBLANCES BETWEEN ANCIENT AND MODERN

It may be convenient at the outset to compare some of the characteristics of the legislative branch of the Roman government with those of modern parliaments. The Roman method of legislating was very similar in its essential features to that followed by the states of this Union which freely use the initiative and referendum.[14] These two political devices come to us of course from Switzerland. One or both of them in their present form may be traced to Rousseau’s opposition to representative government and to his advocacy of the doctrine of popular sovereignty. But traces of the referendum may be found in certain Swiss cities long before Rousseau’s day, and the legislative principle which underlies it may possibly be an inheritance from Roman times, preserved through the Middle Ages in the independent Italian cities. Where the referendum prevails, an elected assembly, the Legislature in our states and the Greater Council in the Swiss cantons, is set over against the whole body of citizens, voting in this country in their home towns, or in Switzerland at some central point. Either legislative organization may initiate legislation, and in practice most proposals originate in the elected body, from which important or controversial matters are referred to the people. Popular action overrides that of the chosen body. The people may not amend a proposal, but must vote “Yes” or “No” upon it. This is an exact description of the relation of the Roman senate to the popular assembly under the Republic. The ancient system had the merits and defects which we see in its modern counterpart. The assembly of the people helped to preserve the rights of the democracy and gave expression to popular aspirations. The aristocratic body, being made up of experienced politicians and administrative officials, was better qualified to deal with technical questions and foreign affairs, and the relative importance of the two legislative organizations varied from one period to another according to the predominance of the one set of questions or the other. Naturally the problems arising out of long-continued wars increased the prestige of the Roman Senate, just as its exclusive right to approve treaties of peace with the Central European States has enhanced the authority of the American Senate at the expense of the Lower House. We noticed above that a few important matters were reserved to the Roman popular assembly. One of these was the declaration of an offensive war. Now in the last two or three years in casting about for some means to avert future wars, it has been proposed to take the right of declaring war from the Congress and to submit the question in each case to the people. This proposal has been made partly in the belief that the people who must bear the brunt of a war will lean toward peace. If we may draw an inference from the attitude of the Roman people, this conclusion is unfounded. Professor Tenney Frank in his Roman Imperialism has shown that the great war with Pyrrhus, the First Punic War, and perhaps the Jugurthine War were forced on Rome by the democracy against the desire and the judgment of the Senate. The Senate knew better than the people what sacrifices of blood and treasure such wars would mean.[15]

In one of the chapters of his book on Society and Politics in Ancient Rome the present writer has attempted a comparison between the Roman Senate and the Senate of the United States.[16] The Roman Senate was, and our Senate is, engaged in a struggle with the executive and with another legislative body more popular than itself for the control of the state. The life terms of Roman senators and the comparatively long terms of our own senators put them largely beyond the reach of popular sentiment, and give them a feeling of security in their positions. The long and honorable tradition of both bodies and their esprit de corps strengthen this sense of security. Roman senators showed for one another the same senatorial courtesy which has become a byword with us. An element of strength in both organizations is the absence, as a rule, of clôture. A measure submitted by an executive may easily be talked to death or amended so as to bear slight resemblance to the original proposal, if there is little or no limitation on debate. But two powers in particular, enjoyed by both bodies, would give any legislative organization an excellent means of controlling public policy and of directing the administration of public affairs. I mean the right to confirm important appointments and to be consulted in the settlement of foreign affairs. What a tremendous influence the Senate of the United States can exert through its right to participate in the management of foreign affairs we have seen illustrated within the last few years, and, as we have noticed in Chapter I, the Roman Senate held the same position of advantage. Just as our senators control in large measure the appointment to important offices, so the Roman Senate rewarded with lucrative posts in the provinces the politicians who supported its policies, and punished leaders like Caesar who opposed it, with provinces “of forests and marshes.” It may be added also that, as has been observed in Chapter I, the Roman Senate was made up of former administrative officials who were familiar from past experience with the questions which came before it, and the Romans did not have the two-party system, which strengthens the hands of a government in Anglo-Saxon countries. It is not strange, therefore, that in course of time the Roman Senate reduced the magistrate to the position of its minister, and that its policy became his policy. As in most modern countries, the members of the government attended the meetings of the legislative body and voted in it. It is interesting to bear the fact in mind that we have felt in the United States the unfortunate results which arise in the making of laws from the lack of close coöperation between the legislative and executive branches of our government, and it has been proposed lately to adopt the Roman practice to the extent of allowing members of the Cabinet to attend meetings of the Congress, without giving them the right to vote.

ii. DIFFERENCES BETWEEN ANCIENT AND MODERN

We have been speaking of points of resemblance between the Roman Senate and the Senate of the United States. Some striking points of difference between its procedure and that of modern legislative chambers should be mentioned. A member of our Senate or House of Representatives, if he were summoned to a meeting of the Roman Senate, would be as astonished at the lack of parliamentary machinery, as was the Connecticut Yankee of Mark Twain’s story at the lack of labor-saving devices in the court of King Arthur. He would find no fixed order of business, no quorum ordinarily required, no committees to collect facts and make recommendations, motions not put in writing, and no minutes kept. He would be still more astounded to find three or four mutually exclusive motions before the house at the same time, from which the presiding officer was allowed to make his choice. Yet no legislative body has left behind it such a marvellous record of business-like achievement as the Roman Senate has. This fact may well lead us to ask the question whether the elaborate procedure and the complicated parliamentary rules which our legislative bodies follow are necessary for the expeditious transaction of business. This is not to say that the Roman method could be adopted out of hand today. That was a matter of growth, but it may at least suggest that it would be possible and wise for us to simplify our procedure. Many of the practices peculiar to the Roman Senate may be explained out of its history. Although it is the most famous legislative body known, in theory it was not a legislative body at all. It was in its origin only the Advisory Council, or consilium, of the chief magistrate. Its members were merely the experienced old men whose advice the king, and later the consul, sought. When he needed counsel he called them together, and asked their opinions, following naturally the order of age and eminence. In its outward forms the circumstances of its origin were never forgotten. The Senate never met unless the magistrate called it together. The business of the day was laid before it by the presiding officer. Its members were not expected to give their opinions until he asked them, and the presiding officer who was asking advice could naturally pick out the proposal which seemed to him wisest and ask the judgment on it of the other members, and it was the traditional practice to make these proposals orally.